Incentive-compatible pricing for a service facility with joint production and congestion externalities

Management Science

Volumn 44, Issue 12 PART 1, 1998, Pages 1623-1636

  Ha, Albert Y ^a  

^a YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT   (United States)

Author keywords

Delay Cost; Incentive; Joint Production; Optimal Design of Queues; Pricing; Service Facility

Indexed keywords

COSTS; OPTIMIZATION; QUALITY ASSURANCE; VALUE ENGINEERING;

CUSTOMER-CHOSEN SERVICE RATES; INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE PRICING; LINEAR DELAY COSTS;

QUEUEING THEORY;

EID: 0032298450     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.44.12.1623     Document Type: Article

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