Competitive prizes: When less scrutiny induces more effort

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 311-336

  Dubey, Pradeep ^a   Wu, Chien wei ^b  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL CHI NAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Competitive prizes; Principal's policy; Strategic game

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035893138     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00079-9     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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