About market structure

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 240-251

  Kultti, Klaus ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Auctions; Market structure; Matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037288493     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1094-2025(02)00016-9     Document Type: Review

References (13)

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