The existence and uniqueness of optimal pollution policy in the presence of victim defense measures

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 106-122

  McKitrick, Ross ^a   Collinge, Robert A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO   (United States)

Author keywords

Externalities; Optimal pollution policy; Uniqueness; Victim defense

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS; POLLUTION POLICY;

EID: 0036651619     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.2001.1200     Document Type: Article

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