The Polish peasant party: A mass party in postcommunist Eastern Europe?

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 554-585

  Szczerbiak, Aleks ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035736929     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/088832501766276272     Document Type: Article

References (114)

1. See, for example, Petr Kopecky, "Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe: What Type of Party is Likely to Emerge?" Party Politics 1:4 (October 1995): 515-34; Paul Lewis, ed., Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996); Peter Mair. What is different about post-communist party systems? (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1996); and David Olson, "Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe," Political Studies 46: 3 (June 1998): 432-64.
2. See, for example, Petr Kopecky, "Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe: What Type of Party is Likely to Emerge?" Party Politics 1:4 (October 1995): 515-34; Paul Lewis, ed., Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996); Peter Mair. What is different about post-communist party systems? (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1996); and David Olson, "Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe," Political Studies 46: 3 (June 1998): 432-64.
3. See, for example, Petr Kopecky, "Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe: What Type of Party is Likely to Emerge?" Party Politics 1:4 (October 1995): 515-34; Paul Lewis, ed., Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996); Peter Mair. What is different about post-communist party systems? (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1996); and David Olson, "Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe," Political Studies 46: 3 (June 1998): 432-64.
4. See, for example, Petr Kopecky, "Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe: What Type of Party is Likely to Emerge?" Party Politics 1:4 (October 1995): 515-34; Paul Lewis, ed., Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996); Peter Mair. What is different about post-communist party systems? (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1996); and David Olson, "Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe," Political Studies 46: 3 (June 1998): 432-64.
5. Kopecky, "Developing Party Organisations," 517.
6. Paul G. Lewis and Radzislawa Gortat, "Models of Party Development and Questions of State Dependence in Poland," Party Politics 1:4 (October 1995): 603.
7. On the mass party see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen, 1954). On the catch-all party, see Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of West European Party Systems," in Joseph P. La Palmabora and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177-200. On the electoral-professional party, see Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the cartel party, and for a useful summary of the historical development and main features of all the party models, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organisations and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," Party Politics 1:1 (January 1995): 5-28.
8. On the mass party see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen, 1954). On the catch-all party, see Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of West European Party Systems," in Joseph P. La Palmabora and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177-200. On the electoral-professional party, see Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the cartel party, and for a useful summary of the historical development and main features of all the party models, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organisations and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," Party Politics 1:1 (January 1995): 5-28.
9. On the mass party see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen, 1954). On the catch-all party, see Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of West European Party Systems," in Joseph P. La Palmabora and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177-200. On the electoral-professional party, see Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the cartel party, and for a useful summary of the historical development and main features of all the party models, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organisations and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," Party Politics 1:1 (January 1995): 5-28.
10. On the mass party see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen, 1954). On the catch-all party, see Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of West European Party Systems," in Joseph P. La Palmabora and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177-200. On the electoral-professional party, see Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the cartel party, and for a useful summary of the historical development and main features of all the party models, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organisations and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," Party Politics 1:1 (January 1995): 5-28.
11. Panebianco, Political Parties, 52.
12. See, for example, Mair, What is Different, 9-16.
13. See, for example, Kopecky, "Developing Party Organisations," 529-30; and Lewis, Party Structure, 6-7.
14. See, for example, Kopecky, "Developing Party Organisations," 529-30; and Lewis, Party Structure, 6-7.
15. Duverger, Political Parties, 63.
16. Ibid.
17. See Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "After the Peasants' Unity Congress: A New Political Constellation?" RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe (25 May 1990): 33-36.
18. For the best English-language historical account of the origins and development of the Polish agrarian movement, see Olga Narkiewicz, The Green Flag: Polish Populist Politics, 1867-1970 (London: Croom Helm, 1976). For a short Polish account, see Janusz Gmitruk, Sto Lat Ruchu Ludowego, 1895-1995 (Warsaw: PSL, 1995).
19. For the best English-language historical account of the origins and development of the Polish agrarian movement, see Olga Narkiewicz, The Green Flag: Polish Populist Politics, 1867-1970 (London: Croom Helm, 1976). For a short Polish account, see Janusz Gmitruk, Sto Lat Ruchu Ludowego, 1895-1995 (Warsaw: PSL, 1995).
