The end of rationing in the Soviet Union, 1934-1935

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 51, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 557-609

  Khlevnyuk, Oleg ^a   Davies, R W ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0001085422     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139998804     Document Type: Article

References (223)

1. Otechestvennye arkhivy, 1996, 2, p. 28 (V. P. Popov).
2. See N. D. Kondrat'ev, Rynok khlebov i ego regulirovanie vo vremya voiny i revolyutsii (Moscow, 1991, first published 1922), pp. 298-301. In practice (as often happened later) the ration was not always honoured; it was an entitlement, but not a guaranteed entitlement.
3. K. Marx, Capital, volume 2 (Kerr edn, NY, 1933), p. 412 (chapter XVIII, section II).
4. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s" ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, 7th edition, volume I (Moscow, 1953), p. 425.
5. N. Bukharin & E. Preobrazhensky, The ABC of Communism (Harmondsworth, 1969), p. 391.
6. Lenin commented in the margin of his copy 'Correct! and well said, without affectation' (Leninskii sbornik, volume XI (Moscow, 1929), p. 389).
7. The rationing system is examined in three valuable studies based on Russian archives: E. A. Osokina, Ierarkhiya potrebleniya (Moscow, 1993); E. A. Osokina, Za fasadom "stalinskogo izobiliya" (Moscow, 1998) and J. M. Hessler, 'Culture of Shortages: A Social History of Soviet Trade', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (University of Chicago, 1996).
8. The rationing system is examined in three valuable studies based on Russian archives: E. A. Osokina, Ierarkhiya potrebleniya (Moscow, 1993); E. A. Osokina, Za fasadom "stalinskogo izobiliya" (Moscow, 1998) and J. M. Hessler, 'Culture of Shortages: A Social History of Soviet Trade', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (University of Chicago, 1996).
9. The rationing system is examined in three valuable studies based on Russian archives: E. A. Osokina, Ierarkhiya potrebleniya (Moscow, 1993); E. A. Osokina, Za fasadom "stalinskogo izobiliya" (Moscow, 1998) and J. M. Hessler, 'Culture of Shortages: A Social History of Soviet Trade', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (University of Chicago, 1996).
10. See R. W. Davies, Crisis and Progress in the Soviet Economy, 1931-1933 (London and Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 177-180, 452-455.
11. Na novom etape sotsialisticheskogo stroitel' stva: sbornik statei (Moscow, 1930), volume 2, pp. 7-51.
12. Suits, coats and leather footwear continued to be rationed.
13. RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/484, 42; see also Osokina, Za fasadom ..., p. 176. This assessment of the underlying grain situation was extremely overoptimistic.
14. See Davies, Crisis ..., pp. 60-62.
15. RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/875, 16-7 (Politburo decision of 8 March); GARF, 5446/1/66, 322-4 (art. 408; Sovnarkom decree of 23 March).
16. Ekonomicheskaya zhizn', 8 June 1932 (E. Fain). In Pravda, 16 July 1932, Krylenko pointed out that developed Soviet trade would eliminate rationing.
17. For further discussion of developments in these years, see the memorandum prepared for the November 1934 plenum of the party central committee, RTsKhIDNI, 82/2/45, 78-9.
18. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, volume III (1954), pp. 153-154.
19. Ibid., p. 219 (February 1934).
20. Vtoroi pyatiletnii plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR (1933-1937gg.) (Moscow, 1934), I, pp. 391-392, 530-531 (this published volume was sent to press on 1 September 1934).
21. G. Ya. Neiman, Vnutrennaya torgovlya SSSR (Moscow, 1935), p. 238; Zakonodatel' stvo i administrativnye rasporyazheniya po vneshnei i vnutrennoi torgovle, 1929, no. 70, pp. 2-11.
22. G. Ya. Neiman, Vnutrennaya torgovlya SSSR (Moscow, 1935), p. 238; Zakonodatel' stvo i administrativnye rasporyazheniya po vneshnei i vnutrennoi torgovle, 1929, no. 70, pp. 2-11.
23. Tovarooborot za gody rekonstruktivnogo perioda (Moscow, 1932), pp. 131-137.
24. Itogi vypolneniya narodno-khozyaistvennogo plana po torgovle i snabzheniyu (hereafter Itogi ... po torgovle), November 1932, p. 81; they increased from 690 on 1 January to 1608 on 1 December 1932 (1928 average = 100).
25. In addition, some goods were sold at so-called 'average-higher' (srednepovyshennye) prices, intermediate between normal prices and commercial prices. In the practice of trade planning, supplies of food and consumer goods were allocated to a so-called 'commodity stock' (tovarnyi fond). This was divided into a 'non-market stock' (vnerynochnyi fond) for supply to state consumers (industry, army, railways, etc.) and a 'market stock' (rynochnyi fond) for supplies to the consumer. The name 'market' was a misnomer, as the goods were sold at fixed state prices. The 'market stock' was in turn divided into 'normal stock' (normal'nyi fond) containing both rationed and unrationed goods, but sold at fixed low prices, and 'commercial stock' (kommercheskii fond) for so-called 'commercial' sales at higher prices (see above).
26. See R. W. Davies, The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929-1930 (London and Basingstoke, 1989), p. 534, and Davies, Crisis ..., p. 546. In 1932 70.9% of revenue came from turnover tax and tax on commercial trade, and 10.7% from mass loans. These figures are for the 'unified budget' of the all-Union and republican authorities, including state subsidies and receipts to and from local authorities, but not the whole of the local budget; the self-balancing income and expenditure of transport and state loans have been netted out by the present authors.
27. See R. W. Davies, The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929-1930 (London and Basingstoke, 1989), p. 534, and Davies, Crisis ..., p. 546. In 1932 70.9% of revenue came from turnover tax and tax on commercial trade, and 10.7% from mass loans. These figures are for the 'unified budget' of the all-Union and republican authorities, including state subsidies and receipts to and from local authorities, but not the whole of the local budget; the self-balancing income and expenditure of transport and state loans have been netted out by the present authors.
