Expectations and information in second generation currency crises models

Economic Modelling

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 203-222

  Sbracia, Massimo ^a   Zaghini, Andrea ^a  

^a BANK OF ITALY   (Italy)

Author keywords

D82; D84; Exchange rate crises; F31; Global games; Speculative attacks

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001315123     PISSN: 02649993     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0264-9993(00)00034-1     Document Type: Article

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