Stakhanovism and the Soviet economy

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 54, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 867-903

  Davies, R W ^a,b   Khlevnyuk, Oleg ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC HISTORY; ECONOMIC POLICY; LABOR PRODUCTIVITY;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 0036746048     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0966813022000008447     Document Type: Article

References (151)

1. The authors are grateful for their comments to the participants in the conference on 'Stalin's Politburo, 1928-1953', held in the European University Institute, Florence, 30-31 March 2000, and in the Work Group on the same topic held in the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, in August 2001. Our research was supported by the British Economic and Social Research Council (grant no. R 000 237388, project on 'The Soviet Politburo and Economic Decision-Making and Development in the Stalin Era'). Note that throughout this article we have used official statistics. These overestimate the rate of growth of capital investment, production and labour productivity (but not wages). They do, however, adequately indicate relative changes in and between different sectors.
2. F. Benvenuti, Fuoco sui sabotatori!: Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934-38 (Rome, 1988); F. Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism and Stalinism, 1934-8', CREES Discussion Paper SIPS No. 30, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, UK, 1989; L. H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge, 1988); D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: the Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (London, 1986); E. A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 (London and Basingstoke, 1995); M. Buckley, 'Was Rural Stakhanovism a Movement?', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 2, 1999, pp. 299-314. One of the present authors has examined the relation between Stakhanovism, the anti-sabotage campaign and the political repression of 1936-38 (O. Khlevniuk, In Stalin's Shadow: the Career of 'Sergo' Ordzhonikidze (New York, 1995)).
3. F. Benvenuti, Fuoco sui sabotatori!: Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934-38 (Rome, 1988); F. Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism and Stalinism, 1934-8', CREES Discussion Paper SIPS No. 30, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, UK, 1989; L. H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge, 1988); D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: the Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (London, 1986); E. A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 (London and Basingstoke, 1995); M. Buckley, 'Was Rural Stakhanovism a Movement?', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 2, 1999, pp. 299-314. One of the present authors has examined the relation between Stakhanovism, the anti-sabotage campaign and the political repression of 1936-38 (O. Khlevniuk, In Stalin's Shadow: the Career of 'Sergo' Ordzhonikidze (New York, 1995)).
4. F. Benvenuti, Fuoco sui sabotatori!: Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934-38 (Rome, 1988); F. Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism and Stalinism, 1934-8', CREES Discussion Paper SIPS No. 30, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, UK, 1989; L. H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge, 1988); D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: the Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (London, 1986); E. A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 (London and Basingstoke, 1995); M. Buckley, 'Was Rural Stakhanovism a Movement?', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 2, 1999, pp. 299-314. One of the present authors has examined the relation between Stakhanovism, the anti-sabotage campaign and the political repression of 1936-38 (O. Khlevniuk, In Stalin's Shadow: the Career of 'Sergo' Ordzhonikidze (New York, 1995)).
5. F. Benvenuti, Fuoco sui sabotatori!: Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934-38 (Rome, 1988); F. Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism and Stalinism, 1934-8', CREES Discussion Paper SIPS No. 30, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, UK, 1989; L. H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge, 1988); D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: the Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (London, 1986); E. A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 (London and Basingstoke, 1995); M. Buckley, 'Was Rural Stakhanovism a Movement?', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 2, 1999, pp. 299-314. One of the present authors has examined the relation between Stakhanovism, the anti-sabotage campaign and the political repression of 1936-38 (O. Khlevniuk, In Stalin's Shadow: the Career of 'Sergo' Ordzhonikidze (New York, 1995)).
6. F. Benvenuti, Fuoco sui sabotatori!: Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934-38 (Rome, 1988); F. Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism and Stalinism, 1934-8', CREES Discussion Paper SIPS No. 30, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, UK, 1989; L. H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge, 1988); D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: the Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (London, 1986); E. A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 (London and Basingstoke, 1995); M. Buckley, 'Was Rural Stakhanovism a Movement?', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 2, 1999, pp. 299-314. One of the present authors has examined the relation between Stakhanovism, the anti-sabotage campaign and the political repression of 1936-38 (O. Khlevniuk, In Stalin's Shadow: the Career of 'Sergo' Ordzhonikidze (New York, 1995)).