28. See Davies, Crisis ..., pp. 325-326.
29. Total commercial trade amounted to 4000 million rubles in 1932 (11.3% of all retail trade excluding public catering) and 6301 million rubles in 1933 (14.5% of all retail trade) (Sovetskaya torgovlya (Moscow, 1935 [?1936]), p. 74.
30. See Davies, Crisis ..., p. 429.
31. 2167 out of 3739 million rubles (Sovetskaya torgovlya (1935[?1936]), pp. 63, 74.
32. Sovetskaya torgovlya (1935[?1936]), p. 74.
33. RGAE, 4372/32/25, 257-4, 252-1 - V. V. Belenko, head of administration for planning fondy and trade, Gosplan, to Mezhlauk, dated 25 November 1933. The following figures for retail trade (including public catering, but excluding the kolkhoz market) (in thousand million rubles) were presented in the memoranda: 1934 (plan 1934 (plan 1933 without price with price (expected) reduction) reduction) Socialised trade at normal prices 42.8 49.6 Commercial trade (including free sale of bread products) 7.2 17.4 Total socialised trade 50.0 67.0 58.0 The 1934 plan for socialised trade eventually approved was 60 000 million rubles (Planovoe khozyaistvo, 1934, 5-6, p. 199). In fact socialised trade amounted to 49 800 million rubles in 1933 and 61 800 million in 1934 (see Table 4); commercial trade amounted to 6300 million rubles in 1933 and 13 100 million rubles in 1934 (Sovetskaya torgovlya (1935[?1936]), p. 74). Kolkhoz market prices fell by 39% in 1934 (A. N. Malafeev, Istoriya tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR, 1917-1963gg. (Moscow, 1964), p. 402), the most substantial fall in any one year. Mezhlauk was promoted to head of Gosplan on 25 April 1934, replacing Kuibyshev.
34. RGAE, 4372/32/25, 257-4, 252-1 - V. V. Belenko, head of administration for planning fondy and trade, Gosplan, to Mezhlauk, dated 25 November 1933. The following figures for retail trade (including public catering, but excluding the kolkhoz market) (in thousand million rubles) were presented in the memoranda: 1934 (plan 1934 (plan 1933 without price with price (expected) reduction) reduction) Socialised trade at normal prices 42.8 49.6 Commercial trade (including free sale of bread products) 7.2 17.4 Total socialised trade 50.0 67.0 58.0 The 1934 plan for socialised trade eventually approved was 60 000 million rubles (Planovoe khozyaistvo, 1934, 5-6, p. 199). In fact socialised trade amounted to 49 800 million rubles in 1933 and 61 800 million in 1934 (see Table 4); commercial trade amounted to 6300 million rubles in 1933 and 13 100 million rubles in 1934 (Sovetskaya torgovlya (1935[?1936]), p. 74). Kolkhoz market prices fell by 39% in 1934 (A. N. Malafeev, Istoriya tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR, 1917-1963gg. (Moscow, 1964), p. 402), the most substantial fall in any one year. Mezhlauk was promoted to head of Gosplan on 25 April 1934, replacing Kuibyshev.
35. RGAE, 4372/32/25, 257-4, 252-1 - V. V. Belenko, head of administration for planning fondy and trade, Gosplan, to Mezhlauk, dated 25 November 1933. The following figures for retail trade (including public catering, but excluding the kolkhoz market) (in thousand million rubles) were presented in the memoranda: 1934 (plan 1934 (plan 1933 without price with price (expected) reduction) reduction) Socialised trade at normal prices 42.8 49.6 Commercial trade (including free sale of bread products) 7.2 17.4 Total socialised trade 50.0 67.0 58.0 The 1934 plan for socialised trade eventually approved was 60 000 million rubles (Planovoe khozyaistvo, 1934, 5-6, p. 199). In fact socialised trade amounted to 49 800 million rubles in 1933 and 61 800 million in 1934 (see Table 4); commercial trade amounted to 6300 million rubles in 1933 and 13 100 million rubles in 1934 (Sovetskaya torgovlya (1935[?1936]), p. 74). Kolkhoz market prices fell by 39% in 1934 (A. N. Malafeev, Istoriya tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR, 1917-1963gg. (Moscow, 1964), p. 402), the most substantial fall in any one year. Mezhlauk was promoted to head of Gosplan on 25 April 1934, replacing Kuibyshev.
36. RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/935, 58-62 (decision by correspondence no. 93/74, dated 28 November); see also GARF, 5446/57/27, 117-125 (Sovnarkom decree art. 2589/598s dated 29 November). For the 1934 plan, adopted with minor changes, see Sobranie zakonov [hereafter SZ], 1934, art. 13, dated 31 December 1933.
37. Stalin, Sochineniya, volume 13 (Moscow, 1951), pp. 340-346.
38. Vtoroi pyatiletnii plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR (1933-1937 gg.), volume I (Moscow, 1934), p. 383; this volume was sent to press on 1 September 1934.
39. On 28 February 1934 the Politburo planned total stocks of food grains on 1 July 1934 at 1.51 million tons, an increase of only 0.05 million above 1 July 1933 (calculated from the revised grain-fodder balance of 1933/34 in RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/16, 7, 11-2 - decision by correspondence no. 99/82). Total grain stocks, including fodder grains, were planned at 2.56 million tons, compared with 1.95 million tons on 1 July 1933. Then, on 20 May 1934, a Politburo resolution and Sovnarkom decree stated the aim of keeping the stock of food grain on 1 July 1934 at the level of the previous year (RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/945, 40, no. 181/171; GARF, 5446/57/30, 230-1, art. 1207/206s).
40. According to official figures, the production of the light industry commissariat (Narkomlegprom), together with the light industry of the commissariats of local industry (NKMestpromy), increased by 6.8%, compared with the planned 12%; the production of the food industry commissariat (Narkompishcheprom) together with the food industry of the NKMestpromy increased by 27% compared with the planned 31% (Narodno-khozyaistvennyi plan na 1935 god (Moscow, 1935), pp. 540-541, 551).
