Troubled triangle: Russia, Ukraine and the United States

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 104-142

  Kincade, William H ^a   Nolan, Cynthia M ^a  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035608176     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390108437824     Document Type: Article

References (219)

1. An excellent account of the motivation, process, and meaning of the Trilateral Agreement is in Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1997) pp.121-4.
2. On the oligarchs, see the following in The Economist, 'Putin versus the Oligarchs?' 17 June 2000, 'Boris Berezovsky, Puppeteer or Future Victim?,' 25 March 2000, and 'Russia's Oligarchs: How Are the Mighty Falling', 13 Feb. 1999. The May 2000 raid on the office of media baron Vladimir Gusinsky and his arrest was widely seen as a blunder by President Putin; see Andrew Jack, 'Russia's Tax Police Raid Media HQ', Financial Times, 12 May 2000 and David Hoffman, 'Mogul's Arrest Bears Mark of 'Strongman', Washington Post, 16 June 2000.
3. On the oligarchs, see the following in The Economist, 'Putin versus the Oligarchs?' 17 June 2000, 'Boris Berezovsky, Puppeteer or Future Victim?,' 25 March 2000, and 'Russia's Oligarchs: How Are the Mighty Falling', 13 Feb. 1999. The May 2000 raid on the office of media baron Vladimir Gusinsky and his arrest was widely seen as a blunder by President Putin; see Andrew Jack, 'Russia's Tax Police Raid Media HQ', Financial Times, 12 May 2000 and David Hoffman, 'Mogul's Arrest Bears Mark of 'Strongman', Washington Post, 16 June 2000.
4. On the oligarchs, see the following in The Economist, 'Putin versus the Oligarchs?' 17 June 2000, 'Boris Berezovsky, Puppeteer or Future Victim?,' 25 March 2000, and 'Russia's Oligarchs: How Are the Mighty Falling', 13 Feb. 1999. The May 2000 raid on the office of media baron Vladimir Gusinsky and his arrest was widely seen as a blunder by President Putin; see Andrew Jack, 'Russia's Tax Police Raid Media HQ', Financial Times, 12 May 2000 and David Hoffman, 'Mogul's Arrest Bears Mark of 'Strongman', Washington Post, 16 June 2000.
5. On the oligarchs, see the following in The Economist, 'Putin versus the Oligarchs?' 17 June 2000, 'Boris Berezovsky, Puppeteer or Future Victim?,' 25 March 2000, and 'Russia's Oligarchs: How Are the Mighty Falling', 13 Feb. 1999. The May 2000 raid on the office of media baron Vladimir Gusinsky and his arrest was widely seen as a blunder by President Putin; see Andrew Jack, 'Russia's Tax Police Raid Media HQ', Financial Times, 12 May 2000 and David Hoffman, 'Mogul's Arrest Bears Mark of 'Strongman', Washington Post, 16 June 2000.
6. On the oligarchs, see the following in The Economist, 'Putin versus the Oligarchs?' 17 June 2000, 'Boris Berezovsky, Puppeteer or Future Victim?,' 25 March 2000, and 'Russia's Oligarchs: How Are the Mighty Falling', 13 Feb. 1999. The May 2000 raid on the office of media baron Vladimir Gusinsky and his arrest was widely seen as a blunder by President Putin; see Andrew Jack, 'Russia's Tax Police Raid Media HQ', Financial Times, 12 May 2000 and David Hoffman, 'Mogul's Arrest Bears Mark of 'Strongman', Washington Post, 16 June 2000.
7. David Hoffman, 'Primakov Accused of Inaction on Economic Front', Washington Post, 12 March 1999. Putin's 10-year economic reform plan calls for private ownership, greater competition, guarantees against renationalization, and an end to official barter but contains few details on implementation; Associated Press dispatch, Washington Post, 29 June 2000.
8. David Hoffman, 'Primakov Accused of Inaction on Economic Front', Washington Post, 12 March 1999. Putin's 10-year economic reform plan calls for private ownership, greater competition, guarantees against renationalization, and an end to official barter but contains few details on implementation; Associated Press dispatch, Washington Post, 29 June 2000.