7. F. Benvenuti, Fuoco sui sabotatori!: Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934-38 (Rome, 1988); F. Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism and Stalinism, 1934-8', CREES Discussion Paper SIPS No. 30, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, UK, 1989; L. H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge, 1988); D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: the Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (London, 1986); E. A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 (London and Basingstoke, 1995); M. Buckley, 'Was Rural Stakhanovism a Movement?', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 2, 1999, pp. 299-314. One of the present authors has examined the relation between Stakhanovism, the anti-sabotage campaign and the political repression of 1936-38 (O. Khlevniuk, In Stalin's Shadow: the Career of 'Sergo' Ordzhonikidze (New York, 1995)).
8. F. Benvenuti, Fuoco sui sabotatori!: Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934-38 (Rome, 1988); F. Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism and Stalinism, 1934-8', CREES Discussion Paper SIPS No. 30, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, UK, 1989; L. H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge, 1988); D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: the Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (London, 1986); E. A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 (London and Basingstoke, 1995); M. Buckley, 'Was Rural Stakhanovism a Movement?', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 2, 1999, pp. 299-314. One of the present authors has examined the relation between Stakhanovism, the anti-sabotage campaign and the political repression of 1936-38 (O. Khlevniuk, In Stalin's Shadow: the Career of 'Sergo' Ordzhonikidze (New York, 1995)).
9. Mikoyan wrote in his memoirs that 'Molotov as chairman of Sovnarkom felt responsible for preserving proportions in the economy and, in particular, was very concerned to maintain the stability of our currency, to reduce the losses of economic organisations and to seek sources of profit'. According to Mikoyan, 'he was under the strong influence of the People's Commissar for Finance Grin'ko; Grin'ko was an intelligent man, well-trained, and had a good grasp of questions relating to his commissariat.' A. Mikoyan, Tak eto bylo (Moscow, 1999), p. 520.
10. See the Gosplan estimates for investment and investment costs in 1933-37 (dated 11 May 1938) in Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (henceforth RGAE), 4372/92/101, 73-76. In 1934 building costs were planned to decline by 15% (see E. Zaleski, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933-1952 (London and Basingstoke, 1980), p. 660), while the costs of capital equipment remained approximately stable (building costs amounted to two-thirds of all investment costs).
11. See the Gosplan estimates for investment and investment costs in 1933-37 (dated 11 May 1938) in Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (henceforth RGAE), 4372/92/101, 73-76. In 1934 building costs were planned to decline by 15% (see E. Zaleski, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933-1952 (London and Basingstoke, 1980), p. 660), while the costs of capital equipment remained approximately stable (building costs amounted to two-thirds of all investment costs).
12. For this memorandum see RGAE, 4372/33/122, ll. 250-248. The figure of 2050 million rubles was taken from the five-year plan directives presented to the XVII party congress in January 1934. The published plan (approved in November 1934) gave 2025 million rubles (Vtoroi pyatiletnii plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistya SSSR (1933-1937 gg.) (Moscow, 1934), (i, l. 718). The figure eventually allocated was 1565 million rubles (in current prices) (RGAE, 7297/28/71, l. 5). These figures include iron ore but not the coking-chemical industry.
13. See Promyshlennost' SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1957), p. 105.
14. Memorandum in the Gosplan files addressed to Kviring, a deputy chairman of Gosplan, dated 20 July 1934 (RGAE, 4372/33/122, ll. 190-189).
15. RGAE, 4372/33/122, l. 149 (dated 20 July 1934).
16. See previous note.
17. See M. Harrison & R. W. Davies, The Soviet Military-economic Effort in the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937)', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 3, 1997, pp. 380, 384.
