The coevolution of institutions, organizations, and ideology: The Longlake experience of property rights transformation

Politics and Society

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 415-445

  Wang, Ning ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0035619773     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329201029003005     Document Type: Article

References (146)

1. The literature on restructuring property rights in transition economies is too vast and expands too quickly to review. For a rich flavor of this literature, see Janos Kornai, "The Affinity between Ownership Forms and Coordination Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Perspective 4, no. 3 (1990): 131-47; Kazimierz Poznanski, "Restructuring of Property Rights in Poland: A Study in Evolutionary Economics," East European Politics and Societies 7, no. 3 (1993): 395-421; David Stark, "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Weimer, ed., The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jean Oi and Andrew Walder, eds., Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
2. The literature on restructuring property rights in transition economies is too vast and expands too quickly to review. For a rich flavor of this literature, see Janos Kornai, "The Affinity between Ownership Forms and Coordination Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Perspective 4, no. 3 (1990): 131-47; Kazimierz Poznanski, "Restructuring of Property Rights in Poland: A Study in Evolutionary Economics," East European Politics and Societies 7, no. 3 (1993): 395-421; David Stark, "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Weimer, ed., The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jean Oi and Andrew Walder, eds., Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
3. The literature on restructuring property rights in transition economies is too vast and expands too quickly to review. For a rich flavor of this literature, see Janos Kornai, "The Affinity between Ownership Forms and Coordination Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Perspective 4, no. 3 (1990): 131-47; Kazimierz Poznanski, "Restructuring of Property Rights in Poland: A Study in Evolutionary Economics," East European Politics and Societies 7, no. 3 (1993): 395-421; David Stark, "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Weimer, ed., The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jean Oi and Andrew Walder, eds., Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
4. The literature on restructuring property rights in transition economies is too vast and expands too quickly to review. For a rich flavor of this literature, see Janos Kornai, "The Affinity between Ownership Forms and Coordination Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Perspective 4, no. 3 (1990): 131-47; Kazimierz Poznanski, "Restructuring of Property Rights in Poland: A Study in Evolutionary Economics," East European Politics and Societies 7, no. 3 (1993): 395-421; David Stark, "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Weimer, ed., The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jean Oi and Andrew Walder, eds., Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
5. The literature on restructuring property rights in transition economies is too vast and expands too quickly to review. For a rich flavor of this literature, see Janos Kornai, "The Affinity between Ownership Forms and Coordination Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Perspective 4, no. 3 (1990): 131-47; Kazimierz Poznanski, "Restructuring of Property Rights in Poland: A Study in Evolutionary Economics," East European Politics and Societies 7, no. 3 (1993): 395-421; David Stark, "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 4 (1996): 993-1027; David Weimer, ed., The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jean Oi and Andrew Walder, eds., Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
6. Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, 2d ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
7. Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, 2d ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
8. Douglass North and Robert Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981); Nathan Rosenberg and L. E. Bridzell, How the West Got Rich (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
9. Douglass North and Robert Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981); Nathan Rosenberg and L. E. Bridzell, How the West Got Rich (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
10. Douglass North and Robert Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981); Nathan Rosenberg and L. E. Bridzell, How the West Got Rich (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
11. Gerald Scully, "The Institutional Framework and Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy 96, no. 3 (1988): 652-62; J. Torstensson, "Property Rights and Economic Growth," Kyklos 47, no. 2 (1994): 231-47; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and Economic Performance," Economics and Politics 7, no. 2 (1995): 207-27.
12. Gerald Scully, "The Institutional Framework and Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy 96, no. 3 (1988): 652-62; J. Torstensson, "Property Rights and Economic Growth," Kyklos 47, no. 2 (1994): 231-47; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and Economic Performance," Economics and Politics 7, no. 2 (1995): 207-27.
13. Gerald Scully, "The Institutional Framework and Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy 96, no. 3 (1988): 652-62; J. Torstensson, "Property Rights and Economic Growth," Kyklos 47, no. 2 (1994): 231-47; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and Economic Performance," Economics and Politics 7, no. 2 (1995): 207-27.
14. Janos Kornai, The Road to a Free Economy (New York: Norton, 1990).
15. North, Institutions; Andrei Shleifer, "Establishing Property Rights," in M. Bruno and B. Pleskovic, eds., Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995); Weimer, The Political.
