A cooperative game theory of noncontiguous Allies

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 391-411

  Daniel, G ^a   Arce, M ^a   Sandler, Todd ^b  

^a RHODES COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037500270     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00075     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. CONYBEARE, J. A. C., and TODD SANDLER (1990) The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance 1880-1914: A collective goods approach, American Political Science Review, 84, 1197-1206.
2. EICHBERGER, J. (1993) Game Theory for Economists. San Diego: Academic Press.
3. GARDNER, R. (1995) Games for Business and Economics. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
4. JAMES, P. (1988) Crisis and War. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
5. LUCE, R. D., and H. RAIFFA (1957) Games and Decisions. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
6. MASCHLER, M., B. PELEG, and L. S. SHAPLEY (1979) Geometric properties of the kernel, nucleolus, and related solution concepts, Mathematics of Operations Research, 4, 303-338.
7. MICHTA, A., (ed. (1999) America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
8. MORROW, J. D. (1991) Alliances and asymmetry: An alternative to the capability aggregation model of alliances, American Journal of Political Science, 35, 904-913.
9. MOULIN, H. (1988) Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. MOULIN, H. (1995) Cooperative Microeconomics. A Game-Theoretic Introduction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
11. MURDOCH, J. C., and T. SANDLER (1982) A theoretical and empirical analysis of NATO, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26, 237-263.
12. MURDOCH, J. C., and T. SANDLER (1984), Complementarity, free riding, and the military expenditures of NATO allies, Journal of Public Economics, 25, 83-101.
13. OLSON, M., and R. ZECKHAUSER (1966) An economic theory of alliances, Review of Economics and Statistics, 48, 266-279.
14. RAWLS, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
15. SANDLER, T. (1977) Impurity of defense: An application to the economics of alliances, Kyklos, 30, 443-460.
16. SANDLER, T. (1999) Alliance formation, alliance expansion and the core, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43, 727-747.
17. SANDLER, T., and J. CAULEY (1975) On the economic theory of alliances, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19, 330-348.
18. SANDLER, T., and K. HARTLEY (1999) The Political Economy of NATO: Past Present, and into the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19. SANDLER, T., and K. HARTLEY (2000) Economics of alliances: The lessons for collective action, manuscript.
20. SCHMEIDLER, D. (1969) The nucleolus of a characteristic function game, SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 17, 1163-1170.
21. SHAPLEY, L. S. (1953) Value of n-person games; in Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. 2. H. W. KUHN and A. W. TUCKER, eds., 307-317. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
22. THIES, W. J. (1987) Alliances and collective goods: A reappraisal, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3, 298-332.
23. TULKENS, H. (1979) An economic model of international negotiations relating to transfrontier pollution; in Communication and Control in Society, K. KRIPPENDORFF, ed., 199-212, New York: Gordon and Breach.
24. VAN YPERSELE DE STRIHOU, J. (1967) Sharing the defense burden among Western allies, Review of Economics and Statistics, 49, 527-536.