An analysis of welfare effects of legislative term limits

Public Choice

Volumn 110, Issue 3-4, 2002, Pages 245-260

  Lee, Kangoh ^a  

^a TOWSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036102349     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013012627335     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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