16. North, Institutions; Andrei Shleifer, "Establishing Property Rights," in M. Bruno and B. Pleskovic, eds., Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995); Weimer, The Political.
17. North, Institutions; Andrei Shleifer, "Establishing Property Rights," in M. Bruno and B. Pleskovic, eds., Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995); Weimer, The Political.
18. Shleifer, "Establishing."
19. Kornai, The Road.
20. Even in public sectors there exist diverse routes to property rights reforms. Walder recognizes that privatization is one among many choices. See Andrew Walder, "Corporation Organization and Local Government Property Rights in China," in V. Milor, ed., Changing Political Economies: Privatization in Post-Communist and Reforming Communist States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Oi and Walder, Property. Stark stresses the feature of path dependence in property rights reforms, challenging the unquestioned universal validity of privatization in transition economies. See Stark, "Recombinant."
21. Even in public sectors there exist diverse routes to property rights reforms. Walder recognizes that privatization is one among many choices. See Andrew Walder, "Corporation Organization and Local Government Property Rights in China," in V. Milor, ed., Changing Political Economies: Privatization in Post-Communist and Reforming Communist States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Oi and Walder, Property. Stark stresses the feature of path dependence in property rights reforms, challenging the unquestioned universal validity of privatization in transition economies. See Stark, "Recombinant."
22. Even in public sectors there exist diverse routes to property rights reforms. Walder recognizes that privatization is one among many choices. See Andrew Walder, "Corporation Organization and Local Government Property Rights in China," in V. Milor, ed., Changing Political Economies: Privatization in Post-Communist and Reforming Communist States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Oi and Walder, Property. Stark stresses the feature of path dependence in property rights reforms, challenging the unquestioned universal validity of privatization in transition economies. See Stark, "Recombinant."
23. It is well-known that China's success in economic reforms is primarily due to the rise of new private sectors, particularly the township and village enterprises. Even in Russia and other transition economies, where privatization is the main reform strategy, new enterprises rather than privatized ones perform better. See Richard Ericson, "Economics and the Russian Transition," Slavic Review 57, no. 3 (1998): 609-25.
24. The booming literature is impressive on property rights transformation in Chinese reforms, see, for example, Walder, "Corporation"; David Li, "A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of Chinese Non-State Sector," Journal of Comparative Economics 23, no. 1 (1996): 1-19; Martin Weizman and Chenggang Xu, "Chinese Township and Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives," in John Romer, ed., Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, International Economic Association, 1997); Jiahua Che and Yingyi Qian, "Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 2 (1998): 467-96; Oi and Walder, Property. These studies, however, with the exception of Oi and Walder, only tangentially, if not at all, touch on the process of property rights transformation.
25. The booming literature is impressive on property rights transformation in Chinese reforms, see, for example, Walder, "Corporation"; David Li, "A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of Chinese Non-State Sector," Journal of Comparative Economics 23, no. 1 (1996): 1-19; Martin Weizman and Chenggang Xu, "Chinese Township and Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives," in John Romer, ed., Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, International Economic Association, 1997); Jiahua Che and Yingyi Qian, "Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 2 (1998): 467-96; Oi and Walder, Property. These studies, however, with the exception of Oi and Walder, only tangentially, if not at all, touch on the process of property rights transformation.
26. The booming literature is impressive on property rights transformation in Chinese reforms, see, for example, Walder, "Corporation"; David Li, "A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of Chinese Non-State Sector," Journal of Comparative Economics 23, no. 1 (1996): 1-19; Martin Weizman and Chenggang Xu, "Chinese Township and Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives," in John Romer, ed., Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, International Economic Association, 1997); Jiahua Che and Yingyi Qian, "Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 2 (1998): 467-96; Oi and Walder, Property. These studies, however, with the exception of Oi and Walder, only tangentially, if not at all, touch on the process of property rights transformation.
