A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 322-338

  Perea, Andrés ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Extensive form games; One deviation property; Rationalizability; Sequential rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036688023     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00005-2     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. On rationalizability in extensive games
2. Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory
3. Rationality, Nash equilibrium, and backwards induction in perfect information games
4. Rationalizable strategic behavior
5. Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
6. Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
7. Self-confirming equilibrium
8. Stable (Incomplete) Agreements in Dynamic Games: Worlds Apart-but Acting Together
9. The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
10. Sequential equilibria
11. Extensive form games and the problem of information
12. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection
13. Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragezeit
14. Reexamination of the 'perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games.'