41. The realised market fund of both food products and industrial goods was far less than planned (see Itogi ... po tovarooborotu, March 1934, pp. 14-17; food products are given in kind, and non-food products in 1934 wholesale prices of industry). Retail trade in current prices was reported as slightly less than planned (see ibid., p. 24).
42. The realised market fund of both food products and industrial goods was far less than planned (see Itogi ... po tovarooborotu, March 1934, pp. 14-17; food products are given in kind, and non-food products in 1934 wholesale prices of industry). Retail trade in current prices was reported as slightly less than planned (see ibid., p. 24).
43. See GARF, 5446/15a/473, 1-2.
44. RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/16, 18, no. 148/128 dated 17 March. The amount eventually sold commercially was 1 771 000 tons (Itogi ... po tovarooborotu, July 1935, pp. 16-17).
45. See R. W. Davies & O. V. Khlevnyuk, 'Gosplan', in E. A. Rees (ed.), Decision-making in the Stalinist Command Economy, 1932-7 (1997), p. 53.
46. RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/945, 40 (no. 187/171); for the Sovnarkom decree on the same day see GARF, 5446/57/30, 230-1 (art. 1207/206s), and for the clause on the Far East see GARF, 5446/57/34, 8.
47. RTsKhIDNI, 79/1/798, 7-9, dated 5 June, published in O. V. Khlevnyuk et al., compilers, Stalinskoe Politbyuro v 30-e gody: sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 1995), pp. 140-141. No accounts of this dispute have so far been traced in Russian archives.
48. RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/946, 21 (no. 91/79, decision by correspondence dated 4 June). An exception was made for Moscow, Leningrad and the textile areas (a major strike had occurred in the textile areas in 1932, after cuts in the bread ration, and this no doubt explains why they were exempted from the increase), but even here, while the price of ordinary bread was not increased, the increase applied to sandwiches (buterbrody) and white rolls.
49. Sotsialisticheskoe zemledelie, 28 May 1934 (decree of central committee and Sovnarkom dated 27 May); RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/946, 5, 49-58 (Politburo decision no. 13/1 by correspondence, dated 27 May). For the relevant decree of the Committee on Commodity Funds, dated 29 May, see Byulleten' finansovogo i khozyaistvennogo zakonodatel' stva [hereafter BFKhZ], 1934, 31/33. The wage increase was provided for nearly nine million of the 23 million persons employed by the state (estimated from data in decree of 28 May and in Narodnokhozyaistvennyi plan ... 1935 (1935), pp. 645-657).
50. Sotsialisticheskoe zemledelie, 28 May 1934 (decree of central committee and Sovnarkom dated 27 May); RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/946, 5, 49-58 (Politburo decision no. 13/1 by correspondence, dated 27 May). For the relevant decree of the Committee on Commodity Funds, dated 29 May, see Byulleten' finansovogo i khozyaistvennogo zakonodatel' stva [hereafter BFKhZ], 1934, 31/33. The wage increase was provided for nearly nine million of the 23 million persons employed by the state (estimated from data in decree of 28 May and in Narodnokhozyaistvennyi plan ... 1935 (1935), pp. 645-657).
51. Sotsialisticheskoe zemledelie, 28 May 1934 (decree of central committee and Sovnarkom dated 27 May); RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/946, 5, 49-58 (Politburo decision no. 13/1 by correspondence, dated 27 May). For the relevant decree of the Committee on Commodity Funds, dated 29 May, see Byulleten' finansovogo i khozyaistvennogo zakonodatel' stva [hereafter BFKhZ], 1934, 31/33. The wage increase was provided for nearly nine million of the 23 million persons employed by the state (estimated from data in decree of 28 May and in Narodnokhozyaistvennyi plan ... 1935 (1935), pp. 645-657).
52. RTsKhIDNI 17/3/946, 49.
53. S. Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 28.
54. This was the figure in the published decree of 27 May; the Politburo estimate was 665 million.
55. In 1934 the revenue paid by Komzag (the Committee for Agricultural Collections, responsible for the grain collections) to the unified budget amounted to 4574 million rubles in turnover tax (Otchet Narodnogo Komissariata Finansov Soyuza SSR ob ispolnenii edinogo gosudarslvennogo byudzheta Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik za 1934g. (hereafter Otchet ... 1934) (Leningrad, 1935), pp. 174-175); this excludes the payments from commercial trade. Let us assume that the sales of grain per month were approximately the same before and after the price increase (in fact they were a little higher - it may be calculated from the data in Itogi ... po tovaroborotu, January 1935, pp. 22, 25, that the market fund for non-commercial sales of flour amounted to 3 609 000 tons in January-June and 4 123 000 tons in July-December). With a doubling of prices from 1 June, it may be estimated that receipts per month were 481 million in June-December as against 241 million in January-May, an additional 240 million rubles; over seven months the additional revenue amounted to 240 × 7 = 1680 million rubles. This needs to be reduced by the decline in commercial revenue due to the slight fall in commercial sales of grain in the second half of the year, and the halving of the commercial price of bread from 1 December 1934. The revenue from turnover paid by Komzag in 1934 (excluding commercial sales), 4574 million rubles, was 2300 million rubles in excess of the original 1934 budget (Otchet ... 1934, pp. 174-175).
56. In 1934 the revenue paid by Komzag (the Committee for Agricultural Collections, responsible for the grain collections) to the unified budget amounted to 4574 million rubles in turnover tax (Otchet Narodnogo Komissariata Finansov Soyuza SSR ob ispolnenii edinogo gosudarslvennogo byudzheta Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik za 1934g. (hereafter Otchet ... 1934) (Leningrad, 1935), pp. 174-175); this excludes the payments from commercial trade. Let us assume that the sales of grain per month were approximately the same before and after the price increase (in fact they were a little higher - it may be calculated from the data in Itogi ... po tovaroborotu, January 1935, pp. 22, 25, that the market fund for non-commercial sales of flour amounted to 3 609 000 tons in January-June and 4 123 000 tons in July-December). With a doubling of prices from 1 June, it may be estimated that receipts per month were 481 million in June-December as against 241 million in January-May, an additional 240 million rubles; over seven months the additional revenue amounted to 240 × 7 = 1680 million rubles. This needs to be reduced by the decline in commercial revenue due to the slight fall in commercial sales of grain in the second half of the year, and the halving of the commercial price of bread from 1 December 1934. The revenue from turnover paid by Komzag in 1934 (excluding commercial sales), 4574 million rubles, was 2300 million rubles in excess of the original 1934 budget (Otchet ... 1934, pp. 174-175).
