Reform and Counterreform: The Path to Market in Hungary and Cuba

Comparative Politics

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 211-231

  Cruz, Consuelo ^a   Seleny, Anna ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0036336382     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4146938     Document Type: Article

References (100)

1. Ákos Róna-Tas, "Post-Communist Transition and the Absent Middle Class in East Central Europe," in Victoria Bonnell, ed., Identities in Transition: Eastern Europe and Russia after the Collapse of Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 29-30.
2. Karl Polányi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), pp. 139, 141.
3. Kiren Aziz Chaudry, "Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State, " Comparative Politics, 21 (October 1994).
4. Peter Lewis, "Economic Reform and Political Transition in Africa, " World Politics, 49 (October 1996).
5. Jorge Dominguez, "Free Politics and Free Markets in Latin America, " Journal of Democracy, 9 (October 1998); Privatization in Eastern Europe (New York: CEU Press, 1994); Privatization in the Transition Process (New York: UNCTAD 1992); Paul Marer, "Economic Transformation, 1990-1998 "; and Keith Crane, "Privatization Policies, " in Aurel Braun and Zoltán Bárány, Dilemmas of Transition (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1999).
6. Jorge Dominguez, "Free Politics and Free Markets in Latin America, " Journal of Democracy, 9 (October 1998); Privatization in Eastern Europe (New York: CEU Press, 1994); Privatization in the Transition Process (New York: UNCTAD 1992); Paul Marer, "Economic Transformation, 1990-1998 "; and Keith Crane, "Privatization Policies, " in Aurel Braun and Zoltán Bárány, Dilemmas of Transition (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1999).
7. Jorge Dominguez, "Free Politics and Free Markets in Latin America, " Journal of Democracy, 9 (October 1998); Privatization in Eastern Europe (New York: CEU Press, 1994); Privatization in the Transition Process (New York: UNCTAD 1992); Paul Marer, "Economic Transformation, 1990-1998 "; and Keith Crane, "Privatization Policies, " in Aurel Braun and Zoltán Bárány, Dilemmas of Transition (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1999).
8. Jorge Dominguez, "Free Politics and Free Markets in Latin America, " Journal of Democracy, 9 (October 1998); Privatization in Eastern Europe (New York: CEU Press, 1994); Privatization in the Transition Process (New York: UNCTAD 1992); Paul Marer, "Economic Transformation, 1990-1998 "; and Keith Crane, "Privatization Policies, " in Aurel Braun and Zoltán Bárány, Dilemmas of Transition (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1999).
9. Jorge Dominguez, "Free Politics and Free Markets in Latin America, " Journal of Democracy, 9 (October 1998); Privatization in Eastern Europe (New York: CEU Press, 1994); Privatization in the Transition Process (New York: UNCTAD 1992); Paul Marer, "Economic Transformation, 1990-1998 "; and Keith Crane, "Privatization Policies, " in Aurel Braun and Zoltán Bárány, Dilemmas of Transition (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1999).
10. To qualify as a reform, change in a state socialist system must alter at least one of the system's defining attributes - ideology, property rights, or bureaucratic coordination. János Kornai, The Socialist System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 36-50; 71; 361; 388.
11. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 7.
12. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 26.
13. The second economy consisted of nonstate private economic activity, licenced and informal, legal, illegal, and on the borderline of illegality. István Gábor and Péter Galasi, "Second Economy, State and Labor Market, " in Peter Galasi and György Szirácki, eds., Labour Market and Second Economy in Hungary (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1985).
14. The economist Paul Marer points out that Hungary's overall transformation may even have been faster than Poland's or the Czech Republic's, and several economists have noted that the gradual/radical dichotomy adopted by many political scientists is fundamentally misleading. Accordingly, we hew closely to Kornai's definition of reform.
15. Delay of stabilization slowed growth until 1996, though other factors - economic mismanagement between 1990 and 1994, higher per capita debt service than any other East European country, very high social spending as a percentage of GDP, and institutional restructuring earlier than its neighbors (including far more early bankruptcies after the draconian bankruptcy law of 1992) - also contributed. János Kornai, "The Transformational Recession, " Economie Appliquée, 956 (1993), 181-227. On the links to political stability and consensus, see Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gábor Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Anna Seleny, "Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies: Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland, " World Politics, 51 (July 1999). On the 1995 program and growth, see Marer, pp. 167, 195-96.
