Rewarding North Korea: Theoretical perspectives on the 1994 Agreed Framework

Journal of Peace Research

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 51-68

  Martin, Curtis H ^a  

^a MERRIMACK COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036003167     PISSN: 00223433     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022343302039001003     Document Type: Article

References (82)

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3. Introduction and analytical framework
4. How to think about Korean unification
5. North Korea
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7. The value of economic incentives in international politics
8. Securing compliance with disarmament treaties
9. Mixing carrots with sticks: Evaluating the effectiveness of positive incentives
10. Cooperative threat reduction in perspective
11. Case studies and theory in political science
12. Will economic sanctions work against North Korea?
13. On the meaning of non-violence
14. Sanctioning madness
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16. North Korean foreign policy
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18. Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma
19. The nuclear age: The next chapter
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21. Lessons of the agreed framework for using engagement as a nonproliferation tool
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23. Explaining North Korea's negotiated cooperation with the US
24. Responding to proliferation: A role for nonlethal defense
25. Nuclear blackmail and North Korea's search for a place in the sun
26. Linkage
27. The role of rewards in conflictual international interactions
28. The Korean Peninsula energy development organization: Achievements and challenges
29. Policies toward North Korea: A time for new thinking