The hidden logic of candidate selection for Chilean parliamentary elections

Comparative Politics

Volumn 34, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 419-438

  Siavelis, Peter ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0036638712     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4146946     Document Type: Review

References (33)

1. Two member districts are uncommon, though they exist at the state level in the U.S. Their mechanical effects are discussed by Rein Taagepera, "The Effect of District Magnitude and Properties of Two Seat Districts," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds., Choosing an Electoral System (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 1-102; and Gary Cox, "Electoral Equilibrium in Double Member Districts," Public Choice, 44 (1984), 443-51.
2. Two member districts are uncommon, though they exist at the state level in the U.S. Their mechanical effects are discussed by Rein Taagepera, "The Effect of District Magnitude and Properties of Two Seat Districts," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds., Choosing an Electoral System (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 1-102; and Gary Cox, "Electoral Equilibrium in Double Member Districts," Public Choice, 44 (1984), 443-51.
3. The party integrative and stabilizing tendencies of the electoral system are underscored by, among others, Eugenio Guzmán, "Reflexiones sobre el sistema binominal," Estudios Públicos, 51 (Winter 1993), 303-25; and Rhoda Rabkin, "Redemocratization, Electoral Engineering, and Party Strategies in Chile, 1989-1995," Comparative Political Studies, 29 (June 1996), 335-56. Those who are not convinced that the electoral system possesses these qualities include Peter Siavelis and Arturo Valenzuela, "Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability: The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile," in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 77-100; J. Samuel Valenzuela and Timothy Scully, "Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile: Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy," Comparative Politics, 29 (July 1997), 511-27; and Peter Siavelis, "Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System: On the Transformational Effects of Electoral Reform," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (December 1997), 651-74.
4. The party integrative and stabilizing tendencies of the electoral system are underscored by, among others, Eugenio Guzmán, "Reflexiones sobre el sistema binominal," Estudios Públicos, 51 (Winter 1993), 303-25; and Rhoda Rabkin, "Redemocratization, Electoral Engineering, and Party Strategies in Chile, 1989-1995," Comparative Political Studies, 29 (June 1996), 335-56. Those who are not convinced that the electoral system possesses these qualities include Peter Siavelis and Arturo Valenzuela, "Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability: The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile," in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 77-100; J. Samuel Valenzuela and Timothy Scully, "Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile: Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy," Comparative Politics, 29 (July 1997), 511-27; and Peter Siavelis, "Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System: On the Transformational Effects of Electoral Reform," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (December 1997), 651-74.
5. The party integrative and stabilizing tendencies of the electoral system are underscored by, among others, Eugenio Guzmán, "Reflexiones sobre el sistema binominal," Estudios Públicos, 51 (Winter 1993), 303-25; and Rhoda Rabkin, "Redemocratization, Electoral Engineering, and Party Strategies in Chile, 1989-1995," Comparative Political Studies, 29 (June 1996), 335-56. Those who are not convinced that the electoral system possesses these qualities include Peter Siavelis and Arturo Valenzuela, "Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability: The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile," in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 77-100; J. Samuel Valenzuela and Timothy Scully, "Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile: Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy," Comparative Politics, 29 (July 1997), 511-27; and Peter Siavelis, "Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System: On the Transformational Effects of Electoral Reform," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (December 1997), 651-74.
6. The party integrative and stabilizing tendencies of the electoral system are underscored by, among others, Eugenio Guzmán, "Reflexiones sobre el sistema binominal," Estudios Públicos, 51 (Winter 1993), 303-25; and Rhoda Rabkin, "Redemocratization, Electoral Engineering, and Party Strategies in Chile, 1989-1995," Comparative Political Studies, 29 (June 1996), 335-56. Those who are not convinced that the electoral system possesses these qualities include Peter Siavelis and Arturo Valenzuela, "Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability: The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile," in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 77-100; J. Samuel Valenzuela and Timothy Scully, "Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile: Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy," Comparative Politics, 29 (July 1997), 511-27; and Peter Siavelis, "Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System: On the Transformational Effects of Electoral Reform," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (December 1997), 651-74.
