The Influence of Reasons on Interpretations of Probability Forecasts

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 107-126

  Flugstad, Annette R ^a   Windschitl, Paul D ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^b The University of Iowa   (United States)

Author keywords

Evaluability; Forecasts; Optimism; Probability; Reasons; Risk perception

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037262356     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.437     Document Type: Article

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