Avoidance costs and the entry-exit condition on polluting firms

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 216-224

  Kohn, Robert E ^a  

^a SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY EDWARDSVILLE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; PIGOUVIAN TAX; POLLUTION CONTROL;

EID: 0030865371     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9485.00054     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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