Limited commitment and crowding out of private transfers: Evidence from a randomised experiment

Economic Journal

Volumn 113, Issue 486, 2003, Pages

  Albarran, Pedro ^a   Attanasio, Orazio P ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INCOME; INSURANCE SYSTEM; RURAL ECONOMY; RURAL PLANNING; WELFARE PROVISION;

MEXICO;

EID: 0037357061     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00112     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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