An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn , Issue 2, 2002, Pages 135-142

  Larson, Kate ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATION THEORY; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; THEOREM PROVING;

BARGAINING MODELS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 0036368944     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/544772.544774     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

1. Deliberation scheduling for problem solving in time-constrained environments
2. Monitoring and control of anytime algorithms: A dynamic programming approach
3. Reasoning about beliefs and actions under computational resource constraints
4. Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
5. Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games
6. Multiagent negotiation under time constraints
7. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium
8. Costly valuation computation in auctions
9. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
10. Rationality and intelligence
11. Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
12. Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
13. Bargaining with deadlines
14. Optimal composition of real-time systems