Regulating a polluting firm under asymmetric information

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 267-284

  Jebjerg, Lars ^a   Lando, Henrik ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b Copenhagen Business School ^*  (Denmark)

Author keywords

Laffont Tirole model; Pollution; Regulator; Tax generation; Tax schemes

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; POLLUTION CONTROL; TAXATION;

LAFFONT TIROLE MODEL; LINEAR TAX SCHEMES;

LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION; LAFFONT-TIROLE MODEL; POLLUTION CONTROL; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK;

EID: 0031259926     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026471117727     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Baron, D. (1985), 'Regulating of Prices and Pollution Under Incomplete Information', Journal of Public Economics 28.
2. Baron, D. and R. Myerson (1982), 'Regulating a Monopolist and with Unknown Costs', Econometrica 50(4).
3. Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, Game Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
4. Tirole J. and J.-J. Laffont (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulations. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
5. Sethi, S. P. and G. L. Thompson (1981), Optimal Control Theory. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing.
6. Spulber, D. F. (1988), 'Optimal Environmental Regulation Under Asymmetric Information', Journal of Public Economics 35.