16. Delay of stabilization slowed growth until 1996, though other factors - economic mismanagement between 1990 and 1994, higher per capita debt service than any other East European country, very high social spending as a percentage of GDP, and institutional restructuring earlier than its neighbors (including far more early bankruptcies after the draconian bankruptcy law of 1992) - also contributed. János Kornai, "The Transformational Recession, " Economie Appliquée, 956 (1993), 181-227. On the links to political stability and consensus, see Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gábor Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Anna Seleny, "Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies: Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland, " World Politics, 51 (July 1999). On the 1995 program and growth, see Marer, pp. 167, 195-96.
17. Delay of stabilization slowed growth until 1996, though other factors - economic mismanagement between 1990 and 1994, higher per capita debt service than any other East European country, very high social spending as a percentage of GDP, and institutional restructuring earlier than its neighbors (including far more early bankruptcies after the draconian bankruptcy law of 1992) - also contributed. János Kornai, "The Transformational Recession, " Economie Appliquée, 956 (1993), 181-227. On the links to political stability and consensus, see Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gábor Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Anna Seleny, "Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies: Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland, " World Politics, 51 (July 1999). On the 1995 program and growth, see Marer, pp. 167, 195-96.
18. Delay of stabilization slowed growth until 1996, though other factors - economic mismanagement between 1990 and 1994, higher per capita debt service than any other East European country, very high social spending as a percentage of GDP, and institutional restructuring earlier than its neighbors (including far more early bankruptcies after the draconian bankruptcy law of 1992) - also contributed. János Kornai, "The Transformational Recession, " Economie Appliquée, 956 (1993), 181-227. On the links to political stability and consensus, see Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gábor Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Anna Seleny, "Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies: Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland, " World Politics, 51 (July 1999). On the 1995 program and growth, see Marer, pp. 167, 195-96.
19. Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Tóka, p. 131.
20. On the classical bureaucratic system, see Kornai, The Socialist System, ch. 6.
21. This analysis borrows from Paul Pierson's work on the mechanism of policy feedback. The premise is simple: government policies affect politics. Prior policies provide learning experiences for political elites. Policies also produce incentives and resources that facilitate or block interest group mobilization and can even engender new interest groups and create "niches " for political entrepreneurs, who may help "latent groups overcome collective action problems. " Finally, policies can supply "mass publics " with crucial information by generating "focusing events " or "cues " that help social actors interpret the world around them. Paul Pierson, "When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change, " World Politics, 45 (July 1993), 598-601, 611-619.
22. Leila Webster, "Private Sector Manufacturing in Hungary: A Survey of Firms " (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Industry Development Division, Industry and Energy Department, 1992).
23. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 156.
24. Minxin Pei, "Microfoundations of State-Socialism and Patterns of Economic Transformation, " Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 29 (1996), 132-33.
25. Beverly Crawford, "Post-Communist Political Economy, " in Beverly Crawford, ed., Markets, State and Democracy: The Political Economy of Communist Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 4-5.
26. Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), p. 41.
27. David Bartlett, The Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reform and Democratization in Hungary (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 2-3.
28. Bureaucratic reorganization, regulatory tinkering, and consolidation or decentralization of state firms are less important to the development of market economies than property rights reform. Even the state's fiscal relationship with firms, while critical, is secondary. State-owned firms and bureaucracies can be reorganized by governmental fiat; regulations can be altered by ministerial decree; and parliaments can, in the transitional years, vote to limit state subsidies of firms.
29. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
30. The counterclaim that private sector development under state socialism is unnecessary for a successful postsocialist transition is, to a point, reasonable. In a postsocialist environment private vendors spring up overnight; restaurants open in private homes; and personal automobiles become taxis. But barring a presocialist history of relatively advanced industrial development (for example, Czechoslovakia), what applies to the retail and service sectors and to miniscule, one or two person operations does not apply to manufacturing or to those retail or service sector businesses that by their nature require major investments of human or capital resources.
31. As opposed to municipal party organizations' discretionary and highly restrictive licensing of private ventures.
32. Ekiert.
33. Lázló Bruszt, "The Political Organization of Business Interests in Hungary, " EUI Colloquium Papers (DC. IUE 261/87 Col 45) (Florence: European University Institute, June 1988), p. 33.
34. Rudolf Andorka, "The Importance and Role of the Second Economy for Hungarian Economy and Society " (unpublished paper, Budapest University of Economics, 1990).
35. Iván Szelényi, Socialist Entrepreneurs: Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 72.
36. Peter Galasi and György Sziráczki, "A Review of Developments in the Organization and Structure of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: Hungary " (unpublished manuscript prepared for the International Labor Organization, Budapest, Karl Marx University of Economics, 1987), pp. 14-18.
