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Economic Theory
Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 637-644
Risk aversion, moral hazard, and the principal's loss
Author keywords

Moral hazard; Principal agent; Risk aversion
Indexed keywords

EID: 0036026156     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990100222     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (12)
References (5)
  • 1
    • 0000638668 scopus 로고
    • An analysis of the principal-agent problem
    • Grossman, S., Hart, O.: An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 51, 7-45 (1983)
    • (1983) Econometrica , vol.51 , pp. 7-45
    • Grossman, S.1    Hart, O.2
  • 2
    • 84937304812 scopus 로고
    • Risk aversion, performance, and the principal agent problem
    • Haubrich, J.: Risk aversion, performance, and the principal agent problem. Journal of Political Economy 102, 258-276 (1994)
    • (1994) Journal of Political Economy , vol.102 , pp. 258-276
    • Haubrich, J.1
  • 3
    • 0032219890 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Executive compensation: A calibration approach
    • Haubrich, J., Popova, I.: Executive compensation: a calibration approach. Economic Theory 12, 561-581 (1998)
    • (1998) Economic Theory , vol.12 , pp. 561-581
    • Haubrich, J.1    Popova, I.2
  • 4
    • 0004164413 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Mimeo, Department of Economics, Stanford University
    • Milgrom, P.: The envelope theorems. Mimeo, Department of Economics, Stanford University (1999)
    • (1999) The Envelope Theorems
    • Milgrom, P.1
  • 5
    • 0001547529 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Wealth effects in the principal-agent model
    • Thiele, H., Wambach, A.: Wealth effects in the principal-agent model. Journal of Economic Theory 89, 247-260 (1999)
    • (1999) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.89 , pp. 247-260
    • Thiele, H.1    Wambach, A.2

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.