9. Peter Slavrakis makes the analogy of failed states in Africa to Russia in Shadow Politics: The Russian State in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Inst. 1997) pp.6-22.
10. David Ignatius, 'Russian Crapshoot', Washington Post, I Sept. 1999.
11. Fred Hiatt, 'Stumbling in Russia', Washington Post, 29 Aug. 1999, wrote that 'the debate over who lost Russia is legitimate and even necessary, as long as it's understood that Russia is not lost and was in any case never ours to lose. But the debate can be useful only if it's historically honest - about Russia's initial handicaps, about its prospects, and about how much worse things might be'.
12. 'Western Influence on the Soviet Union', in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (eds.) Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1988) p.366.
13. For commentary on the administration's policy change and constancy regarding Russia, see Charles Babington and Steven Mufson, 'Berger Says Nationalist Russia Could Pose Threat', Washington Post, 7 Jan. 2000; Jim Hoagland, 'Russia: What Went Wrong,' ibid., 8 Nov. 1998; Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Narrows its Vision of "Partnership" with Russia', ibid. 22 Nov. 1998; Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, 'Russia's Recession: The Nuclear Fallout', ibid. 23 Dec. 1998; Peter Reddaway, 'Russia: Where the West is Heading for a Fall', Letter to the Editor, ibid. 9 Jan. 1999; and, Robert G. Kaiser, 'Pumping Up the Problem', ibid. 15 Aug. 1999.
14. For commentary on the administration's policy change and constancy regarding Russia, see Charles Babington and Steven Mufson, 'Berger Says Nationalist Russia Could Pose Threat', Washington Post, 7 Jan. 2000; Jim Hoagland, 'Russia: What Went Wrong,' ibid., 8 Nov. 1998; Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Narrows its Vision of "Partnership" with Russia', ibid. 22 Nov. 1998; Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, 'Russia's Recession: The Nuclear Fallout', ibid. 23 Dec. 1998; Peter Reddaway, 'Russia: Where the West is Heading for a Fall', Letter to the Editor, ibid. 9 Jan. 1999; and, Robert G. Kaiser, 'Pumping Up the Problem', ibid. 15 Aug. 1999.
15. For commentary on the administration's policy change and constancy regarding Russia, see Charles Babington and Steven Mufson, 'Berger Says Nationalist Russia Could Pose Threat', Washington Post, 7 Jan. 2000; Jim Hoagland, 'Russia: What Went Wrong,' ibid., 8 Nov. 1998; Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Narrows its Vision of "Partnership" with Russia', ibid. 22 Nov. 1998; Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, 'Russia's Recession: The Nuclear Fallout', ibid. 23 Dec. 1998; Peter Reddaway, 'Russia: Where the West is Heading for a Fall', Letter to the Editor, ibid. 9 Jan. 1999; and, Robert G. Kaiser, 'Pumping Up the Problem', ibid. 15 Aug. 1999.
16. For commentary on the administration's policy change and constancy regarding Russia, see Charles Babington and Steven Mufson, 'Berger Says Nationalist Russia Could Pose Threat', Washington Post, 7 Jan. 2000; Jim Hoagland, 'Russia: What Went Wrong,' ibid., 8 Nov. 1998; Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Narrows its Vision of "Partnership" with Russia', ibid. 22 Nov. 1998; Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, 'Russia's Recession: The Nuclear Fallout', ibid. 23 Dec. 1998; Peter Reddaway, 'Russia: Where the West is Heading for a Fall', Letter to the Editor, ibid. 9 Jan. 1999; and, Robert G. Kaiser, 'Pumping Up the Problem', ibid. 15 Aug. 1999.