37. Andorka, p. 5.
38. David Stark, "Coexisting Organizational Forms in Hungary's Emerging Mixed Economy, " in Victor Nee and D. Stark, eds., Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).
39. Anna Seleny, "Constructing the Discourse of Transformation, " East European Politics and Societies, 8 (Fall 1994), 439-66.
40. Anna Seleny, "Reforms within Socialism, " paper delivered at the conference Toward A New Cuba? Revolutionary Legacy and Market Imperative in the Age of Globalization, Princeton University, April 7-8, 1995.
41. Judit Fekete, "'Coup' as a Method of Management: Crisis Management Methods in Hungary in the Eighties, " Acta Oeconomica, 42 (1990).
42. Interview with István Hetényi, former Minister of Finance, Ministry of Finance, Budapest, 1995.
43. Tamás Sárkozy, A tarsásági törvény: Magyarázatokkal és iratmintákkal [The Law on Association: Explanations and Sample Documents] (Budapest: Lang, 1988), ch. 7.
44. István Gábor, "Italy on the Danube, " The Economist, Feb. 23, 1991, p. 48.
45. On Hungarian privatization and the ways it was shaped by the existing private sector, see Akos Róna-Tas, The Great Surprise of the Small Transformation: The Demise of Communism and the Rise of the Private Sector in Hungary (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 275-320.
46. Oliver Blanchard et al., Reform in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), p. 11.
47. Mihály Laki, "Chances for the Acceleration of Transition: The Case of Hungarian Privatization, " East European Politics and Societies, 1 (1993), 448-49.
48. Webster.
49. Susan Eckstein, Back from the Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 31; Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981), p. 12.
50. Susan Eckstein, Back from the Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 31; Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981), p. 12.
51. Under the prerevolutionary regime sugar's share of total exports was 78 percent, and harvesting peaked at 7 million tons. By 1967 the share of sugar exports was 86 percent of the total, while the harvest of 1968-69 reached only 4.5 million tons. Janette Habel, Cuba: The Revolution in Peril (London: Verso, 1991).
52. In the agrarian reforms of 1959 and 1963, which placed most land under state control, state farmers lost their private plots, while remaining private farmers were required "to sell all their produce to the state (at low prices), to cooperate with state plans, and to hire no labor. " Farmers were also "pressed to incorporate their properties into the state sector. " Eckstein, pp. 33-34.
53. H. Thomas, The Cuban Revolution (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971).
54. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, La Economía en Cuba socialista: Una evaluación de dos décodas (Madrid: Editorial Playor, 1983).
55. Granma Weekly Review, Aug. 30, 1970, pp. 4-5.
56. Eckstein, p. 45.
57. Sergio Roca, "The Comandante in His Economic Labyrinth, " in E. Baloyra and J. Morris, eds., Conflict and Change in Cuba (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), p. 160.
58. Andrew Zimbalist, "Incentives and Planning in Cuba, " Latin American Research Review, 24 (1989).
59. Jorge Pérez López, "Bringing the Cuban Economy into Focus: Conceptual and Empirical Challenges, " Latin American Research Review, 26 (1991).
60. Mauricio Font, "Crisis and Reform in Cuba, " in Miguel Angel Centeno and Mauricio Font, eds., Toward a New Cuba: Legacies of a Revolution (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 112.
61. Peasants were not permitted to use intermediaries to distribute their produce and were frequently accused of not meeting their state quotas and/or of selling beyond the amount allowed by their licenses. Jonathan Rosenberg, "Cuba's Free-Market Experiment: Los Mercados Libres Campesinos, " Latin American Research Review, 27 (1992).
62. CEPAL, "Balance preliminar de la economía latinoamericana 1986, " in Notas sobre la economía y el desarrollo, 438-39 (December 1986); Jorge Pérez-López, "Bringing the Cuban Economy into Focus: Conceptual and Empirical Challenges, " Latin American Research Review, 26 (1991).
63. CEPAL, "Balance preliminar de la economía latinoamericana 1986, " in Notas sobre la economía y el desarrollo, 438-39 (December 1986); Jorge Pérez-López, "Bringing the Cuban Economy into Focus: Conceptual and Empirical Challenges, " Latin American Research Review, 26 (1991).
64. C. D. Deere and M. Meurs, "Markets, Markets Everywhere? Understanding the Cuban Anomaly, " World Development, 20 (1992), 825-39.
65. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Cuba: Un caso único de reformas de anti-mercado: Retrospectívas y Perspectivas, " Pensamiento Iberoamericano, 2 (July 1992-June 1993).
