Corporate governance, investment bandwagons and overcapacity: An analysis of the worldwide petrochemical industry, 1975-95

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 349-373

  Henderson, James ^a   Cool, Karel ^b  

^a BABSON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b INSEAD   (France)

Author keywords

Capacity expansion; Corporate governance; Overinvestment

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INVESTMENTS; MANAGERS; PETROCHEMICALS; PETROLEUM INDUSTRY;

CAPACITY EXPANSION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0037380327     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.302     Document Type: Article

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