Reform and crisis in romanian civil-military relations 1989-1999

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 597-622

  Watts, Larry L ^a  

^a SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0035637729     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0102700405     Document Type: Article

References (97)

1. Anton A. Bebler, "The Region-wide Perspective on Post Communist Civil-Military Relations," in Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, ed. Anton A. Bebler (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 72-76 and 131; Douglas L. Bland, "Protecting the Military from Civilian Control: A Neglected Aspect of Civil-Military Relations" in Democratic and Civil Control Over Armed Forces: Case Studies and Perspectives, ed. Ernest Oilman and Detlief Herold (Rome: NATO Defence College International Symposium December, 1994), 107-127. David A. Mares asserts that "civilian control is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratic consolidation and regional cooperation" in his "Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and Regional Stability in Comparative Perspective" in Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, ed. David A. Mares (Boulder: Westview, 1998), 256.
2. Anton A. Bebler, "The Region-wide Perspective on Post Communist Civil-Military Relations," in Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, ed. Anton A. Bebler (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 72-76 and 131; Douglas L. Bland, "Protecting the Military from Civilian Control: A Neglected Aspect of Civil-Military Relations" in Democratic and Civil Control Over Armed Forces: Case Studies and Perspectives, ed. Ernest Oilman and Detlief Herold (Rome: NATO Defence College International Symposium December, 1994), 107-127. David A. Mares asserts that "civilian control is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratic consolidation and regional cooperation" in his "Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and Regional Stability in Comparative Perspective" in Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, ed. David A. Mares (Boulder: Westview, 1998), 256.
3. Anton A. Bebler, "The Region-wide Perspective on Post Communist Civil-Military Relations," in Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, ed. Anton A. Bebler (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 72-76 and 131; Douglas L. Bland, "Protecting the Military from Civilian Control: A Neglected Aspect of Civil-Military Relations" in Democratic and Civil Control Over Armed Forces: Case Studies and Perspectives, ed. Ernest Oilman and Detlief Herold (Rome: NATO Defence College International Symposium December, 1994), 107-127. David A. Mares asserts that "civilian control is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratic consolidation and regional cooperation" in his "Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and Regional Stability in Comparative Perspective" in Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, ed. David A. Mares (Boulder: Westview, 1998), 256.
4. See especially Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 26, 1 (Fall 1999): 7-26; and his, "Managing the 'Expert Problem' in Civil-Military Relations," European Security 8, 3 (Fall 1999): 25-43.
5. See especially Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 26, 1 (Fall 1999): 7-26; and his, "Managing the 'Expert Problem' in Civil-Military Relations," European Security 8, 3 (Fall 1999): 25-43.
6. As of 1998 American military officers with expertise in the area considered the Romanian military as "ahead of other armies in the region in terms of efficiency." Robert D. Kaplan, "Europe's Fulcrum State," Atlantic Monthly 282, 3 (September 1998): 35. U.S. officers also characterized Romania's participation in the MIL-to-MIL program as "the best, most active and most dynamic of all thirteen programs involved."
7. Commander Mark R. Shelley, "NATO Enlargement: The Case for Romania," Central European Issues 3, 1 (Summer 1997): 98 and 195. See also Richard C. Holbrooke, "U.S. Relations with Romania," Central European Issues 1, 1 (Fall 1995): 35-45.
8. Commander Mark R. Shelley, "NATO Enlargement: The Case for Romania," Central European Issues 3, 1 (Summer 1997): 98 and 195. See also Richard C. Holbrooke, "U.S. Relations with Romania," Central European Issues 1, 1 (Fall 1995): 35-45.
9. See, e.g., Andrew Cottey, East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in Search of Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); Rudolf Joo, The Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Challiot Papers No. 23 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1996); Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk, Adelphi Paper No. 306 (Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1996);
10. See, e.g., Andrew Cottey, East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in Search of Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); Rudolf Joo, The Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Challiot Papers No. 23 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1996); Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk, Adelphi Paper No. 306 (Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1996);
11. See, e.g., Andrew Cottey, East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in Search of Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); Rudolf Joo, The Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Challiot Papers No. 23 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1996); Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk, Adelphi Paper No. 306 (Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1996);
12. See, e.g., Andrew Cottey, East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in Search of Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); Rudolf Joo, The Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Challiot Papers No. 23 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1996); Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk, Adelphi Paper No. 306 (Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1996);
13. and Bebler, Post-Communist States. The U. S. State Department included Romania in Central Europe after 1989.
14. A partial exception to this is Thomas S. Szayna and F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Military Reform After the Cold War: Implications for the US (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995).