66. Font, p. 113.
67. Cuba had powerful short-term incentives for preserving the status quo in trade policy, since the Soviet Union paid high preferential prices for Cuban sugar imports and exported its oil to Cuba at below market prices until 1986. Cuba then reexported the oil at a profit. Pérez-López, pp. 120, 123.
68. The GSP grew at 1 percent in 1986, then contracted by 3.9 percent in 1987. The recovery registered in 1988 and 1989 was mild: 2.5 percent and 1.0 percent rates of growth, respectively. CEPAL, "Balance preliminar de la economía de América Latina y el Caribe, " Notas sobre la economía y el desarrollo, 500-501 (December 1990).
69. Granma, June I, 1986.
70. Rosenberg.
71. Carlos García Valdés et al., Economía Cubana: Del Trauma a la Recuperación (Havana: Editorial Pueblo y Educación, 1998), p. 103.
72. García Valdés et al., pp. 166-67.
73. Juan M. Del Aguila, "The Party, the Fourth Congress and the Process of Counter-Reform, " in Dilemmas of a Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 82.
74. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Are Economic Reforms Propelling Cuba to the Market? (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1994), pp. 5-6.
75. División de Desarrollo Económico de CEPAL, Estudio económico de América Latina y Caribe 1997-1998 (September 1998).
76. Marifeli Perez-Stable, "The Invisible Crisis: The Exhaustion of Politics in 1990s Cuba, " in Centeno and Font, eds.
77. Jorge Dominguez, "The Secrets of Castro's Staying in Power, " Foreign Affairs, 72 (Spring 1997), 97-107.
78. Arturo Cruz and Consuelo Cruz, Quo Vadis, Fidel? (unpublished manuscript, June 1999).
79. García Valdés et al., pp. 106-7.
80. M. Cooper, "Castro's 'Grandchildren' Discover the Glory of the Dollar, " Harper's, 290, no. 1738 (1995), 61.
81. "Cuba Vive, " speech by Fidel Castro, August 6, 1995, quoted in Barricada (Managua), Sept. 1, 1995.
82. "Cuba: Red Comedy and Not Very Comic, " The Economist, Sept. 26, 1998, pp. 35-36.
83. Mauricio Font, Asuntos Cubanos (Princeton: Comité Cubano por la Democracia, Summer-Fall 1994), p. 11.
84. "Cuba Vive. "
85. Manuel Pastor and Andrew Zimbalist, "When Will They Ever Learn? Economic Adjustment and Reform in Cuba, " paper presented at the symposium Toward a New Cuba?, Princeton University, April 7-8, 1995.
86. Country Report, Cuba, 4th Quarter (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994), p. 16.
87. Stephen Handelman, "The Russian Mafia, " Foreign Affairs (March-April 1994); Virginie Coulloudon, "The Criminalization of Russia's Political Elite, " East European Constitutional Review, 6 (Fall 1997), 73-77; Erik P. Hoffmann, "Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russian Politics, " in Harry Eckstein, Frederic Fleron, Erik Hoffmann, and William Reisinger, eds., Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 131-32. On central Europe, see Marer; Crane.
88. Stephen Handelman, "The Russian Mafia, " Foreign Affairs (March-April 1994); Virginie Coulloudon, "The Criminalization of Russia's Political Elite, " East European Constitutional Review, 6 (Fall 1997), 73-77; Erik P. Hoffmann, "Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russian Politics, " in Harry Eckstein, Frederic Fleron, Erik Hoffmann, and William Reisinger, eds., Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 131-32. On central Europe, see Marer; Crane.
89. Stephen Handelman, "The Russian Mafia, " Foreign Affairs (March-April 1994); Virginie Coulloudon, "The Criminalization of Russia's Political Elite, " East European Constitutional Review, 6 (Fall 1997), 73-77; Erik P. Hoffmann, "Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russian Politics, " in Harry Eckstein, Frederic Fleron, Erik Hoffmann, and William Reisinger, eds., Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 131-32. On central Europe, see Marer; Crane.
