An optimal IPO mechanism

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 117-146

  Biais, Bruno ^a,b   Rochet, Jean Charles ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INVESTMENT; STOCK MARKET; THEORETICAL STUDY;

FRANCE; UNITED KINGDOM;

EID: 0036183625     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00200     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Signaling by underpricing in the IPO market
2. Anleger tappen im Dunkeln
3. A model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues
4. How investment bankers determine the offer price and allocation of new issues
5. A comparative analysis of IPO proceeds under alternative regulatory environments
6. IPO auctions: English, dutch, ... French and internet
7. Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 by 2 case
8. The 7% solution
9. Evidence on the strategic allocation of IPO
10. Large sample properties of general method of moments estimates
11. French auctions of common stock new issues
12. The demand for stocks: An analysis of IPO auctions
13. Continuous auction and insider trading
14. An exploration of the theory of optimum income taxation
15. Das Kartell der Absahner
16. Ironing, sweeping and multidimensional screening
17. Insider trading without normality
18. Why new issues are underpriced
19. Wall street brokers press small investors to hold IPO shares
20. Preplay communication, participation restrictions, and efficiency in initial public offerings
21. Seasoned offerings, imitation costs and the underpricing of IPOs