15. Romania's "maverick" status is described in Alexander Alexiev, Romania and the Warsaw Pact: The Defense Policy of a Reluctant Ally (Santa Monica: RAND, 1979); Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982), 41-59; and Walter M. Bacon, Jr., "Romania" in Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability, ed. Daniel N. Nelson (Boulder: Westview, 1984), 250-263.
16. Romania's "maverick" status is described in Alexander Alexiev, Romania and the Warsaw Pact: The Defense Policy of a Reluctant Ally (Santa Monica: RAND, 1979); Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982), 41-59; and Walter M. Bacon, Jr., "Romania" in Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability, ed. Daniel N. Nelson (Boulder: Westview, 1984), 250-263.
17. Romania's "maverick" status is described in Alexander Alexiev, Romania and the Warsaw Pact: The Defense Policy of a Reluctant Ally (Santa Monica: RAND, 1979); Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982), 41-59; and Walter M. Bacon, Jr., "Romania" in Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability, ed. Daniel N. Nelson (Boulder: Westview, 1984), 250-263.
18. Romanian officers were not sent for training to the USSR after 1961, whereas Czech and Slovak officers continued to attend Soviet military academies and institutes until the demise of the USSR (66 attending in the summer of 1991, with 8 more slated for training in 1992). Thomas S. Szayna and James B. Steinberg, Civil-Military Relations and National Security Thinking in Czechoslovakia (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), 18.
19. One Soviet officer stated that Romania was an "opponent" and "enemy" of the Soviet Union. Victor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (New York: Berkeley Books, 1982), 3-11. A senior Polish officer likewise noted that while Poland and Romania were Warsaw Pact members in similar "geostrategic" situations, only Romania was "the sole decisionmaker with respect to its own armed forces." Interview with Colonel Ryszard J. Kuklinski, "The War Against the Nation as Seen from Inside," Kultura 4, 475 (Spring 1987): 3-57.
20. One Soviet officer stated that Romania was an "opponent" and "enemy" of the Soviet Union. Victor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (New York: Berkeley Books, 1982), 3-11. A senior Polish officer likewise noted that while Poland and Romania were Warsaw Pact members in similar "geostrategic" situations, only Romania was "the sole decisionmaker with respect to its own armed forces." Interview with Colonel Ryszard J. Kuklinski, "The War Against the Nation as Seen from Inside," Kultura 4, 475 (Spring 1987): 3-57.
21. Szayna and Larrabee, East European Military Reform, 2, footnote 3.
22. See, e.g., Larry Watts, "Romanian Autonomy and Military Policy," Sudost Europa 2, 34 (1985): 67-82.
23. In 1967 Bucharest established a domestic armaments program to further reduce strategic dependency, followed by the establishment of military R&D agencies in 1968. R&D allocations rose by almost 600% from 1961-65 to 1966-70, doubling again in 1971-75. Alexander Alexiev, Party-Military Relations in Romania (Santa Monica: RAND, 1977), 39.
24. Although called out in 1977, the army was not employed against striking miners. At that time the army's role as national defender was already consecrated not only in popular and military mythology but in the odd ideology of Ceausescu's regime as well. See footnote 6 and Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson, East European Military Reliability: An Emigre-Based Assessment (Santa Monica: RAND, 1986).
25. Larry L. Watts, "Party-Military-Security Relations in Romania." Paper delivered to the East European Seminar at Uppsala University, Sweden, December 1982, and "Military-Security Relations in Romania." Paper delivered at Hanns-Seidel Stiftung, Wildbad-am-Kreuth, July 1986.
26. Larry L. Watts, "Party-Military-Security Relations in Romania." Paper delivered to the East European Seminar at Uppsala University, Sweden, December 1982, and "Military-Security Relations in Romania." Paper delivered at Hanns-Seidel Stiftung, Wildbad-am-Kreuth, July 1986.
27. Szayna and Larrabee, East European Military Reform, 9. Their conclusion that all the militaries played a "constructive" role in the demise of Communism seems overdrawn. In Czechoslovakia, at least, the first post-communist defense minister had drawn up plans for repressing the pro-democracy demonstrations.
28. See e.g., Simon, NATO Enlargement, 197.
29. Christopher Donnelly, "Developing a National Strategy for the Transformation of the Defense Establishment in Post-Communist States," European Security 5, 1 (Spring 1996): 5.
30. For the rise and fall of CADA, see Larry L. Watts, "The Romanian Army in the December Revolution and Beyond," in Romania after Tyranny, ed. Daniel N. Nelson (Boulder: Westview, 1992), 95-126,
31. and Walter M. Bacon, Jr., "Romanian Civil-Military Relations after 1989," in The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 188-9.
32. One of these officers, Chief of Staff Vasile Ionel, was posted out of the military hierarchy at the same time as Militaru's resignation. The other was retired from his command in 1995.
33. Romania Libera, 25 July 1990. CADA was institutionalized by military order #16 of 4 March 1990.
34. Sixty-two of CADA's official 76 members resumed their service in the military (8 remaining in the Border Guards when it was transferred to the Interior Ministry). Three have since passed away. The bulk of the remainder entered politics, most joining the Civic Alliance.
35. The situation was further complicated in that domestic intelligence (SRI) was reconstituted on much the same dysfunctional basis as its authoritarian predecessor, evincing a clear preference for extra-legal activities and political involvement.
36. The lack of a functioning police or crowd control force (or domestic intelligence agency) was one of the reasons why politically-driven ethnic tensions resulted in violence in Tirgu Mures in March 1990. The military resisted intervention for several days before sending a small unit. The unit proved largely ineffectual, strengthening military resolve to avoid such activities in the future. Law and order bodies were reconstituted immediately after this event. There have been no similar incidents since.
37. Among other tasks, the CSAT created the strategy for forming a civilian defense community and developed the framework of military rapprochement with Hungary, through the Romanian-initiated "Open Skies" agreement, during 1991.
38. The author attended some of the preliminary discussions leading to the CSAT deliberations during the spring of 1991. The principal protagonists of the discussion included Colonel Ioan Talpes; Chief of Staff General Dumitru Cioflina (who replaced Ionel in 1991), the Defense Minister, General Nicolae Spiroiu (appointed in the spring of 1991), and General Lucien Culda, then head of the education directorate.
39. According to evidence recently uncovered in the investigation of the University Square repression in June 1990, portions of the military, interior ministry, and intelligence community, apparently in league with unspecified French authorities, were attempting to depose the then newly-elected President Iliescu when their plan went awry.
40. The main civilian educators involved were Dr. Liviu Muresan, Dr. Ioan Mircea Pascu, and Dr. Vasile Secares of the National School for Political Administration and Public Policy. The main military educators, aside from General Cioflina, who had been occupied with the reform of military education and instruction since his appointment as deputy chief of staff in January 1991, and General Spiroiu, who took a close interest in the development of the facility, were Generals Gheorghe Schiopu and Neculai Balan.
41. The author wishes to thank the Romanian National Defense College and the Chamber of Deputies Defense Committee for generously providing these statistics.
42. According to Eurobarometer polls, Romanian public and military support for NATO integration was consistently the highest in the region, exceeding even that of Poland. Larry L. Watts, "Romania's Bid for NATO: An Overview," Romanian Civilization 6, 1 (Spring-Summer 1997): 5-26. The 1999 Balkan war undercut this support to levels on a par with that of Poland, but still exceeding those of the Czech Republic and Hungary.
43. Analysts have noted that "Romania's unique military position within the Warsaw Pact insured that the military were able to think and take decisions for themselves." See, e.g., Review of Parliamentary Oversight of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence and the Democratic Control of its Armed Forces, DMCS Study No. 43/96 (London: Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services, 1997), 30. (Hereafter cited as DMCS, Review.)
44. DMCS, Review, 37.
45. Ibid.
46. Gheorghe Diaconescu, Florea Serban and Nicolae Pavel, eds., Democratic Control Over the Army in Romania (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedica, 1996), 312-314. This volume contains all Romanian legislation dealing with the military as of early 1996. It is required reading among the senior officer corps.
47. This was the conclusion of British Defense Ministry analysts in DMCS, Review, 42. As director of foreign intelligence in 1992-1997, General Ioan Talpes was also the leading advocate for the creation of an effective foreign intelligence oversight commission.
48. Lack of comprehension, rather than evasion, was the initial problem. The situation was akin to that faced by U.S. federal agencies, which delivered seminars on money laundering based on erroneous assumptions that regional police officers possessed basic banking and accounting knowledge. The agencies were astonished to discover that most participants had never owned checkbooks. It took time and effort to identify and remedy all of these gaps.
49. DMCS, Review, 24.
50. For example, Defense Minister Babiuc apparently approved the acquisition of ELTA-AZUR electronic warfare equipment against the recommendations of both the military technical commission and the chief of staff. Adevarul, 9, 12, 16 November 1999.
51. Contrast this with the practice in the Czech Republic where "such interaction is not allowed," and where, as one general staff officer complained, "the only time he has been able to talk with a member of the (Parliamentary) Committee has been at a course arranged by the U.S., which was jointly attended by people from the General Staff, the MOD, and Parliament." Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "The Democratization of Civil-Military Relations in the Czech Republic," in Former Eastern Bloc, ed. Danopoulos and Zirker, 63.
52. DMCS, Review, 12-13.
53. The defense committee was headed by the leader of the Democratic Party Petre Roman, in opposition after his resignation from the government in September 1991. Ioan Mircea Pascu, "Parliamentary Control over the Military" in Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration, ed. Kurt W. Treptow and Mihail S. Ionescu (Iasi-Oxford-Portland: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999), 118, footnote 12.
54. Although a coalition of many parties and "civic" organizations, the dominant entities within the CD were the National Peasant Party-Christian Democrat (PNTCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). The USD was a minicoalition dominated by the Democratic Party (PD) of Petre Roman.
55. See, e.g., Zoe Petre, "The Role of the President in Romania's Approach to NATO Integration" in Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration, ed. Treptow and Ionescu, 92-94 and 96 especially. This rejection of the accomplishments of the former administration was evident in other domains as well. For instance, when Constantinescu signed a new property law in January 2000, he claimed credit for the return of all property while failing to mention that the Iliescu administration had returned all land belonging to the peasants already in 1991. Adevarul, 12 January 2000.
56. See, e.g., Zoe Petre, "The Role of the President in Romania's Approach to NATO Integration" in Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration, ed. Treptow and Ionescu, 92-94 and 96 especially. This rejection of the accomplishments of the former administration was evident in other domains as well. For instance, when Constantinescu signed a new property law in January 2000, he claimed credit for the return of all property while failing to mention that the Iliescu administration had returned all land belonging to the peasants already in 1991. Adevarul, 12 January 2000.
57. This was in line with the tendency of the Democratic Convention to seek domestic and foreign support by portraying the 1996 elections as the "real" revolution and the 1989 events as merely a coup.
58. For example, during 1991-1995 U.S. funding and assistance from the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute were proffered exclusively to the self-styled "democratic" opposition - the Democratic Convention and its supporters, particularly the Civic Alliance and the Group for Social Dialogue. Similar partisanship was evident in European aid. Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996).
59. This was evident throughout the new leadership. For example, when presenting the new Strategy for National Defense to parliament in June 1999, President Constantinescu noted as the first modality for assuring national security, "the assurance of civilian control over the institutions in the domain of national security and public order." See, e.g., Cronica Romana, 22 June 1999. The issue of democratic control is not raised in the strategy.
60. The Chairman of the House of Deputies Defense Committee signaled the problem to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff after the first round of voting (then annulled because of poor turnout). Parallel tabulation of election returns indicated that voting in military sectors uniformly failed to conform to the voting ratios in the civilian sectors in remarkably consistent ways. For example, the Democratic Convention candidate polled in the 50-60% range while the opposition Part of Social Democracy (PDSR) candidate polled only 10-20% in the military sectors. However, the Convention's candidate won 50.5% of all votes, while the PDSR candidate won 49.5%. When the government failed to take the matter seriously, instead counterattacking the party for undermining Romania's image abroad, the PDSR held a press conference to protest the lack of official response. PDSR press conference, 6 November 1998 and Cotidianul, 9 November 1998.
61. See, e.g., Cronica Romana, 2 November 1998 and Curierul National, 9 November 1998. The Electoral Law specifies in article 3, line 4, that only citizens resident in Bucharest for at least three months can exercise their vote. Until the mayoralty election of 1998, no exceptions had been made in previous elections for military personnel.
62. See, e.g., Cronica Romana, 2 November 1998 and Curierul National, 9 November 1998. The Electoral Law specifies in article 3, line 4, that only citizens resident in Bucharest for at least three months can exercise their vote. Until the mayoralty election of 1998, no exceptions had been made in previous elections for military personnel.
63. Curierul National, 1 November and 3 December, Adevarul, 4 November and 2 December, and Cotidianul, 4 November 1999.
64. Curierul National, 1 November and 3 December, Adevarul, 4 November and 2 December, and Cotidianul, 4 November 1999.
65. Curierul National, 1 November and 3 December, Adevarul, 4 November and 2 December, and Cotidianul, 4 November 1999.
66. The Ordonanta de urgenta privind regimul starii de asediu si regimul starii de urgenta, nr. 1/1999, which stipulated that the mobilization was necessary to counter the "grave danger" to "national security and constitutional democracy," was forwarded to Parliament on 21 January 1999 and subsequently withdrawn, remaining unsigned and unpromulgated. The government has yet to adopt a Law on Emergency Situations and Martial Law.
67. See, e.g., Cronica Romana for 20 and 26 January 1999; Romania Libera, 27 January 1999; Curierul National, 20-21, 26, 30-31 January and 21 February 1999;
68. See, e.g., Cronica Romana for 20 and 26 January 1999; Romania Libera, 27 January 1999; Curierul National, 20-21, 26, 30-31 January and 21 February 1999;
69. See, e.g., Cronica Romana for 20 and 26 January 1999; Romania Libera, 27 January 1999; Curierul National, 20-21, 26, 30-31 January and 21 February 1999;
70. and Cotidianul, 21 February 1999.
71. Cronica Romana, 21-21 January and Curierul National, 20 January 1999. This report was widely circulated, e.g., Le Monde reported that the "army is ready to intervene against the miners."
72. Cronica Romana, 21-21 January and Curierul National, 20 January 1999. This report was widely circulated, e.g., Le Monde reported that the "army is ready to intervene against the miners."
73. Cotidianul, 8 February 1999; Frankfurter Rundschau, 1 February 1999; Curierul National, 10 February 1999. Likewise, newly-appointed Interior Minister Constantin Dudu Ionescu declared that his investigations did not support the allegations of coup d'etat. Curierul National, 3 February 1999.
74. Cotidianul, 8 February 1999; Frankfurter Rundschau, 1 February 1999; Curierul National, 10 February 1999. Likewise, newly-appointed Interior Minister Constantin Dudu Ionescu declared that his investigations did not support the allegations of coup d'etat. Curierul National, 3 February 1999.
75. Cotidianul, 8 February 1999; Frankfurter Rundschau, 1 February 1999; Curierul National, 10 February 1999. Likewise, newly-appointed Interior Minister Constantin Dudu Ionescu declared that his investigations did not support the allegations of coup d'etat. Curierul National, 3 February 1999.
76. Cotidianul, 8 February 1999; Frankfurter Rundschau, 1 February 1999; Curierul National, 10 February 1999. Likewise, newly-appointed Interior Minister Constantin Dudu Ionescu declared that his investigations did not support the allegations of coup d'etat. Curierul National, 3 February 1999.
77. For obvious reasons these officers were speaking off the record. The president's expression of gratitude towards the Army and justifications supplied by other government coalition members did little to address the central problem. See, e.g., Curierul National and Cronica Romana for 25 January 1999.
78. For obvious reasons these officers were speaking off the record. The president's expression of gratitude towards the Army and justifications supplied by other government coalition members did little to address the central problem. See, e.g., Curierul National and Cronica Romana for 25 January 1999.
79. Government unwillingness/inability to establish a dialogue was signaled by the press before and at the very beginning of the march as a principal factor. See, e.g., Curierul National, 19 January 1999. One newspaper quoted the late president of the National Peasant Party, the leading party in the coalition, after the miners' march of September-October 1991, stating that "I believe the initial mistake of the authorities was that they did not respond to the desperate appeals made by the miners when they requested the presence of the Prime Minister." Cotidianul, 21 January 1999. Indeed, the presence of the prime minister was a consistent demand during January 1999 and, once the prime minister agreed to meet with the miners, the protest ended. See, e.g., Curierul National, 25 January 1999. The Minister of Interior at the start of the march also declared that governmental arrogance and unwillingness to meet with the miners provoked the march. Cronica Romana, 26 January 1999.
80. Government unwillingness/inability to establish a dialogue was signaled by the press before and at the very beginning of the march as a principal factor. See, e.g., Curierul National, 19 January 1999. One newspaper quoted the late president of the National Peasant Party, the leading party in the coalition, after the miners' march of September-October 1991, stating that "I believe the initial mistake of the authorities was that they did not respond to the desperate appeals made by the miners when they requested the presence of the Prime Minister." Cotidianul, 21 January 1999. Indeed, the presence of the prime minister was a consistent demand during January 1999 and, once the prime minister agreed to meet with the miners, the protest ended. See, e.g., Curierul National, 25 January 1999. The Minister of Interior at the start of the march also declared that governmental arrogance and unwillingness to meet with the miners provoked the march. Cronica Romana, 26 January 1999.
81. Government unwillingness/inability to establish a dialogue was signaled by the press before and at the very beginning of the march as a principal factor. See, e.g., Curierul National, 19 January 1999. One newspaper quoted the late president of the National Peasant Party, the leading party in the coalition, after the miners' march of September-October 1991, stating that "I believe the initial mistake of the authorities was that they did not respond to the desperate appeals made by the miners when they requested the presence of the Prime Minister." Cotidianul, 21 January 1999. Indeed, the presence of the prime minister was a consistent demand during January 1999 and, once the prime minister agreed to meet with the miners, the protest ended. See, e.g., Curierul National, 25 January 1999. The Minister of Interior at the start of the march also declared that governmental arrogance and unwillingness to meet with the miners provoked the march. Cronica Romana, 26 January 1999.
82. Government unwillingness/inability to establish a dialogue was signaled by the press before and at the very beginning of the march as a principal factor. See, e.g., Curierul National, 19 January 1999. One newspaper quoted the late president of the National Peasant Party, the leading party in the coalition, after the miners' march of September-October 1991, stating that "I believe the initial mistake of the authorities was that they did not respond to the desperate appeals made by the miners when they requested the presence of the Prime Minister." Cotidianul, 21 January 1999. Indeed, the presence of the prime minister was a consistent demand during January 1999 and, once the prime minister agreed to meet with the miners, the protest ended. See, e.g., Curierul National, 25 January 1999. The Minister of Interior at the start of the march also declared that governmental arrogance and unwillingness to meet with the miners provoked the march. Cronica Romana, 26 January 1999.
83. Cronica Romana, 26 February 1999.
84. This was the reasoning of both Stoica and of Democratic Convention leader Ion Diaconescu. Only the extreme right wing Romania Mare Party supported the move. Most of the other non-CD parties in the governing coalition rejected it. Cronica Romana, 11 and 17 February 1999 . In harsher terms, the Timisoara Revolutionary Association condemned "the intention of Dudu Ionescu to create troops for repressive actions formed of mercenaries" that "do not have to respond for their deeds before the law." Cronica Romana, 16 February 1999.
85. This was the reasoning of both Stoica and of Democratic Convention leader Ion Diaconescu. Only the extreme right wing Romania Mare Party supported the move. Most of the other non-CD parties in the governing coalition rejected it. Cronica Romana, 11 and 17 February 1999 . In harsher terms, the Timisoara Revolutionary Association condemned "the intention of Dudu Ionescu to create troops for repressive actions formed of mercenaries" that "do not have to respond for their deeds before the law." Cronica Romana, 16 February 1999.
86. This sparked a vehement debate over the legality of the measure between the defense ministry on the one hand, and former Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca and former CADA member (and former member of the CD-USD-UDMR government) Valerian Stan on the other. See, e.g., Cotidianul, 14-16 and 25 May, 14 and 17 June 1999, and Cronica Romana, 24 May and 18 June 1999.
87. This sparked a vehement debate over the legality of the measure between the defense ministry on the one hand, and former Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca and former CADA member (and former member of the CD-USD-UDMR government) Valerian Stan on the other. See, e.g., Cotidianul, 14-16 and 25 May, 14 and 17 June 1999, and Cronica Romana, 24 May and 18 June 1999.
88. Serious differences were apparent between the MOD and General Degeratu. The reasoning employed in defense of the reorganization highlighted the preference of the new civilian authorities for an ideal type of civilian control regardless of its manifestly disruptive impact on the civilian-military relationship or the setback to democratic consolidation represented by its mode of implementation. Curierul National, 18 May 1999.
89. Cotidianul, 14 May 1999.
90. See, e.g., Cotidianul and Adevarul for 22 and 23 June 1999.
91. See, e.g., Cotidianul and Adevarul for 22 and 23 June 1999.
92. This issue was brought to public attention after Ion Iliescu's editorial in The Washington Post (23 May 1999) cautioning the U.S. against inviting more Russian troops into the Balkans, given the nationalist developments within the Russian army and traditional Russian behavior in the region. Although Iliescu neither criticized Romanian policy nor invoked official authority for his views, the presidency issued an official condemnation of the article.
93. Cotidianul, 29 June 1999.
94. Diaconescu et al., Democratic Control, 214.
95. The CD-USD-UDMR government also avoided parliament in allowing some NATO troops on Romanian territory during the Kosovo crisis even though, as in the case of NATO overflights, opposition approval was likely.
96. Curierul National, 28 June 1999.
97. Curierul National, 29 June 1999.