17. For commentary on the administration's policy change and constancy regarding Russia, see Charles Babington and Steven Mufson, 'Berger Says Nationalist Russia Could Pose Threat', Washington Post, 7 Jan. 2000; Jim Hoagland, 'Russia: What Went Wrong,' ibid., 8 Nov. 1998; Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Narrows its Vision of "Partnership" with Russia', ibid. 22 Nov. 1998; Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, 'Russia's Recession: The Nuclear Fallout', ibid. 23 Dec. 1998; Peter Reddaway, 'Russia: Where the West is Heading for a Fall', Letter to the Editor, ibid. 9 Jan. 1999; and, Robert G. Kaiser, 'Pumping Up the Problem', ibid. 15 Aug. 1999.
18. For commentary on the administration's policy change and constancy regarding Russia, see Charles Babington and Steven Mufson, 'Berger Says Nationalist Russia Could Pose Threat', Washington Post, 7 Jan. 2000; Jim Hoagland, 'Russia: What Went Wrong,' ibid., 8 Nov. 1998; Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Narrows its Vision of "Partnership" with Russia', ibid. 22 Nov. 1998; Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, 'Russia's Recession: The Nuclear Fallout', ibid. 23 Dec. 1998; Peter Reddaway, 'Russia: Where the West is Heading for a Fall', Letter to the Editor, ibid. 9 Jan. 1999; and, Robert G. Kaiser, 'Pumping Up the Problem', ibid. 15 Aug. 1999.
19. Stavrakis, Shadow Politics (note 4) p.4.
20. Timothy J. Colton, 'Boris Yeltsin, Russia's All-Thumbs Democrat', in Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.) Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995) p.57.
21. The plotters were major figures in or closely associated with the Soviet military-industry complex - the Voennaya Promyshlenaya Komplekc or VPK. On VPK personnel and organization, see William H. Kincade and T. Keith Thomson, 'Economic Conversion in the USSR', Problems of Communism, Jan.-Feb. 1990.
22. Zenovia A. Sochor, 'August 1991 in Comparative Perspective', in Jane Shapiro Zacek and Ilpyong J. Kim (eds.) The Legacy of the Soviet Bloc (Gainesville: UP of Florida 1997) p.97.
23. Lilia Shevtsova, 'Russia's Post-Communist Politics: Revolution or Continuity?' in Gail W. Lapidus (ed.) The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995) p. 10, argues that you can take the man out of the Communist Party but you cannot take the communist out of the man. '[I]t is clear that Yeltsin failed to break with the style of governance and the mentality he had acquired as a Communist Party apparatchik. His tendency was to purge supporters when doing so served his political interests. This flexibility helped him maneuver on the highly polarized Russian political scene. But it also made it impossible to elaborate a stable and viable policy, to strike stable alliances, or to secure a power base…In the final analysis, Yeltsin proved unable to meet the new challenges he had himself helped create.'
24. Kaiser, 'Pumping Up the Problem' (note 8).
25. Gail W. Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, 'Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism', in Lapidus (note 8) pp.92-8. Percentages not shown for all response categories.
26. On the events in 1999, see Daniel Williams, 'Russia Opens Land Assault In Chechnya', Washington Post, 1 Oct. 1999.
27. Lapidus and Walker (note 15) p.96.
28. Ibid, pp.92-8. On the relative strength or weakness of the center and periphery, see Steven L. Solnick, 'Is the Center Too Weak or Too Strong in the Russian Federation?' in Valerie Sperling (ed.) Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2000).
29. Ibid, pp.92-8. On the relative strength or weakness of the center and periphery, see Steven L. Solnick, 'Is the Center Too Weak or Too Strong in the Russian Federation?' in Valerie Sperling (ed.) Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2000).
30. An excellent account and analysis of the Yeltsin period through March 1999 is: Lelia Shevtsova, Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment 1999). See also the companion volume, Anders Aslund and Martha Brill Olcott (eds.) Russia After Communism ibid.
31. An excellent account and analysis of the Yeltsin period through March 1999 is: Lelia Shevtsova, Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment 1999). See also the companion volume, Anders Aslund and Martha Brill Olcott (eds.) Russia After Communism ibid.
32. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
33. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
34. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
35. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
36. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
37. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
38. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
39. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
40. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
41. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
42. 'Swiss to Charge Yeltsin's Daughters', Washington Post, 12 June 2000; Sharon LaFraniere, 'Swiss to File Charges in Case Involving Kremlin Contracts,' ibid. 16 June 2000, and 'Yeltsin is Linked to Bribe Scheme', ibid. 8 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr, 'Probe Target Suspected in '96', ibid. 14 Sept. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Yeltsin's Son-in-Law Kept Offshore Accounts, Hill Told', ibid. 23 Sept. 1999; David Hoffman, 'Russia's Cash Flow Flows Out', ibid. 29 Aug. 1999; Robert O'Harrow Jr and Sharon LaFraniere, 'No Open-and-Shut Case', ibid. 3 Oct. 1999; and 'Money Laundering in Russia: Red Ink, Redder Faces', The Economist, II Sept. 1999, p.83. On possible implications for Vice-President Gore, see David Ignatius, 'Who Robbed Russia', Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1999, and Ceci Connolly, 'Gore Faces Ticklish Issue on Russian Corruption', ibid. 27 Aug. 1999. For an analytic treatment of the problem, see Louise Shelley, 'Is the Russian State Coping with Organized Crime and Corruption?' in Sperling (note 18).
43. Coalitions of like-minded appointees exploited conditions to take control of policy-making for usually brief periods. One was the 'party of war' that launched the first ill-fated war in Chechnya. See John B. Dunlop, 'The 'Party of War' and Russian Imperial Nationalism', Problems of Post-Communism, March/April 1996, passim.
44. See also the articles by Stavrakis, 'Russia After the Elections: Democracy or Parliamentary Byzantium?'
45. and Vladimir Brovkin, 'The Emperor's New Clothes: Continuity of Soviet Political Culture in Contemporary Russia'.
46. Quoted in Colton and Tucker, 'Post-Soviet Leadership and Change', idem. Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (note 10) p. 10.
47. Colton, in Colton and Tucker (note 10) p.66.
48. David Lane, 'Political Elites Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin', in Colton and Tucker (note 10) p.46.
49. Although framed by the Congress of People's Deputies as a trap for Yeltsin, the four referendum questions in fact worked to produce an outcome favorable to Yeltsin.
50. On 21 Sept. Yeltsin dissolved the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet and called for elections to a new Federal Assembly in December; that same evening, the Supreme Soviet voted to impeach Yeltsin and elected his vice-president, Aleksandr Rutskoi, as acting president on the grounds that Yeltsin had violated a March 1993 ruling by the Constitutional Court that a president's authority is terminated if he tries to dissolve legally elected institutions such as the parliament. See RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 182, 'Russia: Yeltsin's Decree and Parliament's Response', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 22 Sept. 1993.
51. Shevtsova, in Lapidus (note 13) p.23.
52. Shevtsova, Yeltsin's Russia (note 19) pp.224-7, notes that Yeltsin would later work with the left opposition, especially the communists, in the Duma, while also compromising or coopting them, a tactic that Putin quickly adopted in 2000, to the dismay of many Russians; see Masha Lipman, 'Putin's Only Option' (essay) and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Putin's Duma Deal Ignites Political Furor', Washington Post, 20 Jan. 2000.
53. Shevtsova, Yeltsin's Russia (note 19) pp.224-7, notes that Yeltsin would later work with the left opposition, especially the communists, in the Duma, while also compromising or coopting them, a tactic that Putin quickly adopted in 2000, to the dismay of many Russians; see Masha Lipman, 'Putin's Only Option' (essay) and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Putin's Duma Deal Ignites Political Furor', Washington Post, 20 Jan. 2000.
54. Shevtsova, Yeltsin's Russia (note 19) pp.224-7, notes that Yeltsin would later work with the left opposition, especially the communists, in the Duma, while also compromising or coopting them, a tactic that Putin quickly adopted in 2000, to the dismay of many Russians; see Masha Lipman, 'Putin's Only Option' (essay) and Sharon LaFraniere, 'Putin's Duma Deal Ignites Political Furor', Washington Post, 20 Jan. 2000.