20. The PSL-PL won only 2.37 percent while the SLCh contested the elections as part of the Catholic Electoral Committee "Fatherland" (Katolicki Komitet Wyborczy 'Ojczyzna' [KKW'O']) coalition which won 6.37 percent.
21. See Aleks Szczerbiak, "The Impact of the October 1998 Local Elections on the Emerging Polish Party System," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 15:3 (September 1999): 80-100.
22. See Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe: the Three Faces of Party Organisation," American Review of Politics 14 (Winter 1993): 593-617.
23. Following local government reforms, these were replaced by 16 larger provinces in January 1999.
24. Unless otherwise stated, all references to and citations from the PSL Statutes or parliamentary fraction procedural rules are taken from PSL, Statut (Warsaw: PSL, 1996); and PSL/Klub Parliamentary PSL, Regulamin Klubu Parlamentarnego PSL (Warsaw: PSL/Klub Parlamentarny PSL, 1994).
25. Unless otherwise stated, all references to and citations from the PSL Statutes or parliamentary fraction procedural rules are taken from PSL, Statut (Warsaw: PSL, 1996); and PSL/Klub Parliamentary PSL, Regulamin Klubu Parlamentarnego PSL (Warsaw: PSL/Klub Parlamentarny PSL, 1994).
26. For a useful summary of the official position on the role of PSL parliamentarians, see the interview with then party council chairman Józef Zych in "Wybory potwiedziły nasze wpływy," Rzeczpospolita, 1 July 1994.
27. See "Kalinowski zamiast Jagielińskiego: PSL wycofała rekomendacjȩ dla wicepremiera," Rzeczpospolita, 13 February 1997.
28. See Ania van der Meer-Krok-Paszkowska and Marc van den Muyzenburg, "Orientation to the State? Parliamentary Parties in Hungary and Poland and their Relations with Party in Central Office" (paper presented at the International Conference on The New Democratic Parliaments: The First Years, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 24-25 June 1996).
29. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "Prezes bez zaufania," Rzeczpospolita, 18 December 1995 . Their dismissal was confirmed by the Supreme Council in January 1996, see "Negocjować do skutku," Rzeczpospolita, 29 January 1996 .
30. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "Prezes bez zaufania," Rzeczpospolita, 18 December 1995 . Their dismissal was confirmed by the Supreme Council in January 1996, see "Negocjować do skutku," Rzeczpospolita, 29 January 1996 .
31. The same Congress also lowered the threshold required for the Supreme Council to remove an incumbent leader from a two-thirds to a simple majority. Information supplied by Janusz Gmitruk, director, PSL Institute of Peasant Movement History, author interview, 17 June 1997.
32. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska and Michał Janowski, "Zapowiedź zmian," Rzeczpospolita, 13 October 1997; and Mariusz Janicki, "Pawlak bez głosu," Polityka, 18 October 1997. In December 1995, the Supreme Council had also failed to pass a vote of confidence in Pawlak by 57 votes to 56, but fell short of the 63 votes against required for him to be forced to resign and a subsequent attempt to remove him in January 1996 was defeated by 61 votes to 46. See Czaczkowska, "Prezes bez zaufania"; "Negocjowć do skutku"; and Dominika Wielowiejska, "Swary tylko z rza̧dem," Gazeta Wyborcza, 18-19 May 1996.
33. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska and Michał Janowski, "Zapowiedź zmian," Rzeczpospolita, 13 October 1997; and Mariusz Janicki, "Pawlak bez głosu," Polityka, 18 October 1997. In December 1995, the Supreme Council had also failed to pass a vote of confidence in Pawlak by 57 votes to 56, but fell short of the 63 votes against required for him to be forced to resign and a subsequent attempt to remove him in January 1996 was defeated by 61 votes to 46. See Czaczkowska, "Prezes bez zaufania"; "Negocjowć do skutku"; and Dominika Wielowiejska, "Swary tylko z rza̧dem," Gazeta Wyborcza, 18-19 May 1996.
34. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska and Michał Janowski, "Zapowiedź zmian," Rzeczpospolita, 13 October 1997; and Mariusz Janicki, "Pawlak bez głosu," Polityka, 18 October 1997. In December 1995, the Supreme Council had also failed to pass a vote of confidence in Pawlak by 57 votes to 56, but fell short of the 63 votes against required for him to be forced to resign and a subsequent attempt to remove him in January 1996 was defeated by 61 votes to 46. See Czaczkowska, "Prezes bez zaufania"; "Negocjowć do skutku"; and Dominika Wielowiejska, "Swary tylko z rza̧dem," Gazeta Wyborcza, 18-19 May 1996.
35. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska and Michał Janowski, "Zapowiedź zmian," Rzeczpospolita, 13 October 1997; and Mariusz Janicki, "Pawlak bez głosu," Polityka, 18 October 1997. In December 1995, the Supreme Council had also failed to pass a vote of confidence in Pawlak by 57 votes to 56, but fell short of the 63 votes against required for him to be forced to resign and a subsequent attempt to remove him in January 1996 was defeated by 61 votes to 46. See Czaczkowska, "Prezes bez zaufania"; "Negocjowć do skutku"; and Dominika Wielowiejska, "Swary tylko z rza̧dem," Gazeta Wyborcza, 18-19 May 1996.
36. Until the electoral law was amended in 2001, Polsh Sejm deputies were elected in two tranches. The first tranche of 391 deputies are elected from 52 local electoral constituencies (one constituency being co-terminus with a province, except for Warsaw which was has two and Katowice which has three) by proportional representation among those parties which crossed the 5 percent and 8 percent thresholds nationally. The second tranche of 69 deputies were also elected by proportional representation from a national list of candidates among those parties securing 7 percent or more of the vote nationally.
37. Because many of these supposedly "middle-ranking" leaders are also parliamentarians, it is difficult to identify them unambiguously as a factor strengthening the influence of the party on the ground.
38. Every PSL province had the right to automatically nominate two party Council members.
39. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "Konkurenci Pawlaka," Rzeczpoipolita, 9 April 1996; Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "W PSL stan podwyzszonej aktywności prezesa," Rzeczpospolita, 17 May 1996; and "Narada przed Rada̧" Rzeczpoipolita, 6 October 1997.
40. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "Konkurenci Pawlaka," Rzeczpoipolita, 9 April 1996; Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "W PSL stan podwyzszonej aktywności prezesa," Rzeczpospolita, 17 May 1996; and "Narada przed Rada̧" Rzeczpoipolita, 6 October 1997.
41. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "Konkurenci Pawlaka," Rzeczpoipolita, 9 April 1996; Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "W PSL stan podwyzszonej aktywności prezesa," Rzeczpospolita, 17 May 1996; and "Narada przed Rada̧" Rzeczpoipolita, 6 October 1997.
42. Author interview with Marian Zalcwski, PSL executive office director, 11 March 1997.
43. Given that a compromise was reached on this issue before the Supreme Council had an opportunity to discuss it, we have no experience of how, in practice, a clash between the two bodies would have been resolved. See "Jagieliński złożył dymisjȩ," Rzeczpospolita, 3 March 1997.
44. See, for example, Mariusz Janicki, "Pawlak i jego druzyna," Polityka, 12 November 1994.
45. Author interview, 4 March 1997.
46. For more on this distinction between the official and real stories, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Introduction: The Cross-National Study of Party Organizations," in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, eds., Party Organization: : A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960-1990 (London: Sage, 1994), 6-10.
47. This factor is not, of course, unique to postcommunist Poland but related to phenomena that are increasingly common to all parties, governments, and legislatures operating in modern, complex democratic states.
48. All the figures on elite overlap cited here are based on documents supplied to the author by the PSL party headquarters, Parliamentary Club Office and the Sejm and Senate Chancelleries.
