Imperfect enforcement, foreign investment, and foreign aid

Macroeconomic Dynamics

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 476-495

  Asiedu, Elizabeth ^a   Villamil, Anne P ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Enforcement; Foreign Aid; Foreign Investment; Multilateral Organizations

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035982396     PISSN: 13651005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1365100501010070     Document Type: Review

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