Non-contractible investments and vertical integration in the Mexican footwear industry

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 8, 2002, Pages

  Woodruff, Christopher ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Property rights; Theory of the firm; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036823507     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(01)00085-6     Document Type: Article

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