Debt restructuring with multiple creditors and the role of exchange offers

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 305-336

  Detragiache, Enrica ^a   Garella, Paolo G ^b  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030194478     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.1996.0017     Document Type: Article

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