18. This view was supported by Litvinov in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and by Tukhachevsky and his associates in the Red Army. On 31 March an article by Tukhachevsky in Pravda, entitled The War Plans of Nazi Germany', presented an alarming account of German rearmament; the article was corrected and endorsed by Stalin. For Stalin's corrections see Izvestiya TsK, 1990, 1, pp. 160-170.
19. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (henceforth GARF), 5446/1/480, ll. 29-61 (Sovnarkom decree, art. 149/19ss).
20. For these developments see Rees, p. 103 and ch. 5 passim.
21. For the most substantial increase in defence investment see Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (formerly RTsKhIDNI) (henceforth RGASPI), 17/162/18, l. 44 (art. 118, dated 22 May); for the decision about the size of the army, see RGASPI, 17/162/18, ll. 24, 35-37 (art. 102).
22. RGASPI, 17/162/18 (art. 172, dated 22 April 1935).
23. See Vtoroi, i, pp. 718-719.
24. GARF, 5446/16/3049, ll. 1, 9, 12-14. Republican and local education authorities requested an increase in investment by 67 million rubles in 1935, and on 10 May Sovnarkom allocated an additional 16.5 million rubles.
25. GARF, 5446/26/66, l. 266. We have not so far found a decision of the Politburo or Sovnarkom requiring a specific reduction of retail prices in 1936.
26. See the entries for 21 July (Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1995, 3, p. 172).
27. Pis'ma I. V. Stalina V. M. Molotovu, 1925-1936gg.: sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 1995), pp. 249-250.
28. RGASPI, 558/11/769, ll. 159-160.
29. GARF, 5446/26/66, ll. 264-266.
30. RGASPI, 17/3/969, ll. 1, 31-36. The Politburo decision was promulgated as a Sovnarkom decree on the same day (GARF, 5446/1/482, l. 92).
31. Pis'ma Stalina Molotovu, p. 251.
32. RGASPI, 558/11/769, ll. 162-163.
33. RGASPI, 17/163/1072, ll. 166-167.
34. Stalin, Sochineniya, xiii (Moscow, 1951), p. 186.
35. Pravda, 27 December 1935.
36. Narodno-khozyaistvennyi plan na 1935 god (Moscow, 1935) (henceforth Plan 1935), p. 301.
37. Narodnokhozyaistvennyi plan na 1936 god (2nd edn, Moscow, 1936) (henceforth Plan 1936), pp. 269, 280.
38. Vtoroi, i, pp. 429, 434-135.
39. Plan 1935, pp. 443, 451.
40. See Filtzer, p. 210.
41. Za industrializatsiyu (henceforth ZI), 29 December 1935 (speech of Andreev to December 1935 plenum of party central committee).
42. Filtzer, chapter 8, gives a detailed account of the variety of devices by which norms were accommodated to the political, social and economic circumstances of the factories.
43. Pravda, 6 May 1935; Stalin, Sochineniya, xiv (US edn, 1967), p. 63. Note that the Russian word 'tekhnika', which we have inadequately translated here as 'technology', means not only technical methods but also productive capital, machinery.
44. Pravda, 6 May 1935; Stalin, Sochineniya, xiv (US edn, 1967), p. 63. Note that the Russian word 'tekhnika', which we have inadequately translated here as 'technology', means not only technical methods but also productive capital, machinery.
45. See for example his call for an increase in the efficiency of blast furnaces in January 1934 and his emphasis on the need to use coal mining equipment more intensively in January 1935 (S. Ordzhonikidze, Stat'i i rechi, ii (Moscow, 1957), pp. 545-546, 585-587, 619-620, 632-634).
46. RGAE, 7297/138/77, ll. 120-122. Birman was at this time director of the Petrovsky iron and steel works. For the 'negotiations' at the Congress of Soviets on 31 January, at which Birman agreed to 1.15 in a public discussion with Ordzhonikidze, see Ordzhonikidze, pp. 632-633.