90. Hungary is the exemplar. The 1982 statutes included detailed regulations on property transfer, contract enforcement, and leasing. Throughout the 1980s new regulations rationalizing the practice of private enterprise were added, and existing ones were refined. By 1985 Hungary had a private income tax law in place, and banking reform began in 1984. By 1987 state firms, demanding the same flexibility accorded private firms, achieved expanded rights to form joint ventures (which they had been nominally able to do since 1977). In Poland the regulatory infrastructure of the private sector outside of agriculture was less well developed, but some steps were taken in the late 1980s. The absolute right of private farmers to their property was enshrined in the constitution in 1983. On Hungary, see Sárközy, A tarsásági törvény; on Poland, see Ben Slay, The Polish Economy: Crisis, Reform and Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
91. Hungary is the exemplar. The 1982 statutes included detailed regulations on property transfer, contract enforcement, and leasing. Throughout the 1980s new regulations rationalizing the practice of private enterprise were added, and existing ones were refined. By 1985 Hungary had a private income tax law in place, and banking reform began in 1984. By 1987 state firms, demanding the same flexibility accorded private firms, achieved expanded rights to form joint ventures (which they had been nominally able to do since 1977). In Poland the regulatory infrastructure of the private sector outside of agriculture was less well developed, but some steps were taken in the late 1980s. The absolute right of private farmers to their property was enshrined in the constitution in 1983. On Hungary, see Sárközy, A tarsásági törvény; on Poland, see Ben Slay, The Polish Economy: Crisis, Reform and Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
92. Judith Kullberg and William Zimmerman, "Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses and Problems of Russian Democracy, " World Politics, 51 (April 1999), 327. Macroeconomic performance seems to matter more during crises that "impose large losses on most people, " like hyperinflation. Kurt Weyland, "Swallowing the Bitter Pill: Sources of Popular Support for Neoliberal Reform in Latin America, " Comparative Political Studies, 31 (October 1998), 540.
93. Judith Kullberg and William Zimmerman, "Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses and Problems of Russian Democracy, " World Politics, 51 (April 1999), 327. Macroeconomic performance seems to matter more during crises that "impose large losses on most people, " like hyperinflation. Kurt Weyland, "Swallowing the Bitter Pill: Sources of Popular Support for Neoliberal Reform in Latin America, " Comparative Political Studies, 31 (October 1998), 540.
94. This is one reason why Hungary received more direct foreign investment than all the other East European countries put together between 1989 and 1998. The size and diversity of the indigenous private sector was a key factor that figured - along with tax incentives, a stable political system, and well-developed legal infrastructure - in multinational car makers' decisions to base plants in Hungary. David Bartlett and Anna Seleny, "The Political Enforcement of Liberalism: Bargaining, Institutions, and Auto Multinationals in Hungary, " International Studies Quarterly, 42 (1998). See also Marer, pp. 188-89.
95. This is one reason why Hungary received more direct foreign investment than all the other East European countries put together between 1989 and 1998. The size and diversity of the indigenous private sector was a key factor that figured - along with tax incentives, a stable political system, and well-developed legal infrastructure - in multinational car makers' decisions to base plants in Hungary. David Bartlett and Anna Seleny, "The Political Enforcement of Liberalism: Bargaining, Institutions, and Auto Multinationals in Hungary, " International Studies Quarterly, 42 (1998). See also Marer, pp. 188-89.
96. Simon Johnson and Gary Loveman, Starting over in Eastern Europe: Entrepreneurship and Economic Renewal (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1995), pp. 212-33.
97. Small private firms have been leaders of innovation in the United States, while barriers to entry for such firms contribute to high unemployment in some West European countries. F. Fitzroy, "Employment, Entrepreneurship, and 1992, " Small Business Economics, 2 (1989), 11-28; also, Gerald McDermott and Michael Mejstrik, "Czechoslovak Competitiveness and the Role of Small Firms, " in Z. Acs and D. Audretsch, eds., Small Firms and Entrepreneurship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
98. Small private firms have been leaders of innovation in the United States, while barriers to entry for such firms contribute to high unemployment in some West European countries. F. Fitzroy, "Employment, Entrepreneurship, and 1992, " Small Business Economics, 2 (1989), 11-28; also, Gerald McDermott and Michael Mejstrik, "Czechoslovak Competitiveness and the Role of Small Firms, " in Z. Acs and D. Audretsch, eds., Small Firms and Entrepreneurship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
99. Superficial in the sense that it often fails to produce clearly identifiable real owners whose immediate interests are closely tied to the firm's fortunes and who can thus be expected to have "genuine...entrepreneurial motivation. " János Kornai, The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System (New York: Norton 1990), p. 82. See also Current Aspects of the Czech Capital Market (Prague: Ministry of Finance, 1997); Crane.
100. Superficial in the sense that it often fails to produce clearly identifiable real owners whose immediate interests are closely tied to the firm's fortunes and who can thus be expected to have "genuine...entrepreneurial motivation. " János Kornai, The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System (New York: Norton 1990), p. 82. See also Current Aspects of the Czech Capital Market (Prague: Ministry of Finance, 1997); Crane.