57. In 1934 the revenue paid by Komzag (the Committee for Agricultural Collections, responsible for the grain collections) to the unified budget amounted to 4574 million rubles in turnover tax (Otchet Narodnogo Komissariata Finansov Soyuza SSR ob ispolnenii edinogo gosudarslvennogo byudzheta Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik za 1934g. (hereafter Otchet ... 1934) (Leningrad, 1935), pp. 174-175); this excludes the payments from commercial trade. Let us assume that the sales of grain per month were approximately the same before and after the price increase (in fact they were a little higher - it may be calculated from the data in Itogi ... po tovaroborotu, January 1935, pp. 22, 25, that the market fund for non-commercial sales of flour amounted to 3 609 000 tons in January-June and 4 123 000 tons in July-December). With a doubling of prices from 1 June, it may be estimated that receipts per month were 481 million in June-December as against 241 million in January-May, an additional 240 million rubles; over seven months the additional revenue amounted to 240 × 7 = 1680 million rubles. This needs to be reduced by the decline in commercial revenue due to the slight fall in commercial sales of grain in the second half of the year, and the halving of the commercial price of bread from 1 December 1934. The revenue from turnover paid by Komzag in 1934 (excluding commercial sales), 4574 million rubles, was 2300 million rubles in excess of the original 1934 budget (Otchet ... 1934, pp. 174-175).
58. RTsKhIDNI, 79/1/798, 10-11, published in Khlevnyuk et al., p. 140. Kuibyshev, who had previously been in direct charge of agricultural collections and of Gosplan, was still generally responsible for both these functions in the Politburo and Sovnarkom.
59. RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/946, 19-20, 67-70 (no. 88/76, adopted by correspondence); the planned supply of goods to the countryside was to be reduced by the same amount.
60. RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/948, 15 (decision by correspondence no. 61/43); GARF, 5446/57/31, 142-6 (art. 1553/268s).
61. Otchet ... 1934 (1935), pp. 174-175.
62. GARF, 5446/15a/451, 2. L. E. Mar'yasin was appointed vice-chairman of Gosbank on 11 February 1932 and chairman on 4 April 1934 (he replaced M. I. Kalmanovich, who was appointed People's Commissar for the Grain and Livestock State Farms).
63. RGAE, 6759/3/9, 79.
64. See GARF, 5446/15a/451, 1 (memorandum to Molotov from R. Levin, deputy People's Commissar for Finance, dated 9 August); revenue amounted to 685 million rubles, compared with the 753 million planned.
65. RTsKhIDNI, 17/163/1033, 496, 136-7. This was not the sole explanation of the additional currency issue: in July issue amounted to 334 million rubles (see GARF, 5446/26/6, 14), exceeding the plan by more than 130 million rubles (600 million rubles in the quarter amounts to 200 million rubles per month). But the shortfall in the tax on commercial sales was only 68 million (see previous note).
66. RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/949, 28 (no. 147/128, approved by correspondence). In the same decision the Politburo also agreed to the commercial sale of eggs in Moscow and Leningrad.
67. GARF, 5446/26/6, 4-6 (memorandum to Molotov). This is a copy, and the comment by Molotov (dated 19 August) is typed, but bears Molotov's signature. Ya. E. Rudzutak, like Chubar'. was a vice-chairman of Sovnarkom.
68. RGAE, 4372/33/122, 135-132 (memorandum by Lomov dated 18 July 1934).
69. RTsKhIDNI, 17/3/949, 6 (decision no. 17/139); the corresponding Sovnarkom decree, dated 29 July, is in GARF, 5446/1/89, 158. Gosplan proposed that the gain from the reduction of commercial prices should be as much as 7000 million rubles; the Politburo accepted a figure of 2000-3000 millions.
70. GARF, 6759/1/11, 74; 6759/1/621, 194-5. STO was the main sub-committee of Sovnarkom. For the functions of the KTF see V. Barnett, 'The People's Commissariat of Supply and the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade', in Rees (ed.), p. 181. KTF was absorbed by the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade in August 1934 (ibid., p. 182).
71. GARF, 6759/1/11, 74; 6759/1/621, 194-5. STO was the main sub-committee of Sovnarkom. For the functions of the KTF see V. Barnett, 'The People's Commissariat of Supply and the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade', in Rees (ed.), p. 181. KTF was absorbed by the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade in August 1934 (ibid., p. 182).
72. GARF, 6759/3/9, 79 (memorandum to Stalin and Molotov dated 20 July).
73. GARF, 5446/82/30, 60ob.; see also n. 71 below.
74. RGAE, 7971/2/8, 134; this is a draft decree of Sovnarkom dated [19?] September 1934. For other examples of the sale of goods at illegally high prices see Malafeev (1964), pp. 197-199.
75. Report from NKVD and militia to Sovnarkom, 31 July and 20 August 1934 (RGAE, 8040/8/45, 276-271). See also GARF, 6759/3/9, 69, 69a (memorandum from Prokof'ev, NKVD, to Molotov, dated 14 July) on Moscow and region and GARF, 6759/3/9, 64-62 (dated 8 August) on Western region. The NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) of the USSR incorporated the former OGPU from July 1934.
76. For this decree see note 62 above.
77. In Moscow the price of a kilogram of rye bread on the kolkhoz market in the first six months of the year varied between Ir85 and 2r, compared with the commercial price of Ir50 (see the data for Moscow and other towns in Tovarooborot SSSR za mai 1934, pp. 36-37).