47. See Rees, pp. 114-118.
48. See ibid., pp. 119-120.
49. Ordzhonikidze, pp. 545-546.
50. Ibid., pp. 619-620.
51. RGAE, 7297/38/175, l. 273 (report to conference on the coal, oil, chemical and metallurgical industries, attended by participants in central committee plenum, 26 December 1935).
52. See Rees, p. 123.
53. RGASPI, 558/11/743, ll. 29-36.
54. Stalin was in Sochi, Ordzhonikidze on the northern side of the mountains in Kislovodsk and Zheleznovodsk.
55. Owing to the large number of aircraft disasters, the top leaders were not permitted to travel by air.
56. RGASPI, 85/29/119, l. 114.
57. See Siegelbaum, pp. 70-71.
58. RGASPI, 85/29/460, ll. 2-3, published in Sovetskoe rukovodstvo: perepiska, 1928-1941 (1999), pp. 310-311. Tel'nykh was the record-breaker in the Donbass praised by Ordzhonikidze the previous January (see above).
59. Cited by Kaganovich in Pervoe Vsesoyuznoe soveshchanie rabochikh i rabotnits - stakhanovtsev, 14-17 noyabrya 1935: stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1935), p. 189. For other aspects of this speech see Rees, p. 122.
60. Cited by Kaganovich in Pervoe Vsesoyuznoe soveshchanie rabochikh i rabotnits - stakhanovtsev, 14-17 noyabrya 1935: stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1935), p. 189. For other aspects of this speech see Rees, p. 122.
61. Pravda, 22 November 1935; Stalin, Sochineniya, xiv, pp. 80, 87-88.
62. Pravda, 22 November 1935; Stalin, Sochineniya, xiv, pp. 80, 87-88.
63. Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism ...', p. 24.
64. See his exchange with Artyukhov, head of the Gorlovka mine (Pervoe, p. 47).
65. Pervoe, pp. 108, 133.
66. See also Zhdanov on some Leningrad factories (ibid., p. 299).
67. However, the independent-minded Tochinsky insisted, contradicting Ordzhonikidze, that the major iron and steel works at Enakievo was not ready to fulfil the five-year plan in four years ; Ordzhonikidze in reply asserted that the iron and steel plan would be 'considerably exceeded' in four years (ibid., pp. 150, 318).
68. Ibid., p. 281. The comment on Stalin evidently referred to his speech of 4 May (see above).
69. Ibid., p. 324.
70. See GARF, 5446/33/71, ll. 48-49, reporting the initial Sovnarkom proposals of 7 September and the Gosplan upward revision of 14 September; GARF, 5446/1/483, l. 34, where Sovnarkom on 16 September accepted the new proposals with minor changes; and RGASPI, 17/163/1080, ll. 109-110, where the Politburo approved further increases on Molotov's proposal - these were incorporated in a Sovnarkom decree of 26 September.
71. RGASPI, 85/29/129, l. 9.
72. RGASPI, 85/29/129, l. 9 (Ordzhonikidze's personal file; the same speech appears in the Orgburo papers: RGASPI, 17/114/741, ll. 103-112). Ordzhonikidze's percentage fulfilments evidently refer to increased production compared with 1935, as 1935 production was 26% above 1934 production, and only a few percentage points above the 1935 plan. The production of crude steel in fact reached 16.2 million tons in 1936, slightly above the plan approved in December 1935.
73. See S. Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941 (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 32-34.
74. See Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism ...', pp. 31-32; RGAE, 7297/38/180, ll. 93-283.
75. These issues are extensively discussed in Khlevniuk; Filtzer, chapter 7; R. Thurston in J. A. Getty & R. T. Manning (eds), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 142-160, as well as in Benvenuti and Siegelbaum.
76. The telegram was dated 12 September.
77. Stalin, Sochineniya, xiv, p. 98.
78. GARF, 8131/37/58, ll. 20-21.
79. RGASPI, 17/163/1086, ll. 60, 61-63. The resolution was approved by poll, with the signatures of Stalin, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze, Mikoyan and Kaganovich; Voroshilov, Chubar' and Andreev informed the secretary of their approval.