55. Yeltsin was convinced by the military leadership and the 'party of war' dominant in presidential agencies that the operation would be quick, successful, and thus popular. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev claimed Grozny would be secured in three hours and the whole operation would last a week. See Pal Kolsto, Political Construction Sites: NationBuilding in Russia and the Post-Soviet States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2000) p.215.
56. David Hoffman, 'Russian Premier Pins Bombings on Chechens', Washington Post, 16 Sept. 1999, and 'Fourth Blast in Russia Kills 17', ibid. 17 Sept. 1999. On Chechen and Russian motivations, see Yo'av Karny, 'The Chechen Leaders Thrive on Perpetual, Idealized War'
57. David Hoffman, 'Russian Premier Pins Bombings on Chechens', Washington Post, 16 Sept. 1999, and 'Fourth Blast in Russia Kills 17', ibid. 17 Sept. 1999. On Chechen and Russian motivations, see Yo'av Karny, 'The Chechen Leaders Thrive on Perpetual, Idealized War'
58. David Hoffman, 'Russian Premier Pins Bombings on Chechens', Washington Post, 16 Sept. 1999, and 'Fourth Blast in Russia Kills 17', ibid. 17 Sept. 1999. On Chechen and Russian motivations, see Yo'av Karny, 'The Chechen Leaders Thrive on Perpetual, Idealized War'
59. and Helen Womack, 'Among Russians, Terrorism Begets a Dangerous Unity', ibid. Outlook', 10 Oct. 1999.
60. David Hoffman, 'People's Capitalism Benefiting Only the Elite: Big Tycoons Squeeze Out Small Business', Washington Post, 28 Dec. 1997.
61. The oligarchs sought to reconstruct Russia in a nineteenth-century Western capitalist image, buying efficient or resource-rich industries, controlling the banking sector, and organizing the major media for their own benefit. Said Mikhail Fridman, chairman of the Alfa Group and a leading oligarch: 'The big companies get bigger, and bigger, and bigger. And it's quite easy, because the ties are quite close between a big company and political power. And it can use lhis connection for growth.' Quoted in Jane Zacek, 'The Transformation of Communist Rule,' in Zacek and Kim, Legacy of the Soviet Bloc (note 12) p.7.
62. Michael Dobbs, and Paul Blustein, 'Lost Illusions About Russia', Washington Post, 12 Sept. 1999. On Talbott's role in US-Russian relations, see 'Strobe Talbott, Deliverer of Russia', The Economist, 3 July 1999.
63. Michael Dobbs, and Paul Blustein, 'Lost Illusions About Russia', Washington Post, 12 Sept. 1999. On Talbott's role in US-Russian relations, see 'Strobe Talbott, Deliverer of Russia', The Economist, 3 July 1999.
64. Hoffman, 'Russia's People's Capitalism Benefiting Only the Elite' (note 31). The 'iron curtain' around Russian government finance parted in early 1999, when it became known that Moscow sought to protect and/or exploit its currency reserves by 'sheltering' them in a Russian-organized financial management firm on the Isle of Jersey, a special economic zone.
65. See John Thornhill, Andrew Jack, Arkady Ostrovsky, and Philip Jeune, 'Russia "Moved Reserves to Tax Haven"', Financial Times, 12 Feb. 1999 and
66. 'Russia's Black Hole', The Economist, 13 Feb. 1999, p.71.
67. On Russia's pre-1998 problems, see David Remnick, 'Can Russia Change?' Foreign Affairs 76/1 (Jan./Feb. 1997) pp.36-7; he notes that 'power in Russia is now adrift, unpredictable, and corrupt'. See the sources in Note 20.
68. Betsy McKay, 'Premier is Outwitting the Left, but Hasn't Tackled Economy', Wall Street Journal, 30 Dec. 1998. Neither the ruble or Yeltsin rebounded well; polls showed Primakov ahead of Yeltsin in popularity.
