Nontariff barriers and trade liberalization

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 80-97

  Anderson, Simon P ^a   Schmitt, Nicolas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037261225     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ei/41.1.80     Document Type: Article

References (41)

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