80. GARF, 8131/37/58, ll. 89-90, 99.
81. GARF, 5446/26/49, l. 277. Chubar' was a deputy chairman of Sovnarkom under Molotov.
82. GARF, 8131/37/58, ll. 32-34.
83. RGASPI, 73/1/141, l. 205.
84. RGASPI, 73/1/141, l. 241.
85. See Filtzer, p. 204.
86. Pravda, 29 December 1935.
87. RGASPI, 17/2/561, l. 32.
88. Pravda, 27 December 1935.
89. Pravda, 26 December 1935.
90. For this conference see Khlevnyukin E. A. Rees (ed.), Decision-Making in the Stalinist Command Economy, 1932-37 (London and Basingstoke, 1997), p. 120; Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism ...', pp. 75-76. This was a conference of participants in the plenum concerned with the coal, oil, chemical and metallurgical industries. The report of its proceedings appears, in somewhat different versions, in ZI, 31 December 1935; RGASPI, 85/29/114; and RGAE, 7297/38/175, ll. 46-275.
91. For this conference see Khlevnyukin E. A. Rees (ed.), Decision-Making in the Stalinist Command Economy, 1932-37 (London and Basingstoke, 1997), p. 120; Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism ...', pp. 75-76. This was a conference of participants in the plenum concerned with the coal, oil, chemical and metallurgical industries. The report of its proceedings appears, in somewhat different versions, in ZI, 31 December 1935; RGASPI, 85/29/114; and RGAE, 7297/38/175, ll. 46-275.
92. Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism ...', ll. 35, 40.
93. RGASPI, 17/163/1092, l. 23.
94. RGASPI, 17/163/1092, l. 70.
95. See Siegelbaum, pp. 200-201.
96. Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), 3/26/19, l. 80.
97. RGASPI, 17/114/741, ll. 77-86. An article by K. I. Bukharin in ZI (the newspaper of Narkomtyazhprom), 6 April 1936, condemned the inflated reports of Stakhanovite successes in Urals factories.
98. RGASPI, 17/114/741, ll. 65-73.
99. RGASPI, 17/114/741, ll. 103-112; the same materials are in Ordzhonikidze's files: RGASPI, 85/29/129, ll. 6-9.
100. RGASPI, 17/114/604, ll. 48-50.
101. For examples of prosecutions at this time see Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism ...', pp. 40-42.
102. For Krylenko's memorandum and an account of Vyshinsky's comments see Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, pp. 328-330.
103. Sovetskaya yustitsiya, 1936, 5, cited in Siegelbaum, p. 202.
104. Sovetskaya yustitsiya, 1936, 5, cited in Siegelbaum, p. 202.
105. See Siegelbaum, l. 203.
106. These events are extensively described in Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism ...', pp. 42-49, and in Siegelbaum, pp. 127-135.
107. These events are extensively described in Benvenuti, 'Stakhanovism ...', pp. 42-49, and in Siegelbaum, pp. 127-135.
108. APRF, 3/22/150, p. 129.
109. RGASPI, 558/11/93, ll. 135-136; 81/3/101, ll. 77-79. The original item appeared in Izvestiya, 29 August, so Kaganovich was quick off the mark.
110. RGASPI, 558/11/93, l. 126; 17/3/980, l. 79.
111. RGASPI, 17/2/572, ll. 34ob., 35.
112. RGAE, 4372/92/63, ll. 210-225.
113. RGASPI, 17/3/979, ll. 56-59. These proposals were embodied in a joint central committee and Sovnarkom decree: GARF, 5446/1/487, ll. 114-122 (art. 1282/236s). See also Rees (ed.), pp. 57-58 (Davies & Khlevnyuk).