7. The party integrative and stabilizing tendencies of the electoral system are underscored by, among others, Eugenio Guzmán, "Reflexiones sobre el sistema binominal," Estudios Públicos, 51 (Winter 1993), 303-25; and Rhoda Rabkin, "Redemocratization, Electoral Engineering, and Party Strategies in Chile, 1989-1995," Comparative Political Studies, 29 (June 1996), 335-56. Those who are not convinced that the electoral system possesses these qualities include Peter Siavelis and Arturo Valenzuela, "Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability: The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile," in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 77-100; J. Samuel Valenzuela and Timothy Scully, "Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile: Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy," Comparative Politics, 29 (July 1997), 511-27; and Peter Siavelis, "Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System: On the Transformational Effects of Electoral Reform," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (December 1997), 651-74.
8. See Siavelis and Valenzuela.
9. Reformers relied on Downs's median voter hypothesis as the logic that would produce centripetal and bipolar party competition in Chile. However, as Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuels demonstrate, Downs based his analysis on single member districts, and the bipolar dynamic produced by magnitudes of two differs from that explored by Downs and may even encourage centrifugal competition. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 1957); and Eric Magar, Marc Rosenblum, and David Samuels, "On The Absence of Centripetal Incentives in Double Member Districts: The Case of Chile," Comparative Political Studies, 31 (December 1998), 714-39.
10. Reformers relied on Downs's median voter hypothesis as the logic that would produce centripetal and bipolar party competition in Chile. However, as Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuels demonstrate, Downs based his analysis on single member districts, and the bipolar dynamic produced by magnitudes of two differs from that explored by Downs and may even encourage centrifugal competition. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 1957); and Eric Magar, Marc Rosenblum, and David Samuels, "On The Absence of Centripetal Incentives in Double Member Districts: The Case of Chile," Comparative Political Studies, 31 (December 1998), 714-39.
11. This alliance was known as Democracia y Progreso for the 1989 elections and Unión par el Progreso de Chile in 1993.
12. Siavelis and Valenzuela; Valenzuela and Scully; Siavelis.
13. "You readjust your load as you proceed down the road."
14. While other coalitions present candidates, these two garnered over 80 percent of the vote in the 1989, 1993, and 1997 elections.
15. National councils are composed of senators, deputies, and representatives elected by each regional party council.
16. Michael Gallagher, "Introduction," in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective (London; Sage, 1988), p. 4.
17. These conclusions are based on interviews during 1999 and 2000 with leaders charged with list composition in every major party and on anecdotal press accounts.
18. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, "Introduction," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 6.
19. John Carey, "Parties, Coalitions and the Chilean Congress in the 1990's," in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., Legislatures and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
20. Siavelis; Valenzuela and Scully.
21. The Radical Party secured more candidacies than its national level of support suggests that it should have received. In 1993 the Radicals secured eleven of the 120 Concertacion slates (almost ten percent), and won only 3 percent of the vote nationally.
22. See "Las corrientes ocultas tras las negociaciones," La Segunda, Feb., 19, 1993, p. 13.
23. The PS and PPD are treated as a single anchor party for the purposes of this discussion (as would other parties that agree on the overall number of subpact candidacies for each party before coalition-level negotiations).
24. For a complete breakdown of the Concertación's parties (there were other minor parties in addition to the eleven listed in Figure 2), see El Mercurio, May 21, 1989, p. C5.
25. The sixty-five PDC subpact candidacies were distributed as follows; forty-eight for the PDC, eleven for the PR, four for the SD, and two for associated independents. In the PS-PPD subpact they were distributed as follows: twenty-eight for the PS, twenty-five for the PPD, and two for independents. Data from the ministry of the interior, 1993.
26. See "Pinera al Borde del Si," El Mercurio, Mar. 30, 1997, p. Dl.
27. Rabkin, p. 346.
28. Auth, pp. 353-55.
29. An alternative explanation is that larger parties with more negotiating power reserved these districts for themselves.
30. I am indebted to Andrés Allamand for his insights on the evolution of competition on the right.
31. Servicio Electoral de Chile.
32. It is now the Unión del Centro Centro Progresista.
33. Interview with Andrés Allamand, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1998.