Inferior players in simple games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 209-220

  Napel, Stefan ^a   Widgrén, Mika ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Cooperative games; Power indices

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035733540     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820100075     Document Type: Article

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