27. The booming literature is impressive on property rights transformation in Chinese reforms, see, for example, Walder, "Corporation"; David Li, "A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of Chinese Non-State Sector," Journal of Comparative Economics 23, no. 1 (1996): 1-19; Martin Weizman and Chenggang Xu, "Chinese Township and Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives," in John Romer, ed., Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, International Economic Association, 1997); Jiahua Che and Yingyi Qian, "Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 2 (1998): 467-96; Oi and Walder, Property. These studies, however, with the exception of Oi and Walder, only tangentially, if not at all, touch on the process of property rights transformation.
28. The booming literature is impressive on property rights transformation in Chinese reforms, see, for example, Walder, "Corporation"; David Li, "A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of Chinese Non-State Sector," Journal of Comparative Economics 23, no. 1 (1996): 1-19; Martin Weizman and Chenggang Xu, "Chinese Township and Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives," in John Romer, ed., Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, International Economic Association, 1997); Jiahua Che and Yingyi Qian, "Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 2 (1998): 467-96; Oi and Walder, Property. These studies, however, with the exception of Oi and Walder, only tangentially, if not at all, touch on the process of property rights transformation.
29. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, (1969): 1243-48. For two classic studies of open access fisheries, see H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62, no. 2 (1954): 124-42; Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of Nonexclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13, no. 1 (1970): 49-70. Scholars have recently begun to differentiate between "open access" and "common property." See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Daniel Bromley, Environment and the Economy (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991). According to Baland and Platteau, open access and common property are essentially different in so far as, in a common property, the community has the right to exclude nonmembers from the use of the resource. Under common property, the right of exclusion is assigned to a well-defined group. Under open access, a right of inclusion is granted to anyone who wants to use the resource. See Jean-Marie Baland and Jean Platteau, Halting Degradation of Natural Resource (New York: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1996), 29 . In the light of this distinction, this study is actually concerned with open access resources rather than common property resources, though we continue to use the traditional metaphor, "the tragedy of the commons."
30. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, (1969): 1243-48. For two classic studies of open access fisheries, see H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62, no. 2 (1954): 124-42; Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of Nonexclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13, no. 1 (1970): 49-70. Scholars have recently begun to differentiate between "open access" and "common property." See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Daniel Bromley, Environment and the Economy (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991). According to Baland and Platteau, open access and common property are essentially different in so far as, in a common property, the community has the right to exclude nonmembers from the use of the resource. Under common property, the right of exclusion is assigned to a well-defined group. Under open access, a right of inclusion is granted to anyone who wants to use the resource. See Jean-Marie Baland and Jean Platteau, Halting Degradation of Natural Resource (New York: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1996), 29 . In the light of this distinction, this study is actually concerned with open access resources rather than common property resources, though we continue to use the traditional metaphor, "the tragedy of the commons."
31. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, (1969): 1243-48. For two classic studies of open access fisheries, see H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62, no. 2 (1954): 124-42; Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of Nonexclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13, no. 1 (1970): 49-70. Scholars have recently begun to differentiate between "open access" and "common property." See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Daniel Bromley, Environment and the Economy (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991). According to Baland and Platteau, open access and common property are essentially different in so far as, in a common property, the community has the right to exclude nonmembers from the use of the resource. Under common property, the right of exclusion is assigned to a well-defined group. Under open access, a right of inclusion is granted to anyone who wants to use the resource. See Jean-Marie Baland and Jean Platteau, Halting Degradation of Natural Resource (New York: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1996), 29 . In the light of this distinction, this study is actually concerned with open access resources rather than common property resources, though we continue to use the traditional metaphor, "the tragedy of the commons."
32. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, (1969): 1243-48. For two classic studies of open access fisheries, see H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62, no. 2 (1954): 124-42; Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of Nonexclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13, no. 1 (1970): 49-70. Scholars have recently begun to differentiate between "open access" and "common property." See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Daniel Bromley, Environment and the Economy (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991). According to Baland and Platteau, open access and common property are essentially different in so far as, in a common property, the community has the right to exclude nonmembers from the use of the resource. Under common property, the right of exclusion is assigned to a well-defined group. Under open access, a right of inclusion is granted to anyone who wants to use the resource. See Jean-Marie Baland and Jean Platteau, Halting Degradation of Natural Resource (New York: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1996), 29 . In the light of this distinction, this study is actually concerned with open access resources rather than common property resources, though we continue to use the traditional metaphor, "the tragedy of the commons."
33. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, (1969): 1243-48. For two classic studies of open access fisheries, see H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62, no. 2 (1954): 124-42; Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of Nonexclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13, no. 1 (1970): 49-70. Scholars have recently begun to differentiate between "open access" and "common property." See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Daniel Bromley, Environment and the Economy (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991). According to Baland and Platteau, open access and common property are essentially different in so far as, in a common property, the community has the right to exclude nonmembers from the use of the resource. Under common property, the right of exclusion is assigned to a well-defined group. Under open access, a right of inclusion is granted to anyone who wants to use the resource. See Jean-Marie Baland and Jean Platteau, Halting Degradation of Natural Resource (New York: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1996), 29 . In the light of this distinction, this study is actually concerned with open access resources rather than common property resources, though we continue to use the traditional metaphor, "the tragedy of the commons."
34. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, (1969): 1243-48. For two classic studies of open access fisheries, see H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62, no. 2 (1954): 124-42; Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of Nonexclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13, no. 1 (1970): 49-70. Scholars have recently begun to differentiate between "open access" and "common property." See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Daniel Bromley, Environment and the Economy (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991). According to Baland and Platteau, open access and common property are essentially different in so far as, in a common property, the community has the right to exclude nonmembers from the use of the resource. Under common property, the right of exclusion is assigned to a well-defined group. Under open access, a right of inclusion is granted to anyone who wants to use the resource. See Jean-Marie Baland and Jean Platteau, Halting Degradation of Natural Resource (New York: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1996), 29 . In the light of this distinction, this study is actually concerned with open access resources rather than common property resources, though we continue to use the traditional metaphor, "the tragedy of the commons."
35. We are interested in changes of practical or economic property rights, not legal rights. In this case, legal rules have hardly changed. For the distinction between practical and legal rights, see Barzel, Economic, 3.
36. Ronald Coase, "The New Institutional Economics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140, no. 1 (1984): 229-31; Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); North, Institutions; Erik Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
37. Ronald Coase, "The New Institutional Economics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140, no. 1 (1984): 229-31; Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); North, Institutions; Erik Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
38. Ronald Coase, "The New Institutional Economics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140, no. 1 (1984): 229-31; Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); North, Institutions; Erik Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
39. Ronald Coase, "The New Institutional Economics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140, no. 1 (1984): 229-31; Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); North, Institutions; Erik Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
40. Barzel, Economic.
41. North and Thomas, The Rise, 5.
42. Eggertsson, Economic, 247-77; Furubotn and Richter, Institutions, 104-14. Classical writings on property rights include Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 (1960): 1-44; Armen Alchian, "Some Economics of Property Rights," IL Politico 30, (1965): 916-29; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57, no. 2 (1967): 347-59; North, Structure; Barzel, Economic.
43. Eggertsson, Economic, 247-77; Furubotn and Richter, Institutions, 104-14. Classical writings on property rights include Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 (1960): 1-44; Armen Alchian, "Some Economics of Property Rights," IL Politico 30, (1965): 916-29; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57, no. 2 (1967): 347-59; North, Structure; Barzel, Economic.
44. Eggertsson, Economic, 247-77; Furubotn and Richter, Institutions, 104-14. Classical writings on property rights include Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 (1960): 1-44; Armen Alchian, "Some Economics of Property Rights," IL Politico 30, (1965): 916-29; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57, no. 2 (1967): 347-59; North, Structure; Barzel, Economic.
45. Eggertsson, Economic, 247-77; Furubotn and Richter, Institutions, 104-14. Classical writings on property rights include Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 (1960): 1-44; Armen Alchian, "Some Economics of Property Rights," IL Politico 30, (1965): 916-29; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57, no. 2 (1967): 347-59; North, Structure; Barzel, Economic.
46. Eggertsson, Economic, 247-77; Furubotn and Richter, Institutions, 104-14. Classical writings on property rights include Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 (1960): 1-44; Armen Alchian, "Some Economics of Property Rights," IL Politico 30, (1965): 916-29; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57, no. 2 (1967): 347-59; North, Structure; Barzel, Economic.
47. Eggertsson, Economic, 247-77; Furubotn and Richter, Institutions, 104-14. Classical writings on property rights include Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 (1960): 1-44; Armen Alchian, "Some Economics of Property Rights," IL Politico 30, (1965): 916-29; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57, no. 2 (1967): 347-59; North, Structure; Barzel, Economic.
