Workouts, court-supervised reorganization and the choise between private and public debt

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 233-269

  Hege, Ulrich ^a  

^a HEC PARIS   (France)

Author keywords

Absolute priority rule; Chapter II; Private and public debt; Reorganization law; Workouts

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037236331     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0929-1199(02)00002-0     Document Type: Review

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