Coordination of speculation

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 159-175

  Botman, Dennis P J ^a,b,c   Jager, Henk ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b TINBERGEN INSTITUTE   (Netherlands)

^c NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

Contagion; Coordination; Devaluation; Noisy communication; Speculation

Indexed keywords

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS; CREDIT PROVISION; CURRENCY DEVALUATION; FINANCIAL CRISIS; MODEL;

EID: 0036062061     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00166-0     Document Type: Article

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