78. Byulleten' ekonomicheskogo kabineta prof. Prokopovicha, cxv (August-September 1934), pp. 15, 19.
79. GARF, 6759/1/621, 159-60 (dated 28 August).
80. For this memorandum see n. 63 above.
81. For this decree see n. 62 above.
82. Sovetskaya torgovlya, 6 September 1934, cited in Byulleten' ... Prokopovicha, p. 18.
83. Sovetskaya torgovlya, 6 September 1934, cited in Byulleten' ... Prokopovicha, p. 18.
84. GARF, 5446/82/30, 60-57 (precise date in September not given, but a note on the memorandum by Molotov is dated 11 September).
85. RGAE, 7971/2/8, 122-5; this memorandum, which refers to the town of Moscow, is not dated, but another version in the same file (11. 128-33) is dated 26 October 1934 and is signed by Z. Bolotin.
86. GARF, 5446/15a/427, 27-8 (memorandum addressed to Kaganovich and Kuibyshev as Stalin and Molotov were on leave).
87. Mar'yasin reported that the 'market fund' of sugar would increase from 520 000 tons in 1933/34 to 1 000 000 tons in 1934/35. As budget revenue in 1933/34 amounted to 1450 million rubles, we can calculate that without any price change (and with the same proportion of commercial, rural and urban normal sales) the revenue in 1934/35 would have amounted to 2780 million rubles ((1 000 000 ÷ 520 000) × 1450). The additional revenue was therefore (4000 - 2780) = 1220 million less 900 million compensation = 320 million rubles.
88. Narkomsnab was divided into Narkotnvnutorg and Narkompishcheprom, the People's Commissariat for the Food Industry, by a decree of 27 July 1934 (SZ, 1934, art. 313). I. Ya. Veitser, who had been working in trade for 10 years, was appointed People's Commissar of Narkomvnutorg and Mikoyan (previously head of Narkomsnab) of Narkompishcheprom. The revival of the word 'trade' in the title, and the separation of trading functions from food production, were both significant indications of the increasing importance now attached to trade.
89. The change in retail prices was as follows (in rubles): Superior Grade Grade II Old price: commercial 2.50-3.50 Old price: commercial 1.50 Old price: normal 1.60 Old price: normal 0.80 New price: unified 2.00-2.50 New price: commercial 1.10 New price: normal 0.80 For the Politburo decision, see RTsKhIDNI, 17/163/1043, 49; for the Sovnarkom decree, GARF, 5446/1/93, 20-1.
90. Grain exports amounted to 769 000 tons in 1934 (primarily from the 1934 harvest) compared with 1 684 000 in the previous year (Vneshnyaya torgovlya za 1918-1940gg. (Moscow, 1960), p. 144).
91. RTsKhIDNI, 81/3/100, 48.
92. RTsKhIDNI, 81/3/100, 61-6.
93. Cited from the archives in Istoricheskie zapiski, no. 76 (1965), p. 58.
94. RTsKhIDNI, 81/3/100, 72-5.
95. The amount in both 1933/34 (actual) and 1934/35 (plan) was 20.8 million tons (these figures include deliveries by kolkhozy, sovkhozy and individual peasants, and the payment in kind to MTS, but evidently exclude the milling levy and the repayment in kind of grain loans) (see Kleiner's report to the June 1934 central committee plenum - RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/518, 72, 64-5).
96. See for example Ekonomicheskaya zhizn', 10, 11 October 1934.
97. RTsKhIDNI, 81/3/100, 83-8.
98. Ibid.; this a note on Stalin's letter, which is endorsed as having been read by Molotov, Zhdanov, Kuibyshev, Kalinin and Andreev.
99. The decision set out the responsibilities of Veitser, Zelensky, Kleiner, Shvernik (with Veinberg as his replacement), Mezhlauk and Grin'ko for preparing different aspects of the reform, the work to be undertaken 'in strict secrecy' (APRF (Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii), 3/43/51, 47), I. M. Kleiner, previously deputy head of Komzag, was appointed its head on 10 April 1934, replacing Chernov. Shvernik was head of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; for the others, see text.
100. Cited from Kaganovich's personal archive.
101. 1933: 22.7 zagotovki + O.4 zakupki; 1934: 22.6 + 3.6. For data see I. L. Strilever, S. A. Khazanov & L. S. Yampol'sky, Khlebooborot i standarty (Moscow, 1935), pp. 17, 167.
102. See Stalin's appointments diary in Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1995, 3, pp. 142-143. The first two meetings took place on 3 and 5 November. On 3 November the Politburo, again bez protokola, established a high-level commission to prepare the reform within one week; the commission comprised Molotov (chairman), Kaganovich, Kirov, Zhdanov, Mikoyan, Mezhlauk, M. Belen'ky, Grin'ko, Kleiner, Zelensky, Veitser, Shvernik and Veinberg (APRF, 3/43/51, 57).
103. RGAE, 7971/2/8, 1-77; the drafts in the file were evidently all prepared at roughly the same time; one of them is dated 21 November, four days before the opening of the plenum, and a day after Stalin's meeting with Veitser and others.
104. The report, delivered on 25 November, was published in Izvestiya, 30 November 1934; the archives contain both a typed stenogram of the report (RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/528) and the authorised text in the printed but secret verbatim report (RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/536, 1-9).
105. The phrase on the quantities involved appears in the printed verbatim report in the archives but not in the published version.
106. The passages about the importance of baked bread did not appear in the typed version of Molotov's report.
107. The exchange with Stalin does not appear in the published report. Both the published report and the printed verbatim report in the archives include the following sentence which is not in Molotov's original typed version of the report: 'We must not set the aim that the state should gain any supplementary revenue from carrying out the present measure' - obviously inserted after Stalin's speech at the plenum - see p. 575 above. These two versions of Molotov's report also omit any mention of the 2-2 1/2 thousand million rubles.
108. RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/536, 10-11. In the typed stenogram of this speech, Zelensky referred to a 'huge' rather than a supplementary growth of local and artisan industry (RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/529, 3). The passage about the lack of mills appears in the typed stenogram but not in the printed report in the archives (ibid., 5).
109. RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/536, 11.
110. Ibid., 13.
111. Ibid., 18. In the typed version of Razumov's speech Stalin was recorded as saying 'the market does not take the rationed price into account' (our emphasis). Stalin also interrupted Razumov's comparison of the high price of flour with that of baked bread: 'Stop talking about flour. Talk about baked bread' (RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/529, 67, 66).
112. RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/536, 14-6.
113. RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/530, 78-98; a slightly revised version was prepared for the unpublished Sochineniya, volume XIV, pp. 48-59.
114. In the version prepared for publication in the Sochineniya, the phrase 'in my opinion stupid' and the word 'entirely' were omitted.
115. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, volume III (1954), pp. 256-260; the resolution first appeared in Pravda, 29 November 1934. In the discussion of the resolution, Stalin, in spite of his earlier criticism of Razumov, endorsed his proposal to vary bread prices, commenting that it would 'make the transition more flexible' (RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/529, 78).
116. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, volume III (1954), pp. 256-260; the resolution first appeared in Pravda, 29 November 1934. In the discussion of the resolution, Stalin, in spite of his earlier criticism of Razumov, endorsed his proposal to vary bread prices, commenting that it would 'make the transition more flexible' (RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/529, 78).
117. SZ, 1934, art. 445.
118. Izvestiya, 27 December 1934.
119. Izvestiya, 22 December 1934; Bukharin was the editor of Izvestiya.
120. Izvestiya, 22 December 1934; Bukharin was the editor of Izvestiya.
121. The breakdown between government departments was set out in an unpublished decree of 5 December (GARF, 5446/1/94, 143-5, art. 2672); the total was 4148.5 million rubles, but excluded the gold and platinum industry (as well as the army and the OGPU, which do not seem to have been included in the total 4200 million)
122. Izvestiya, 30 November 1934.
123. GARF, 5446/1/95, 74-7 (art. 39, dated 9 January 1935).
124. See order (prikaz) no. 1574 of Narkomtyazhprom dated 25 December 1934, in BFKhZ, no. 1, 1935, 36-9; and see A. Bergson, The Structure of Soviet Wages (Cambridge, MA, 1946), p. 211. Similar regulations for other commissariats are also published in BFKhZ.
125. See order (prikaz) no. 1574 of Narkomtyazhprom dated 25 December 1934, in BFKhZ, no. 1, 1935, 36-9; and see A. Bergson, The Structure of Soviet Wages (Cambridge, MA, 1946), p. 211. Similar regulations for other commissariats are also published in BFKhZ.
126. Thus in the Special List the bread ration was normally 1 kilogram a day, the increase over the rationed price was 50 kopeks per kilogram, and the wage supplement was 16r per month.
127. RTsKhIDNI, 82/2/45, 80. Those receiving rations because of their occupations included 22.87 million manual and office workers, 1.08 million students, 1 million pensioners, 0.13 million policemen (militsionery), 0.5 million special settlers and 1 million artisans (kustari). These figures evidently exclude the armed forces, the OGPU, and people confined in prisons and camps. According to Molotov's report to the November 1934 party plenum, 40 million persons were on the four ration Lists which received central supplies, and 10 million received rations from local resources (Izvestiya, 30 November 1934); in his report Kaganovich noted that in addition to the 50 million, 24 million peasants received supplies of grain in return for their supply of industrial crops to the state (Ekonomicheskaya zhizn', 27 December 1934).
128. RTsKhIDNI, 82/2/45, 80. Those receiving rations because of their occupations included 22.87 million manual and office workers, 1.08 million students, 1 million pensioners, 0.13 million policemen (militsionery), 0.5 million special settlers and 1 million artisans (kustari). These figures evidently exclude the armed forces, the OGPU, and people confined in prisons and camps. According to Molotov's report to the November 1934 party plenum, 40 million persons were on the four ration Lists which received central supplies, and 10 million received rations from local resources (Izvestiya, 30 November 1934); in his report Kaganovich noted that in addition to the 50 million, 24 million peasants received supplies of grain in return for their supply of industrial crops to the state (Ekonomicheskaya zhizn', 27 December 1934).
129. RTsKhIDNI, 17/2/530, 78-98.
130. GARF, 5446/1/94, 340-1 (Sovnarkom decree dated 26 December 1934). Manual workers on the Special List received 1 kilogram per month if they did not have families, 1.5 kilograms if they did; manual workers on List 1 received 0.8 and 1.2 kilograms; white-collar workers on the Special List or working in Moscow, Leningrad, the Donbass or Baku received 0.5 and 0.75; the ration for all other blue-collar workers depended on resources (white-collar workers on Lists 2 and 3 were not mentioned at all).
131. L. A. Rimmel, 'Another Kind of Fear: Kirov's Murder and the End of Bread Rationing in Leningrad', Slavic Review, 56, 1997, p. 494; see also the housewife's comment reported on p. 496; and S. Davies (1997), p. 140.
132. L. A. Rimmel, 'Another Kind of Fear: Kirov's Murder and the End of Bread Rationing in Leningrad', Slavic Review, 56, 1997, p. 494; see also the housewife's comment reported on p. 496; and S. Davies (1997), p. 140.
133. S. Davies, Popular Opinion ..., p. 29.
134. Rimmel, p. 493.
135. S. Davies, p. 29.
136. Rimmel, pp. 483-484.
137. Ibid., p. 491.
138. Ibid., p. 497.
139. Ibid., pp. 485, 487-488. For hostile and favourable comments on the end of bread rationing recorded in the NKVD files see also Osokina, Za fasadom ..., pp. 180-181.
140. Ibid., pp. 485, 487-488. For hostile and favourable comments on the end of bread rationing recorded in the NKVD files see also Osokina, Za fasadom ..., pp. 180-181.
141. Ekonomicheskaya zhizn', 27 December 1934.
142. Ekonomicheskaya zhizn', 30 December 1934 (G. Kos'yachenko).
143. Trotsky, writing from exile, complained that 'the abolition of consumer rationing directly harms the workers, especially the lower extremely poorly-paid strata, i.e. the vast majority'. He nevertheless commended the abolition of rationing in principle, insisting that 'the transfer of economic relations to the language of money is entirely necessary at the present initial state of socialist development, in order to calculate the real social use and economic effect of the outlays of labour energy by workers and peasants' (Byulleten' oppozitsii, no. 42, February 1935, p. 2).
