Lotteries, sunspots, and incentive constraints

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 107, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 39-69

  Kehoe, Timothy J ^a,b   Levine, David K ^c   Prescott, Edward C ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036867613     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2792     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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