Non-cooperative dynamics of multi-agent teams

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn , Issue 3, 2002, Pages 1082-1089

  Axtell, Robert L ^a  

^a BROOKINGS INSTITUTION   (United States)

Author keywords

Equal division; Increasing returns; Multi agent coalitions; Proportional reward; Stationary distribution of group sizes; Team formation; Transient groups; Unstable Nash equilibria

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SIMULATION; GAME THEORY; SOFTWARE AGENTS;

MULTI-AGENT TEAMS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 0036361431     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/545056.545076     Document Type: Conference Paper

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