69. Kenneth M. Jensen, 'Introduction', in Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensen (eds.), The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy (Washincton DC: US Institute of Peace Press 1994) pp.3-4.
70. Yeltsin's 'sphinx like' silence is noted by Leon Aron in 'The Emergent Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy', in The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy (note 36) p.20, while Mikhail Bezrukov mentions Yeltsin's 'vague interest in the foreign policy domain' in 'Institutional Mechanisms of Russian Foreign Policy' in the same work, p.76.
71. Aron (note 37) passim, esp. pp.20-1.
72. Ibid. p. 18.
73. See, generally, Mary McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty (NY: Cambridge UP 1997) and 'C.I.S., R.I.P'.' Wall Street Journal, 1 March 1999. Uzbekistan quit as a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty early in 1999 and has been open to NATO overtures, as has Georgia which asked NATO to 'protect Georgia's security and independence'. In 1999, only six of the original nine adherents (of 12 CIS members) agreed to renew the collective security treaty; 'CIS Security Union Crumbles', Global Intelligence Update, 10 Feb. 1999 (STRATFOR Inc.: alert@stratfor.com). See also, Paul Kubicek, 'End of the Line for the Commonwealth of Independent States', Problems of Post-Communism, March-April 1999.
74. See, generally, Mary McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty (NY: Cambridge UP 1997) and 'C.I.S., R.I.P'.' Wall Street Journal, 1 March 1999. Uzbekistan quit as a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty early in 1999 and has been open to NATO overtures, as has Georgia which asked NATO to 'protect Georgia's security and independence'. In 1999, only six of the original nine adherents (of 12 CIS members) agreed to renew the collective security treaty; 'CIS Security Union Crumbles', Global Intelligence Update, 10 Feb. 1999 (STRATFOR Inc.: alert@stratfor.com). See also, Paul Kubicek, 'End of the Line for the Commonwealth of Independent States', Problems of Post-Communism, March-April 1999.
75. See, generally, Mary McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty (NY: Cambridge UP 1997) and 'C.I.S., R.I.P'.' Wall Street Journal, 1 March 1999. Uzbekistan quit as a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty early in 1999 and has been open to NATO overtures, as has Georgia which asked NATO to 'protect Georgia's security and independence'. In 1999, only six of the original nine adherents (of 12 CIS members) agreed to renew the collective security treaty; 'CIS Security Union Crumbles', Global Intelligence Update, 10 Feb. 1999 (STRATFOR Inc.: alert@stratfor.com). See also, Paul Kubicek, 'End of the Line for the Commonwealth of Independent States', Problems of Post-Communism, March-April 1999.
76. See, generally, Mary McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty (NY: Cambridge UP 1997) and 'C.I.S., R.I.P'.' Wall Street Journal, 1 March 1999. Uzbekistan quit as a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty early in 1999 and has been open to NATO overtures, as has Georgia which asked NATO to 'protect Georgia's security and independence'. In 1999, only six of the original nine adherents (of 12 CIS members) agreed to renew the collective security treaty; 'CIS Security Union Crumbles', Global Intelligence Update, 10 Feb. 1999 (STRATFOR Inc.: alert@stratfor.com). See also, Paul Kubicek, 'End of the Line for the Commonwealth of Independent States', Problems of Post-Communism, March-April 1999.
77. James Kitfield, 'Stars and Stripes on the Silk Route', National Journal. 12 March 1999. Said a US spokesman, 'We are not attempting to undermine Russia's legitimate and long-standing relationships in the Caspian region. We are against monopoly control of Caspian energy resources, however, which in the past has caused some in Russia to play "Great Game" politics by cutting off the oil flow from certain Caspian countries. We've also emphasized that it is in Russia's security interest to have stable and healthy countries along its southern border, as a buffer against something Moscow is very concerned about - Islamic fundamentalism.' Possible new US-Russian tension over oil may flow from a new oil field discovery in Kazakhstan; see David B. Ottaway, 'Vast Caspian Oil Field Found', Washington Post, 16 May 2000.