48. Eggertsson, Economic, 247-77; Furubotn and Richter, Institutions, 104-14. Classical writings on property rights include Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 (1960): 1-44; Armen Alchian, "Some Economics of Property Rights," IL Politico 30, (1965): 916-29; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57, no. 2 (1967): 347-59; North, Structure; Barzel, Economic.
49. Demsetz, "Toward"; North and Thomas, The Rise.
50. Demsetz, "Toward"; North and Thomas, The Rise.
51. Gary Libecap, "Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145, no. 1 (1989): 6-24; Gary Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
52. Gary Libecap, "Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145, no. 1 (1989): 6-24; Gary Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
53. Gary Libecap, "Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145, no. 1 (1989): 6-24; Gary Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
54. Demsetz, "Toward"; North, Structure.
55. Demsetz, "Toward"; North, Structure.
56. Demsetz, "Toward."
57. North and Thomas, The Rise; Lance Davis and Douglass North, Institutional Change and American Economic Growth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill, "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West," Journal of Law and Economics 18, no. 1 (1975): 163-79.
58. North and Thomas, The Rise; Lance Davis and Douglass North, Institutional Change and American Economic Growth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill, "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West," Journal of Law and Economics 18, no. 1 (1975): 163-79.
59. North and Thomas, The Rise; Lance Davis and Douglass North, Institutional Change and American Economic Growth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill, "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West," Journal of Law and Economics 18, no. 1 (1975): 163-79.
60. Eggertsson, Economic, 250; Furubotn and Richter, Institutions, 108.
61. Eggertsson, Economic, 250; Furubotn and Richter, Institutions, 108.
62. Eggertsson, Economic, 262-71.
63. North, Institutions, 52.
64. Carl Dahlman, The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
65. This emphasis on actors in new institutional economics is attributable to Coase. See Coase, "The New" and The Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). Rational choice sociologists have traditionally stressed action and agency. See, for example, George Homans, "Bring Men Back in," American Sociological Review 29, no. 6 (1964): 809-18; Michael Hechter, ed., The Microfoundations of Macrosociology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983); James Coleman, "Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action," American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 6 (1986): 1309-35.
66. This emphasis on actors in new institutional economics is attributable to Coase. See Coase, "The New" and The Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). Rational choice sociologists have traditionally stressed action and agency. See, for example, George Homans, "Bring Men Back in," American Sociological Review 29, no. 6 (1964): 809-18; Michael Hechter, ed., The Microfoundations of Macrosociology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983); James Coleman, "Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action," American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 6 (1986): 1309-35.
67. This emphasis on actors in new institutional economics is attributable to Coase. See Coase, "The New" and The Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). Rational choice sociologists have traditionally stressed action and agency. See, for example, George Homans, "Bring Men Back in," American Sociological Review 29, no. 6 (1964): 809-18; Michael Hechter, ed., The Microfoundations of Macrosociology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983); James Coleman, "Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action," American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 6 (1986): 1309-35.
68. This emphasis on actors in new institutional economics is attributable to Coase. See Coase, "The New" and The Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). Rational choice sociologists have traditionally stressed action and agency. See, for example, George Homans, "Bring Men Back in," American Sociological Review 29, no. 6 (1964): 809-18; Michael Hechter, ed., The Microfoundations of Macrosociology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983); James Coleman, "Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action," American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 6 (1986): 1309-35.
69. Libecap, "Distributional"; Contracting.
70. Libecap, "Distributional," 22.
71. Guido Calabresi, "The Pointless of Pareto," Yale Law Review 100, no. 2 (1991): 1211-37; Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Transaction Costs Paradigm," Economic Inquiry 36, no. 4 (1998): 514-21.
72. Guido Calabresi, "The Pointless of Pareto," Yale Law Review 100, no. 2 (1991): 1211-37; Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Transaction Costs Paradigm," Economic Inquiry 36, no. 4 (1998): 514-21.
73. Libecap, Contracting.
74. Knight, Institutions, 40.
75. Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., Explaining Social Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
76. Andrew Schotter, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
77. Ning Wang, "Transaction Costs and the Structure of the Market," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 58, no. 4 (1999): 783-805.
78. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). But Popper proposed a different view on subjectivity in social sciences. See Karl Popper, "The Logic of Social Sciences," in Theodor Adorno, ed., Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (New York: Harper, 1976).
79. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). But Popper proposed a different view on subjectivity in social sciences. See Karl Popper, "The Logic of Social Sciences," in Theodor Adorno, ed., Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (New York: Harper, 1976).
80. Two factors discouraged peasants on the south side to continue fishing in the lake. First, close to Jingzhou, they had much more alternative opportunities. Second, since the Longlake Fishing Farm (LLFF) was located on the same side, these peasants could be quite effectively deterred from fishing in the lake.
81. Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4-7.
82. Jiangling County Record (1992), 159.
83. Hardin, "The Tragedy."
84. Ostrom, Governing; Bromley, Environment; Baland and Platteau, Halting.
85. Ostrom, Governing; Bromley, Environment; Baland and Platteau, Halting.
86. Ostrom, Governing; Bromley, Environment; Baland and Platteau, Halting.
87. Wang, "Transaction."
88. Victor Nee, "Peasant Household Individualism," in William Parish, ed., Chinese Rural Development: The Great Transformation (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1985), 164-90.
89. Best bundles of durable goods are represented by the so-called three big items and three new big items. In this region, the bicycle, radio, and watch constituted the "three big items" in the 1970s and early 1980s. They were later gradually replaced by the "three new big items": the electrical fan, TV, and sewing machine. These consumer goods once commanded the most popularity among rural households.
90. One may counterargue that the change of consumption pattern is a mere consequence of the increase of income. However, no one can deny that the change of consumption pattern has a recursive effect, that is, generating more demand for cash. Moreover, it is contagious. The change of consumption pattern in one group has demonstrating or rippling effects and stimulates others to follow the suit. As a result, the change of preference put dramatic pressures on fisheries, a main source of cash income for peasants.
91. Anderson and Hill, "The Evolution"; Barzel, Economic.
92. Anderson and Hill, "The Evolution"; Barzel, Economic.
93. Demsetz, "Toward."
94. Libecap, Contracting; Knight, Institutions.
95. Libecap, Contracting; Knight, Institutions.
96. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
97. During interviews, private fishermen revealed that their side had three death records and various cases of physical abuse. While LLFF officials refused to talk about this issue, private fishermen acknowledged that they also fought back hard against LLFF patrolmen.
98. This strategy reminds us of the "weapon of the weak." When political channels are severely blocked and private individuals cannot articulate their interests and complaints, they usually resort to feigned ignorance, false compliance, verbal threats, mass defiance, and theft to mitigate or deny formal institution. See James Scott, Everyday Forms of Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985).
99. Mark Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Collective Action," American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 6 (1978): 1420-43.
100. William Riker, "The Experience of Creating Institutions: The Framing of the United States Constitution," in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., Explaining Social Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 121-44.
101. Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Fredick Hayek, "The Results of Human Action but Not of Human Design," in F. A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
102. Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Fredick Hayek, "The Results of Human Action but Not of Human Design," in F. A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
103. Robert Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," American Sociological Review 1, no. 6 (1936): 894-904; Raymond Boudon, The Unintended Consequences of Social Action (New York: Macmillan, 1982).
104. Robert Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," American Sociological Review 1, no. 6 (1936): 894-904; Raymond Boudon, The Unintended Consequences of Social Action (New York: Macmillan, 1982).
105. Unfortunately, we do not have quantitative data to illustrate this trend. During interviews, LLFF officials were uncomfortable to talk about their employees' uncivil treatment of caught fishermen. Yet fishermen's resentful accounts clearly indicate that LLFF patrolmen took advantage of the disintegration of gang groups and took harsh measures to punish caught fishermen. They [LLFF patrolmen] enjoyed patrolling very much, intercepting us in the lake, taking away our catch and nets. When they [LLFF patrolmen] caught us [fishermen] in the lake, they would take away everything they could, fish, nets, and boats. And they brought us to their private house of detention, and then ask our families to pay fines before releasing us. Our family members had nothing to do but to pay the fines as soon as possible. Otherwise they would beat us.