49. Pawlak also combined both positions with the premiership between October 1993-February 1995
50. For example, they constituted one-quarter of the delegates to the 1995 Congress. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "Czas Pawlaka siȩ nie skończył," Rzeczpospolita, 17 February 1995. Although the proportion was somewhat reduced at the 1996 Congress following an increase in the total number of delegates from 700 to 1200, in practical terms, they continued to exercise disproportionate influence through their ability to set the tone of and dominate the key debates.
51. Author interview with Jan Wypych, PSL program director, 26 November 1997.
52. For more on Polish parties' electoral strategies generally, see Aleks Szczerbiak, "Interests and Values: The New Polish Parties and their Electorates," Europe-Asia Studies, 51:8 (December 1999):1401-1432.
53. "Deklaracja Ideowa Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego," in PSL, O Kształtowanie Szans Rozwoju dla Polski (Warsaw: PSL, 1997), 5.
54. Ibid., 11. For more on neo-agrarianism see, for example, Jan Jachymek, Nevagraryzm i trzecia droga: Przebudowa i Walka o Nowa̧ Polskȩ (Lublin: Oficyna Wydawnicza 'Czas', 1993); and Władysław Pia̧tkowski, "O konsolidacjȩ ideow̧ Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego," Ludowiec 2-3 (1994).
55. Ibid., 11. For more on neo-agrarianism see, for example, Jan Jachymek, Nevagraryzm i trzecia droga: Przebudowa i Walka o Nowa̧ Polskȩ (Lublin: Oficyna Wydawnicza 'Czas', 1993); and Władysław Pia̧tkowski, "O konsolidacjȩ ideow̧ Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego," Ludowiec 2-3 (1994).
56. Ibid., 11. For more on neo-agrarianism see, for example, Jan Jachymek, Nevagraryzm i trzecia droga: Przebudowa i Walka o Nowa̧ Polskȩ (Lublin: Oficyna Wydawnicza 'Czas', 1993); and Władysław Pia̧tkowski, "O konsolidacjȩ ideow̧ Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego," Ludowiec 2-3 (1994).
57. PSL "Deklaracja ideowa," 13.
58. Ibid.
59. "Naszym celem dobro Polski," Dziennik Ludowy, 22 November 1996.
60. "Polskic Stronnictwo Ludowe wobec wyzwań stoja̧cych przed Polskł," in PSL, O Kształtowania Szans Rozwoju, 59.
61. Janusz Piechociński, "Dlaczego warto głosowai na PSL," Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 August 1997.
62. PSL "Deklaracja ideowa," 13. Pawlak's declaration of support for the threatened Gdańsk Shipyard in June 1996 was cited by one commentator as an example of how the PSL sought to broaden its electoral appeal among the urban working class. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "PSL szuka rekompensaty w mieście," Rzeczpospolita, 21 June 1996.
63. PSL "Deklaracja ideowa," 13. Pawlak's declaration of support for the threatened Gdańsk Shipyard in June 1996 was cited by one commentator as an example of how the PSL sought to broaden its electoral appeal among the urban working class. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "PSL szuka rekompensaty w mieście," Rzeczpospolita, 21 June 1996.
64. Piechociński, "Dlaczego."
65. 1?" Gazeta Wyborcza, 22-23 October 1993.
66. PSL Warsaw provincial chairman Janusz Piechociński cited in interview with Mikołaj Lizut, "Sami jesteśmy sobie wini," Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 September 1997.
67. See, for example, the interview with PSL Supreme Council chairman Józef Zych in Janina Paradowska and Aleksander Checko, "Jȩzyk czynów," Polityka, 18 December 1993.
68. See, for example, Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "Pȩkniȩte spoiwo," Rzeczpospolita, 23 September 1997.
69. Cited in interview with Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "Sa̧ granice różnorodności," Rzeczpospolita, 15 October 1997.
70. Author interview, 24 November 1997.
71. Ibid.
72. These figures were supplied to the author and are based on the exit poll conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research (OBOP).
73. 1993 figures taken from Tomasz Zukowski, "Wybory '93: Kto na kogo głosował," Przegla̧d Spolłeczny, 20 (1994): 21.
74. Mair, What is Different, 15.
75. Ancillary organizations may be defined as organizational units aimed at specific segments of the party's supporters that have a direct overlap with the party's structures such as women's and youth sections.
76. For more on demand side and supply side factors, see Susan Scarrow, Parties and their Members: Organising for Victory in Britain and Germany (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 5-9.
77. The only time an exact figure has been published was in its report to 1992 Congress when the party claimed 194,986 members. See PSL, Sprawozdanie z działalności władz naczenlnych PSL za okres od Nadzwyczajnego Kongresu do III Kongresu PSL (Warsaw: PSL, 1992), 23. The most recent estimate of 150,000 is based on figures supplied to the author by the PSL headquarters in December 1999 although, according to one commentator, membership had, in fact, fallen to around 120,000 by 1998. See Mariusz Janicki, "Szkoha przekuwania," Polityka, 8 August 1998.
78. The only time an exact figure has been published was in its report to 1992 Congress when the party claimed 194,986 members. See PSL, Sprawozdanie z działalności władz naczenlnych PSL za okres od Nadzwyczajnego Kongresu do III Kongresu PSL (Warsaw: PSL, 1992), 23. The most recent estimate of 150,000 is based on figures supplied to the author by the PSL headquarters in December 1999 although, according to one commentator, membership had, in fact, fallen to around 120,000 by 1998. See Mariusz Janicki, "Szkoha przekuwania," Polityka, 8 August 1998.
79. See Życie Warszawy, 7 October 1996, cited in Krzysztof Urbaniak, "Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe - miçdzy rza̧dem a opozycja̧," in Stanisław Gebethner, ed., Wybory '97: Partie i Programy Wyborcze (Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, 1997), 121.
80. See Życie Warszawy, 7 October 1996, cited in Krzysztof Urbaniak, "Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe - miçdzy rza̧dem a opozycja̧," in Stanisław Gebethner, ed., Wybory '97: Partie i Programy Wyborcze (Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, 1997), 121.
81. This lack of accurate membership data also, of course, makes it difficult to draw meaningful temporal comparisons and analyze membership trends.
82. Figure supplied to author by the party headquarters in February 1997. SdRP actually formally wound up in June 1999 but has been replaced by a new party based on members drawn from most of the parties and groups constituting the SLD electoral coalition.
83. Figure supplied to author by the party headquarters in December 1998.
84. See Aleks Szczerbiak, "Testing Party Models in East-Central Europe: Local Party Organization in Post-Communist Poland," Party Politics 5:4 (October 1999): 525-37.
85. "Uchwalła Programowa IV Kongresu PSL" in PSL, O Kszałtowanie Szans Rozwoju dla Polski: Dokumentry Programowe (Warsaw:PSL, 1995), 96.
86. Kancelaria Sejmu, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej z dniach 28, 29 lutego il marca 1996 (Warsaw: Kancelaria Sejmu RP, 1996), 183.
87. See Mirosław Usidus, "PSL - trzecia chłopska droga," Rzeczpospolita, 18 January 1993.
88. Author interview with Marian Zalewski, PSL executive office director, 11 March 1997.
89. See "PSL zabiega o nauczycieli," Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 March 1997; and "Brak miejsca na nowy zwia̧zek," Rzeczpospolita, 18 March 1997.
90. See "PSL zabiega o nauczycieli," Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 March 1997; and "Brak miejsca na nowy zwia̧zek," Rzeczpospolita, 18 March 1997.
91. See Krzysztof Nerć, "VII Krajowy Zjazd ZMW: Chcemy partnerskiej wspólpracy z Polskim Stronnictwen Ludowym," Dziennik Ludowy, 22 November 1996.
92. Author interview, 20 February 1997.
93. PSL, "Uchwala Programowa," 95.
94. "Partia masowa czy kadrowa," Rzeczpospolita, 14 January 1994.
95. Kancelaria Sejmu, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia, 143.
96. Author interview, 20 February 1997.
97. Author interview with Janusz Gmitruk, director, PSL Institute of Peasant Movement History, 17 June 1997. One commentator estimates that 80-85 percent of PSL members are former ZSL activists. See "Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe," Polityka, 10 February 1996.