144. GARF, 5446/16a/329, 17.
145. RTsKhIDNI, 17/163/1051, 77-83.
146. RTsKhIDNI, 17/163/1051, 77-8; GARF, 5446/1/95, 159-60.
147. GARF, 5446/16a/329, 47-9, 59. See also Osokina, Za fasadom ..., p. 182, citing NKVD reports on the very widespread reintroduction of forms of local rationing in the first few months of 1935.
148. GARF, 5446/57/35, 147-8 (art. 405/51s, dated 11 March).
149. GARF, 5446/82/36, 41-36 (dated 15 April).
150. GARF, 5446/57/36, 113-4 (art. 1031 dated 29 May); the reserve was approved by a Politburo decision in the 'special papers' (RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/18, 47, dated 28 May). Eight days after this decision, the reserve was increased to 50 000 tons, with the stipulation that it was partly to be used to increase the sale of flour in the countryside (GARF, 5446/57/36, 128 - art. 1088/167ss, dated 5 June).
151. Tovarooborot SSSR za oktyabr' 1935, p. 27.
152. GARF, 5446/1/103, 226 (art. 1224 dated 17 June).
153. Tovarooborot SSSR za avgust 1935, p. 12.
154. GARF, 5446/82/39, 109-107 (dated 7 September, signed by G. Arkus).
155. Narodno-khozyaistvennyi plan na 1936 god (Moscow, 1936), p. 332. For much higher figures for both years see Table 7(b).
156. Sovetskaya torgovlya v 1935 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik (1936), pp. 157-158.
157. RGAE, 7733/13/184, 28-9 (probably completed on 7 June).
158. RGAE, 7971/2/8, 152-6.
159. Sovetskaya torgovlya v 1935 godu (1936), p. 9.
160. The stocks on 1 July 1935 have been estimated from data in Kleiner's report to Stalin and Molotov (GARF, 5446/26/84, 34-29, dated 15 November 1936). The stocks on 1 July 1934 are those anticipated in the grain-fodder balance approved by the Politburo on 28 February 1934 (RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/16, 7, 11-2); actual stocks were probably lower. These figures include the Nepfond, the Mobfond and transitional stocks, but exclude grain held by trading agencies and government departments. They incorporate all grains, including fodder grains. In a letter to Ordzhonikidze on 4 September 1935 Kaganovich referred to the '370 million puds [6.06 million tons] remaining from last year' (RTsKhIDNI, 85/27/93, 1-11, published in Khlevnyuk et al., pp. 146-147).
161. Narodno-khozyaistvennyi plan ... 1936 (1936), pp. 432-3; Promyshlennost' SSSR (1936), p. 584. 1 ton of flour produces approximately 1.4 tons of bread.
162. Narodno-khozyaistvennyi plan ... 1936 (1936), pp. 432-3; Promyshlennost' SSSR (1936), p. 584. 1 ton of flour produces approximately 1.4 tons of bread.
163. See tables in Sovetskaya torgovlya v 1935 godu (1936), pp. 66-71.
164. Sbornik ... po mukomol' no-krupyanoi promyshlennosti za 1935 god (1936), p. 31 (for full title see Source to Table 6(a)).
165. See quarterly data for 1934 in Itogi ... po tovarooborotu, July 1935, pp. 16-17, and for 1935 in Osnovnye pokazateli vypolneniya narodno-khozyaistvennogo plana [hereafter Osnovnye pokazateli] 1935 (1936), p. 225.
166. See quarterly data for 1934 in Itogi ... po tovarooborotu, July 1935, pp. 16-17, and for 1935 in Osnovnye pokazateli vypolneniya narodno-khozyaistvennogo plana [hereafter Osnovnye pokazateli] 1935 (1936), p. 225.
167. SZ, 1935, art. 422 (dated 25 September).
168. Sovetskaya torgovlya v 1935 godu (Moscow, 1936), p. 123. The value of these sales in current prices increased from 7043 to 7206 million rubles (ibid., p. 60). From these figures it can be calculated that the average cost per course increased by 56.7%; this is an overestimate, because the proportion of higher-priced meat dishes increased in 1935.
169. Sovetskaya torgovlya v 1935 godu (Moscow, 1936), p. 123. The value of these sales in current prices increased from 7043 to 7206 million rubles (ibid., p. 60). From these figures it can be calculated that the average cost per course increased by 56.7%; this is an overestimate, because the proportion of higher-priced meat dishes increased in 1935.
170. Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow, 1959), p. 743.
171. GARF, 5446/27/81, 277-5; a copy of the memorandum was sent to Kuibyshev.
172. See Izvestiya, 28 December 1934.
173. RGAE, 4372/92/53, 18-22.
174. RGAE, 4372/92/53, 6-7 (memorandum from Mar'yasin dated 13 January). According to the Gosplan memorandum of 15 December (see previous footnote), the wage debt on 1 December was 590 million rubles.
175. See memorandum of Mar'yasin and Veitser, dated 16 September 1934, which refers to 'the removal from circulation of considerable amounts of currency issue' in 1935 (GARF, 5446/27/81, 271-270).
176. RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/17, 119 (decision no. 2, by correspondence); GARF, 5446/57/35, 7-8 (art. 23/6ss dated 7 January).
177. GARF, 5446/57/35, 21 (art. 117/15s dated 17 January).
178. The state budget was formally approved in a published decree of TsIK on 8 February; however, following normal practice the decision about currency issue was not included in the decree (SZ, 1935, art. 71).
179. Narodno-khozyaistvennyi plan ... 1936 (1936), pp. 392-395, reporting the 1935 plan. The 1935 plan as published in May 1935 gave the cost increase for all-Union industry as 21.4%, but did not give a figure for industry as a whole (Narodnokhozyaistvennyi plan ... 1935 (1935), p. 659).
