Broiler production contracts as a multi-agent problem: Common risk, incentives and heterogeneity

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 82, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 606-622

  Goodhue, Rachael E ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Production contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000894151     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0002-9092.00050     Document Type: Article

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