98. Author interview, 11 March 1997.
99. See OBOP, Czyje interesy reprezentuja̧ partie polityczne? (Warsaw: OBOP, July 1997).
100. Although any surplus from the election refund is supposed to be assigned for "publicly beneficial purposes," parties have discovered various ways to circumvent this provision. They can also, of course, earn interest by depositing any excess sums that can then be, quite legally, spent strictly on party activities.
101. See Filip Frydrykiewicz, "Co w partyjnych kasach," Rzeczpospolita, 21 November 1996. All figures cited are expressed in 'new' złotys, which came into circulation on 1 January 1995 and were equivalent to 10,000 'old' złotys.
102. Frydrykiewicz, "Co w partyjnych kasach."
103. See Filip Frydrykiewicz, "Sponsor Arthur Anderson," Rzeczpospolita, 19 December 1997.
104. Cited in Ania van der Meer-Krok-Paszkowska and Marc van den Muyzenberg, "The Position of Parties in the Polish and Hungarian Parliaments" (paper presented at the Fourth Workshop on Transformation Processes in Eastern Europe, The Hague, 1-2 February 1996), 8.
105. Based on information supplied to the author by the PSL party headquarters and the Sejm and Senate Chancelleries.
106. This figure is based on Gebethner's calculation that includes the financial resources passed on directly to the PSL parliamentary fraction itself, PSL Sejm deputies and senators' personal expense allowances and the total amount allocated to PSL parliamentarians to maintain their offices. Only the so-called ryczałts (the lump-sums paid to professional parliamentarians who had given up all paid employment to devote themselves to full-time parliamentary work) are excluded, since these are supposed to substitute for income foregone. Even these calculations do not include the various services-in-kind enjoyed by Sejm deputies and senators (such as free public transport by land or air and the free use of hotel accommodation in Warsaw) whose value is impossible to calculate exact. See Stanisiaw Gebethner, "Problem Finansowania Partii Politycznych a System Wyborczy w Polsce w Latach 90," in Franciszek Ryszka et al., eds., Historia - Idee - Polityka (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 1995), 431.
107. The 1997 Party Law obliges parties to publish financial accounts or risk various sanctions including deletion from the official register of political parties. This requirement should, over time, help us to assess more accurately the relative importance of state support, at least as far as identifiable sources of income (such as refunds and donations) are concerned.
108. Kancelaria Sejmu, Sprawozdame Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia, 144.
109. Ibid, 142.
110. Kancelaria Sejmu, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne ze 110 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w dniach 24, 25 i 26 czerwca 1997 (Warsaw: Kancelaria Sejmu RP, 1997), 360.
111. Since 1991 election committees (comprising, as noted above, parties or electoral coalitions) have been able to present their views in special radio and TV broadcasts appearing in the 15 days running up to election. Since 1994, political parties and groupings which obtained at least 400,000 votes in the previous Sejm elections have the opportunity to present their views directly on a weekly, 45-minute program "Forum" with the amount of airtime allocated in proportion to the number of votes obtained.
112. "Program polityczny i społeczno-gospodarczy PSL," in PSL, O Kształtowania Równych Szans, 23.
113. Author interview, 4 March 1997 - although Bentkowski also held out the prospect of making exceptions if "in the meantime an unexpectedly strong, other party should arise." 93. Established by the 1992 Law on Radio and TV Broadcasting and consisting of four members appointed by the Sejm, two by the Senate and three by the president, the KRRiTV was intended to be an independent and apolitical body comprising media experts rather than political nominees who would "guard freedom of speech in radio and TV, the independence of broadcasters and the interests of the audience, and ensure the open and pluralistic character of radio and TV." However, Polish politicians quickly discovered that the KRRiTV was the key to controlling state broadcasting and, given that its members were all selected by overtly political bodies, it was, from the outset, dominated by individuals with very clear connections to particular parties and groups. These party divisions then found their expression in the appointments of the Supervisory Councils and boards so that Polish TV and Radio are, in effect, dominated by party appointees at every level.
114. Author interview with Ewa Czaczkowska, Rzeczpospolita, 26 June 1997.