78. James Kitfield, 'Stars and Stripes on the Silk Route', National Journal. 12 March 1999. Said a US spokesman, 'We are not attempting to undermine Russia's legitimate and long-standing relationships in the Caspian region. We are against monopoly control of Caspian energy resources, however, which in the past has caused some in Russia to play "Great Game" politics by cutting off the oil flow from certain Caspian countries. We've also emphasized that it is in Russia's security interest to have stable and healthy countries along its southern border, as a buffer against something Moscow is very concerned about - Islamic fundamentalism.' Possible new US-Russian tension over oil may flow from a new oil field discovery in Kazakhstan; see David B. Ottaway, 'Vast Caspian Oil Field Found', Washington Post, 16 May 2000.
79. Kaiser, 'Pumping up the Problem' (note 8).
80. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
81. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
82. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
83. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
84. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
85. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
86. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
87. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
88. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
89. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
90. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
91. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
92. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
93. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website of (he Government of the Russian Federation, www.gov.ru), Ariel Cohen, 'The Rise of Putin: What It Means for the Future of Russia', Washington: Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1353, 28 March 2000; Keith Bush, 'President Vladimir Putin' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies, www.csis.org/ruseura, 3 Jan. 2000); Stephen Mulvey, 'Vladimir Putin: Spy Turned Politician', BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk, 1 Jan. 2000; Matt Bivens, 'Waiting for Vladimir Putin', The Moscow Times (Wysiwyg:// 22/http//www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/03/26.001.html) 26 March 2000; Nikolai Sokov, 'Foreign Policy Under Putin: Pro-Western Pragmatism Might Be a Greater Challenge to the West' (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inst. for Int. Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) (no date [2000]); and the following Economist articles: 'Russia's Putin Puzzle', 4 March 2000; 'A Russia to do Business with?' 4 March, 2000; 'A Russian Coronation', 25 March 2000; 'What Next, President Putin?' 1 April 2000; 'Russia: A New Foreign Policy?' 22 April 2000; 'Putin's Russia', 13 May 2000; and 'Russia: In With the New, and Not so New', 27 May 2000.
94. On Putin's effort to gain control of regional leaders by changing the Federation Council (upper house), see David Hoffman, 'Putin Steps Toward Tighter Control', Washington Post, 1 July 2000. Among many sources and profiles, see Putin's 'as-told-to' biography, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President (NY: PublicAffairs, 2000); Vladimir Putin, 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' (article posted 31 Dec. 1999 on website
95. In political terms, entropy signifies a condition in which a system undergoing spontaneous change is increasingly in disorder because energy (power or capability) is diffused, rather than concentrated on essential functions or aims. On the Output collapse' and post-Soviet Ukraine's economy in general, see Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio, Politics and Society in Ukraine (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1999) Chapter 6.
96. Ukraine and Belarus held United Nations seats owing to Stalin's demand for them as a condition of joining the UN. Thus, each had its own, if not independent, foreign policy body.
97. On the constitutional and legal guarantees of rights, see Maria Drohobycky, 'Ukraine and its Ethnic Minorities', in Maria Drohobycky (ed.) Managing Ethnic Tension in Post-Soviet Space: The Examples of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, A Reference Guide (Washington DC: American Assoc. for the Advancement of Science 1995). While Kravchuk, in a spring 1992 speech in Lviv in western Ukraine, made it clear to a delegation of Diaspora Ukrainians that the new state would not be ethnically based, he later endorsed a moderate version of a plan to 'Ukrainize' the military, a goal of many officers and members of the Rada. The unpopular effort was later terminated. Sherman W. Garnett notes: 'No extreme view of the state, whether narrowly Ukrainian nationalist or communist integrationist, could triumph under conditions where diverse regions make it difficult to form a solid and stable majority', Keystone in the Arch (note 1) p.20.