106. Though I do not have data to show how many peasant fishermen shifted to pond fishery, the percentage was very high. All but one of the twenty-four fishermen informants had engaged in pond fishery. Since the fixed supply of ponds usually could not meet the demand, peasants took their turn to rent ponds. This practice not only made peasants who were currently in pond fishery respect secure property rights but also warned those who were waiting to rent ponds not to behave short sightedly.
107. It is true that in the early 1980s, LLFF could not recoup its costs, as LLFF officials acknowledged in interviews.
108. This is known as the "soft budget constraint," a built-in feature of state-owned enterprises in the socialist economy. See Janos Kornai, "Soft Budget Constraints," Kyklos 39, no. 1 (1986): 3-30.
109. As Emile Durkheim put it, A social fact is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals, and the presence of this power may be recognized in its turn either by the existence of some specific sanction or by the resistance offered against every individual effort that tends to violate it. In Michael Hechter, The Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 15. For a recent articulation, see Jean Ensminger and Jack Knight, "Changing Social Norms: Common Property, Bridewealth, and Clan Exogamy," Current Anthropology 38, no. 1 (1997): 1-24.
110. As Emile Durkheim put it, A social fact is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals, and the presence of this power may be recognized in its turn either by the existence of some specific sanction or by the resistance offered against every individual effort that tends to violate it. In Michael Hechter, The Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 15. For a recent articulation, see Jean Ensminger and Jack Knight, "Changing Social Norms: Common Property, Bridewealth, and Clan Exogamy," Current Anthropology 38, no. 1 (1997): 1-24.
111. Another factor also played a role. It is not unexpected that most of these remaining fishermen were recalcitrant in character. In the past, they led the combat against LLFF and gained recognition from fellow fishermen. However, after the gang groups were disbanded, they became increasingly violent and threatening even toward their former fellows. For example, they occasionally turned to their former fellow fishermen's fishing ponds when opportunities allowed. As a result, fishermen who engaged in pond fishery even became cooperative with LLFF officials to get rid of these "tough guys."
112. Edward Shils, "Ideology," in David Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 7 (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), 66-76. For a recent exposition of ideology, particularly its role in economics, see Arthur Denzau and Douglass North, "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos 47, no. 1 (1994): 3-31.
113. Edward Shils, "Ideology," in David Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 7 (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), 66-76. For a recent exposition of ideology, particularly its role in economics, see Arthur Denzau and Douglass North, "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos 47, no. 1 (1994): 3-31.
114. For a general exposition of the relation between social norm and social meaning, see Cass Sunstein, "Social Norms and Social Roles" (the Coase Lecture delivered at the Law School of the University of Chicago, 24 November 1995); Lawrence Lessig, "The Regulations of Social Meaning," The University of Chicago Law Review 62, no. 2 (1995): 943-1045.
115. For a general exposition of the relation between social norm and social meaning, see Cass Sunstein, "Social Norms and Social Roles" (the Coase Lecture delivered at the Law School of the University of Chicago, 24 November 1995); Lawrence Lessig, "The Regulations of Social Meaning," The University of Chicago Law Review 62, no. 2 (1995): 943-1045.
116. Jiangling County Record (1992), 257.
117. Kenneth Arrow, The Limits of Organization (New York: Norton, 1974), 72; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
118. Kenneth Arrow, The Limits of Organization (New York: Norton, 1974), 72; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
119. One may be quick to point out that the "sour grapes" mechanism, as exposed by Elster, was at work here. See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). That is, after their access to fisheries was denied due to LLFF's increased enforcement efforts, fishermen chose to play down and even deny their desire for fisheries, thus reducing the conflict between the reality and their desire. Two considerations direct me away from such an explanation, however. First, if the "sour grapes" were indeed the working mechanism, we would expect fishermen who had gone through such a psychological self-denial to stop fishing in the lake. But they were unlikely to take actions to denounce other fishermen's continuous fishing in the lake. Second and more important, if fishermen changed to deny their desire for fishing in the lake in the face of LLFF's increased enforcement efforts, they would likely to return to the lake after LLFF reduces its patrol efforts. For a critique of Elster's argument, see Tore Sandeven, "Autonomy, Adaptation, and Rationality - A Critical Discussion of Jon Elster's Concept of 'Sour Grapes,'" Philosophy of Social Sciences 29, no. 1 (1999): 3-31.
