Corporate investment myopia: A horserace of the theories

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 353-371

  Lundstrum, Leonard L ^a  

^a NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Investing policy; R D

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036341306     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00050-5     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Do short run objectives lead to under or over investment in the long-term project?
2. Diversification's effect on firm value
3. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior
4. Career concerns of mutual fund managers
5. Managerial incentives for short-term results: A comment
6. Executive incentives and the horizon problem
7. Tobin's marginal q and average q: A neoclassical interpretation
8. R&D and Internal Finance: A panel study of small firms in high-tech industries
9. Do financing constraints explain why investment is correlated with cash flow
10. Golden parachutes, shark repellents, and hostile tender offers
11. Shark repellants and managerial myopia: An empirical test
12. Managerial incentives for short-run results
13. Managerial incentives for short-term results: A reply
14. Renegotiation, investment horizons and managerial discretion
15. Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments
16. Takeover threats and managerial myopia
17. Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate behavior
18. A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroscedasticity