Government speech on unsettled issues

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 69, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 1667-1687

  Greene, Abner S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035637377     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (73)

1. Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 229, 231-32, 305 n.16 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Democracy]. An earlier version of these arguments, less well developed, appears in Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 311, 313 (1993).
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 229, 231-32, 305 n.16 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Democracy]. An earlier version of these arguments, less well developed, appears in Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 311, 313 (1993).
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
5. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
6. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1996).
7. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365, 1393 (1997).
8. Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85 Geo. L.J. 1837, 1846-47 (1997).
9. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 164.
10. Id. at 165-66.
11. Id. at 170.
12. Id. at 179.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 179-80.
15. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45, 865-66 (1984).
16. 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
17. Id at 819.
18. 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
19. Id. at 379.
20. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the Court should defer to agency's regulatory decision as a matter of politics).
21. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). I discuss in the text the majority view in the scholarly community against viewpoint-based government funding and therefore opposed to the outcome in Rust.
22. See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). See supra note 20 for an explanation of scholarly community versus caselaw.
23. Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 29, 75.
24. For further discussion on this point, see Greene, supra note 1, at 52-67.
25. David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675, 716 (1992).
26. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L.J. 151, 171 (1996).
27. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
28. Post, supra note 25, at 173-74 n. 127.
29. Id. at 174 n.128.
30. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 429 (1986).
31. For a related discussion, see Greene, supra note 1, at 31-40.
32. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 198 (1983).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 54-57 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81, 103 (1978).
36. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 54- 57 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81, 103 (1978).
37. Kagan, supra note 22, at 67.
38. See Greene, supra note 1, at 27-40.
39. See id. at 41-49.
40. Ventriloquism involves government speech, either directly or through funding conditions, that masks the fact that government is the source of the speech. This is problematic, but should not be a sufficient ground for constitutional invalidation. For discussion, see id. at 49-52.
41. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, 951 (1995).
42. Id. at 960-61.
43. Id. at 1017-18.
44. See Greene, supra note 1, at 49-52.
45. Lessig, supra note 39, at 1036, 1037, 1039, 1041.
46. See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power 107 (1996); Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 45-48 (1996); Sunstein, Democracy, supra note 2, at 115, 231; Cole, supra note 24, at 743; Kagan, supra note 22, at 67; Post, supra note 25, at 173-74; Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 543, 576, 580 (1996).
47. See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power 107 (1996); Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 45-48 (1996); Sunstein, Democracy, supra note 2, at 115, 231; Cole, supra note 24, at 743; Kagan, supra note 22, at 67; Post, supra note 25, at 173-74; Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 543, 576, 580 (1996).
48. See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power 107 (1996); Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 45-48 (1996); Sunstein, Democracy, supra note 2, at 115, 231; Cole, supra note 24, at 743; Kagan, supra note 22, at 67; Post, supra note 25, at 173-74; Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 543, 576, 580 (1996).
49. See Greene, supra note 1, at 26-49.
50. For further discussion, see id. at 8-12.
51. The establishment clause of the first amendment should be understood as placing restrictions on governmental religious speech, restrictions that do not extend to governmental secular speech. See Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in Law and Religion: A Critical Anthology 226 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 535; Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale L.J. 1611 (1993).
52. The establishment clause of the first amendment should be understood as placing restrictions on governmental religious speech, restrictions that do not extend to governmental secular speech. See Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in Law and Religion: A Critical Anthology 226 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 535; Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale L.J. 1611 (1993).
53. The establishment clause of the first amendment should be understood as placing restrictions on governmental religious speech, restrictions that do not extend to governmental secular speech. See Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in Law and Religion: A Critical Anthology 226 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 535; Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale L.J. 1611 (1993).
54. See Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 293 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground-A Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 646 (1994).
55. See Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 293 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground-A Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 646 (1994).
56. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, slip op. at 3 (Feb. 28, 2001).
57. Slip op. (Feb. 28, 2001).
58. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
59. Velazquez, slip op. at 6.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 8; see also id. at 9.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 13.
66. Id. at 14.
67. See Greene, supra note 1, at 39-40.
68. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
69. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 75-104 (1980).
70. See Greene, supra note 1, at 27-40.
71. See id. at 49-52.
72. See supra, pages 1678-79.
73. See Greene, supra note 1, at 52-67.