120. One may be quick to point out that the "sour grapes" mechanism, as exposed by Elster, was at work here. See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). That is, after their access to fisheries was denied due to LLFF's increased enforcement efforts, fishermen chose to play down and even deny their desire for fisheries, thus reducing the conflict between the reality and their desire. Two considerations direct me away from such an explanation, however. First, if the "sour grapes" were indeed the working mechanism, we would expect fishermen who had gone through such a psychological self-denial to stop fishing in the lake. But they were unlikely to take actions to denounce other fishermen's continuous fishing in the lake. Second and more important, if fishermen changed to deny their desire for fishing in the lake in the face of LLFF's increased enforcement efforts, they would likely to return to the lake after LLFF reduces its patrol efforts. For a critique of Elster's argument, see Tore Sandeven, "Autonomy, Adaptation, and Rationality - A Critical Discussion of Jon Elster's Concept of 'Sour Grapes,'" Philosophy of Social Sciences 29, no. 1 (1999): 3-31.
121. Elster, Nuts; Bunge, "Mechanism"; Hedstrom and Swedberg, Social.
122. Elster, Nuts; Bunge, "Mechanism"; Hedstrom and Swedberg, Social.
123. Elster, Nuts; Bunge, "Mechanism"; Hedstrom and Swedberg, Social.
124. Hayek, "The Results."
125. Eggertsson, Institutions, 19.
126. Douglass North, "Five Propositions about Institutional Change," in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., Explaining Social Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 15-26.
127. Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967).
128. Social scientists are all too familiar with the entrenched tension between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. See, for example, Jon Elster, "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 4 (1989): 99-117. In this everlasting debate, social norms and interests are two competing forces driving human behavior.
129. Denzau and North, "Shared."
130. Peter Murrell, "Can Neoclassical Economics Underpin the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 4 (1991): 59-76.
131. David Stark, "Co-existing Organizational Forms in Hungary's Emerging Mixed Economy," in Victor Nee and David Stark, eds., Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 137-68; Stark, "Recombinant."
132. David Stark, "Co-existing Organizational Forms in Hungary's Emerging Mixed Economy," in Victor Nee and David Stark, eds., Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 137-68; Stark, "Recombinant."
133. Poznanski, "Restructuring."
134. Victor Nee, "Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, and Mixed Economy in China," Administrative Science Quarterly 37, no. 1 (1992): 1-27; Walder, "Corporation" ; Lin, "Local"; Oi and Walder, Property.
135. Victor Nee, "Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, and Mixed Economy in China," Administrative Science Quarterly 37, no. 1 (1992): 1-27; Walder, "Corporation" ; Lin, "Local"; Oi and Walder, Property.
136. Victor Nee, "Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, and Mixed Economy in China," Administrative Science Quarterly 37, no. 1 (1992): 1-27; Walder, "Corporation" ; Lin, "Local"; Oi and Walder, Property.
137. Victor Nee, "Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, and Mixed Economy in China," Administrative Science Quarterly 37, no. 1 (1992): 1-27; Walder, "Corporation" ; Lin, "Local"; Oi and Walder, Property.
138. Weitzman and Xu, "Chinese"; Li, "A Theory"; Che and Qian, "Insecure."
139. Weitzman and Xu, "Chinese"; Li, "A Theory"; Che and Qian, "Insecure."
140. Weitzman and Xu, "Chinese"; Li, "A Theory"; Che and Qian, "Insecure."
141. Nan Lin, "Local Market Socialism: Local Corporatism in Action in Rural China," Theory and Society 24, no. 2 (1995): 301-54; Stark, "Recombinant."
142. Nan Lin, "Local Market Socialism: Local Corporatism in Action in Rural China," Theory and Society 24, no. 2 (1995): 301-54; Stark, "Recombinant."
143. Daniel Kelliher, Peasant Power in China (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Kate Xiao Zhou, How the Farmers Changed China: Power of the People (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).
144. Daniel Kelliher, Peasant Power in China (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Kate Xiao Zhou, How the Farmers Changed China: Power of the People (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).
145. Kelliher, Peasant, 259.
146. Zhou, How.