Market instability in a stackelberg duopoly

Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 199-210

  Matsumura, Toshihiro ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

Endogenous roles; Market instability; Stackelberg

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036545274     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s007120200016     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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6. First mover disadvantages with private information
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13. The equilibrium of duopoly in a market of homogeneous goods
14. Price leadership: A theoretical analysis
15. Duopoly with endogenous strategic timing: Stackelberg regained
16. Second mover disadvantages in a three-player stackelberg game with private information