Contextual deontic logic: Normative agents, violations and independence

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 37, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 33-63

  Van Der Torre, Leendert ^a  

^a VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037209531     PISSN: 10122443     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020207321544     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (83)

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