The rational weakness of strong ties: Failure of group solidarity in a highly cohesive group of rational agents

Journal of Mathematical Sociology

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 189-216

  Flache, Andreas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Computer simulation; Game theory; Group solidarity; Imperfect information; Social control; Social dilemmas

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036660031     PISSN: 0022250X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00222500212988     Document Type: Article

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