Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion

Journal of Business

Volumn 70, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 385-407

  Noe, Thomas N ^a   Rebello, Michael J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040061923     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/209723     Document Type: Article

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