114. GARF, 5446/20/1916, ll. 51-52.
115. GARF, 5446/20a/371, ll. 108-117.
116. GARF, 5446/20a/371, ll. 84-107.
117. RGASPI, 558/11/778, ll. 118.
118. GARF, 5446/1/488, ll. 198-204 (art. 2075/403s).
119. See Plan 1937, pp. 7-40 (decree of TsIK and Sovnarkom); the production figures are on pp. 42-45, the investment figures on pp. 142-143.
120. Ibid., p. 11.
121. These data cannot be taken at their face value as an accurate measure of more efficient use of capital. We need to investigate how far the increased performance was due to the installation of more and improved capital. How far was the better performance of locomotives and wagons due not to their more efficient use but to the greatly increased supply in these years of rolling stock and rails, which relieved the pressure on the system? How far were the improved indicators of iron and steel plant due to the increased proportion of more advanced and larger furnaces? A further question to be untangled is how far the more intensive use of equipment led to its more rapid deterioration. If the equipment did deteriorate, was the more intensive use economically justified?
122. See the monthly data in Osnovnye pokazateli vypolneniya narodno-khozyaistvennogo plana 1935 and in the monthly Osnovnyepokazateli, January-November 1935. It may be calculated from these data that in 1935 the number of accidents was: Group I accidents (major) Group II accidents January-December 1935 5801 14358 (monthly average) September 5061 15313 October 6589 18357 November 7145 19870 December 7682 22833
123. Osnovnye pokazateli, January 1936, p. 90.
124. See Osnovnye pokazateli, January, February, March and April 1936.
125. M. G. Clark, The Economics of Soviet Steel (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 253-255, a study which has not been superseded after nearly half a century. We might also call it 'Ordzhonikidze's dilemma' ...
126. It is safe to assume that the impact of Stakhanovism was small in September 1935, the first month after Stakhanov's feat.
127. GARF, 8131/37/72, ll. 237-239 (no date). Accidents in the coal industry of the Donbass increased from 28 390 to 31 864 (deaths increased from 235 to 261); accidents in the iron and steel industry of the Donbass and Dnepropetrovsk increased from 7167 to 7799.
128. Sovet pri narodnom komissare tyazheloi promyshlennosti SSSR, 25-29 iyunya 1936 g.: stenograficheikii otchet (Moscow, 1936).
129. RGASPI, 558/11/769, ll. 162-163. All rationing of food was abolished on 1 October 1935, and of industrial consumer goods on 1 January 1936 (see Oleg Khlevnyuk & R. W. Davies, 'The End of Rationing in the Soviet Union, 1934-1935', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 4, 1999, pp. 587, 592).
130. See Plan 1935, pp. 442-443, 637, and Zaleski, pp. 550, 562.
131. See Plan 1935, pp. 442-443, 637, and Zaleski, pp. 550, 562.
132. See Siegelbaum, pp. 87-88; Benvenuti, p. 24.
133. See Siegelbaum, pp. 87-88; Benvenuti, p. 24.
134. The relevant Narkomtyazhprom order of 13 March 1935 is printed in Industrializatsiya SSSR, 1933-1937gg (1971), pp. 284-285.
135. Compared with the same period of the previous year, the average wage rose by 28.3% and productivity by only 11% (Osnovnye pokazateli, September 1935, pp. 21-23; Osnovyne pokazateli ... 1935, pp. 59-61). These figures are for the increase in the daily wage as compared with daily productivity. The large increase in wages was mainly because they had been increased to compensate for the increase in bread prices at the beginning of the year.
136. Compared with the same period of the previous year, the average wage rose by 28.3% and productivity by only 11% (Osnovnye pokazateli, September 1935, pp. 21-23; Osnovyne pokazateli ... 1935, pp. 59-61). These figures are for the increase in the daily wage as compared with daily productivity. The large increase in wages was mainly because they had been increased to compensate for the increase in bread prices at the beginning of the year.
137. On 11 October the industrial newspaper Za industrializatsiyu reproduced the norms decision of the previous March, printing in bold type the clause 'The revision of out-of-date norms shall be completed not later than 1 May 1935 and the revised norms shall be fixed (zakrepit') for a period of 1 year'. See Siegelbaum, p. 88, and Industrializatsiya SSSR, 1933-1937gg, pp. 284-285.
138. On 11 October the industrial newspaper Za industrializatsiyu reproduced the norms decision of the previous March, printing in bold type the clause 'The revision of out-of-date norms shall be completed not later than 1 May 1935 and the revised norms shall be fixed (zakrepit') for a period of 1 year'. See Siegelbaum, p. 88, and Industrializatsiya SSSR, 1933-1937gg, pp. 284-285.
139. See Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'Soviet Norm Determination in Theory and Practice, 1917-1941', Soviet Studies, 36, 1, 1984, p. 60; Siegelbaum, p. 87; Benvenuti, Stachanovismo ..., pp. 191-192; and RGAE, 7297/38/180, pp. 153-154.
140. See Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'Soviet Norm Determination in Theory and Practice, 1917-1941', Soviet Studies, 36, 1, 1984, p. 60; Siegelbaum, p. 87; Benvenuti, Stachanovismo ..., pp. 191-192; and RGAE, 7297/38/180, pp. 153-154.
141. See Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'Soviet Norm Determination in Theory and Practice, 1917-1941', Soviet Studies, 36, 1, 1984, p. 60; Siegelbaum, p. 87; Benvenuti, Stachanovismo ..., pp. 191-192; and RGAE, 7297/38/180, pp. 153-154.
142. See data in Osnovnye pokazateli, January 1936, p. 142.
143. Stalin, Sochineniya, xiv, pp. 95-96. Stalin used the phrase 'technical norms' (tekhnicheskie normy) rather than 'output norms' (normy vyrabotki). The term was used to refer both to norms for equipment and norms of output for workers. It was clear from the context that Stalin was referring to output norms for workers, but evidently some people assumed that norms of equipment should also be intermediate between the old level and the Stakhanovite records. At the central committee plenum in December, Mikoyan delicately corrected Stalin's ambiguity: I think that when norms of capacity of equipment and of production capacity of factories are fixed, we must take the indicators of the Stakhanovites as a basis, because technical norms of equipment and norms of output are different things. We cannot revise the capacity norms of equipment and factories every year or two. This is fixed for many years ahead. (Pravda, 27 December 1935).
144. Stalin, Sochineniya, xiv, pp. 95-96. Stalin used the phrase 'technical norms' (tekhnicheskie normy) rather than 'output norms' (normy vyrabotki). The term was used to refer both to norms for equipment and norms of output for workers. It was clear from the context that Stalin was referring to output norms for workers, but evidently some people assumed that norms of equipment should also be intermediate between the old level and the Stakhanovite records. At the central committee plenum in December, Mikoyan delicately corrected Stalin's ambiguity: I think that when norms of capacity of equipment and of production capacity of factories are fixed, we must take the indicators of the Stakhanovites as a basis, because technical norms of equipment and norms of output are different things. We cannot revise the capacity norms of equipment and factories every year or two. This is fixed for many years ahead. (Pravda, 27 December 1935).
145. RGASPI, 558/1/3191, ll. 6, 9-10. Part of his insertions was in his own handwriting, part a typerwritten text probably prepared on Stalin's instructions.
146. Ibid., ll. 13-15.
147. Pravda, 26 December 1935.
148. See Filtzer, p. 184.
149. GARF, 5446/26/74, ll. 36-30 - memorandum by Chubar' and Mezhlauk, dated 31 January 1937.
150. According to official data, in all large-scale industry gross production increased by as much as 30%, labour productivity by 22.4% and the average monthly wage of workers by 20.5%. For these figures see Narodno-khozyaistvennvi plan Soyuza SSR na 1937 god (Moscow, 1937), pp. 44-45; these are preliminary figures.
151. For the plan see RGASPI, 17/162/19, l. 15 - Politburo decision dated 15 December 1935. For the outcome see Khlevnyuk & Davies, 'The End of Rationing ...', p. 595.