180. Narodno-khozyaistvennyi plan ... 1936 (1936), pp. 392-395, reporting the 1935 plan. The 1935 plan as published in May 1935 gave the cost increase for all-Union industry as 21.4%, but did not give a figure for industry as a whole (Narodnokhozyaistvennyi plan ... 1935 (1935), p. 659).
181. Narodnokhozyaistvennyi plan ... 1935 (1935), pp. 442-443, 642-643; for the investment plan see GARF, 5446/57/33, 223-6 (Sovnarkom decree dated 16 December, art. 2721).
182. See Mark Harrison & R. W. Davies, 'The Soviet Military-economic Effort during the Second Five-year Plan (1933-1937)', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 3, May 1997, pp. 369-406 at p. 380.
183. RGAE, 4372/92/53, 6-7.
184. RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/17, 43; GARF, 5446/57/35, 147-154 (art. 405/51s dated 11 March).
185. RGAE, 4372/92/53, 32-6.
186. RGAE, 4372/92/53, 47-50.
187. RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/17, 160-1.
188. RGAE, 7733/13/184, 49-51 (unsigned memorandum on 'Fulfilment of the Balance of Money Incomes and Expenditures of the Population in the 1st Quarter of 1935').
189. GARF, 5446/16a/377, 1-6.
190. GARF, 5446/17/279, 16.
191. GARF, 5446/16a/378, 15-6.
192. GARF, 5446/16a/378, 22-22ob.
193. GARF, 5446/16a/378, 3; GARF, 5446/17/279, 15-6.
194. GARF, 5446/1/99, 261-3 (art. 470).
195. GARF, 5446/17/1, 80-1; 5446/17/39, 24-6. On 15 May a Sovnarkom decree announced various deductions from price and wage incentives designed to encourage the sale of vodka (GARF, 5446/1/101, 349-352 - art. 901).
196. RGAE, 7733/13/184, 28-9 (unsigned memorandum on 'The Balance of Incomes and Expenditures of the Population in the 3rd Quarter of 1935', transmitted 7 June).
197. RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/18, 58 (dated 13 June); GARF, 5446/57/39, 24-7 (art. 1175/178s, dated 14 June).
198. RTsKhIDNI, 17/163/1067, 122; GARF, 5446/57/36, 206-9 (art. 1282/200s, dated 26 June).
199. RTsKhIDNI, 17/163/1069, 2.
200. RTsKhIDNI, 17/163/1070, 101 (decisions of 7 and 16 July).
201. SZ, 1935, art. 422; for the reduction of bread prices see p. 581 above.
202. GARF, 5446/82/40, 122-118 (dated 14 October).
203. RTsKhIDNI, 82/2/684, 96-102.
204. GARF, 5446/17/341, 113 (dated 2 December); for this memorandum see below.
205. RGAE, 4372/92/59, 1-7 (dated 4 December).
206. In 185 Leningrad shops, sugar was not available in 18, rice in 15, butter in eight, and eggs in seven.
207. RGAE, 4372/92/59, 33-43 (3 February 1936), 4372/92/59, 44-58 (2 March 1936).
208. RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/18, 152; the decree (art. 2150/360ss) appears in GARF, 5446/57/38, 75 and (for currency issue) in 5446/57/39, 37.
209. RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/18, 181; this decision was embodied in a decree of Sovnarkom dated 25 October (GARF, 5446/57/38, 181 - art. 2389/394ss).
210. GARF, 5446/17/341, 108-115.
211. GARF, 5446/29/11, 81-5; the document was marked 'secret' and (in Grin'ko's handwriting) 'urgent'.
212. GARF, 5446/17/341, 20-2 (dated 19 December).
213. RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/19, 19.
214. GARF, 5446/26/73, 6-4; for the STO decree, see GARF, 5674/4/10, 71 (point 8).
215. GARF, 5446/26/88, 188-184 (this memorandum to Stalin, Molotov and Chubar', dated 3 October, was endorsed by Molotov: 'for cdes. Smirnov, Shvernik, Chubar', Mikoyan, myself and for the deputies [deputy chairmen of Sovnarkom]').
216. See Malafeev, p. 204.
217. Sovetskaya torgovlya v 1935 godu (1936), pp. 43, 66-67. 'Retail trade: food products' includes public catering. The implied price increase was obtained by the present authors, by dividing the increase measured in current prices by the increase measured in 1935 transfer prices.
218. RGAE, 1562/151/42, 79-80, cited in Malafeev, pp. 201-202.
219. Plan, 1935, 20, p. 38, cited in revised form by Malafeev, pp. 202-203.
220. See the Sovnarkom decrees of 16 December 1935 (GARF, 5446/57/38, 183 - art. 2673-4), and 25 December 1935 (GARF, 5446/1/109, 369-70 - art. 2733), and also Narodno-khozyalstvennyi plan ... 1936 (1936), p. 331. This was followed by the abolition of Torgsin, with its network of shops which sold goods in exchange for foreign currency (see Otechestvennaya istoriya, 1995, 2, pp. 95-97 (E. A. Osokina)). In 1936 and 1937 the network of closed shops in factories and offices was largely assimilated to the normal trade system.
221. See the Sovnarkom decrees of 16 December 1935 (GARF, 5446/57/38, 183 - art. 2673-4), and 25 December 1935 (GARF, 5446/1/109, 369-70 - art. 2733), and also Narodno-khozyalstvennyi plan ... 1936 (1936), p. 331. This was followed by the abolition of Torgsin, with its network of shops which sold goods in exchange for foreign currency (see Otechestvennaya istoriya, 1995, 2, pp. 95-97 (E. A. Osokina)). In 1936 and 1937 the network of closed shops in factories and offices was largely assimilated to the normal trade system.
222. See the Gosplan report dated 29 April 1938, signed by M. Bogolepov (RGAE, 4372/92/159, 71-57).
223. Pis'ma I. V. Stalina V. M. Molotovu, 1925-1936gg.: sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 1995), pp. 178-179, citing RTsKhIDNI, 85/27/397, 5Ob.-6.