98. On the constitutional and legal guarantees of rights, see Maria Drohobycky, 'Ukraine and its Ethnic Minorities', in Maria Drohobycky (ed.) Managing Ethnic Tension in Post-Soviet Space: The Examples of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, A Reference Guide (Washington DC: American Assoc. for the Advancement of Science 1995). While Kravchuk, in a spring 1992 speech in Lviv in western Ukraine, made it clear to a delegation of Diaspora Ukrainians that the new state would not be ethnically based, he later endorsed a moderate version of a plan to 'Ukrainize' the military, a goal of many officers and members of the Rada. The unpopular effort was later terminated. Sherman W. Garnett notes: 'No extreme view of the state, whether narrowly Ukrainian nationalist or communist integrationist, could triumph under conditions where diverse regions make it difficult to form a solid and stable majority', Keystone in the Arch (note 1) p.20.
99. See William H. Kincade and Natalie Melnyczuk, 'Eurasia Letter: Unneighborly Neighbors', Foreign Policy 94 (Spring 1994).
100. On this period, see William H. Kincade, 'Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: Hollow Threat, Wasting Asset', Arms Control Today 23/6 (July/Aug. 1993).
101. B-Sky-B newscast, 4 March 1994, Budapest, Hungary, in English, co-aulhor's notes. The two nations declared their relations a 'strategic partnership'; see Garnett (note 1) 126.
102. Some sources say Kuchma is a Russian-speaking Ukrainian; see Kolsto (note 29) 187.
103. See, for example, 'The Ukrainian Question', The Economist, 20 Nov. 1999.
104. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (note 1) pp.32-6, is the source for the economic context. He notes that President Clinton doubled US aid to Ukraine to S350 million during Kravchuk's 1994 visit (p. 124). For a more detailed account, see the reference in note 44. Markian Bilynskyj observes that Kuchma did not take advantage of legislation for business in Ukraine that allows him to issue economic decrees with the force of law; remarks at the Kennan Institute, 'Ukrainian Elections: Before and After', 12 Oct. 1999, co-author's notes.
105. See 'Ukraine's Two Faces', The Economist, 5 June 1999, p.48, for instance.
106. On these issues, see: Ustina Markus, 'Black Sea Fleet Dispute Apparently Over', Transition, 23 July 1995, pp.30-1, and James Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords', Survival 39/3 (Autumn 1997) pp.33-50. See also 'Russia and Ukraine Are Not Irreconcilable Rivals', Nezavismaya Gazeta, 4 Sept. 1997. Russia's Duma, however, had not ratified the treaty on borders by late 1999 and seemed unlikely to do so soon; see 'Ukraine's Unmended Northern Fence', The Economist, 6 Feb. 1999, p.52. Also in 1997, Ukraine joined Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and, later, Uzbekistan to form a regional integration organization known as GUUAM that irked Russia which saw it as a challenge to the CIS; Kolsto (note 29) p.252.
107. On these issues, see: Ustina Markus, 'Black Sea Fleet Dispute Apparently Over', Transition, 23 July 1995, pp.30-1, and James Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords', Survival 39/3 (Autumn 1997) pp.33-50. See also 'Russia and Ukraine Are Not Irreconcilable Rivals', Nezavismaya Gazeta, 4 Sept. 1997. Russia's Duma, however, had not ratified the treaty on borders by late 1999 and seemed unlikely to do so soon; see 'Ukraine's Unmended Northern Fence', The Economist, 6 Feb. 1999, p.52. Also in 1997, Ukraine joined Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and, later, Uzbekistan to form a regional integration organization known as GUUAM that irked Russia which saw it as a challenge to the CIS; Kolsto (note 29) p.252.
108. On these issues, see: Ustina Markus, 'Black Sea Fleet Dispute Apparently Over', Transition, 23 July 1995, pp.30-1, and James Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords', Survival 39/3 (Autumn 1997) pp.33-50. See also 'Russia and Ukraine Are Not Irreconcilable Rivals', Nezavismaya Gazeta, 4 Sept. 1997. Russia's Duma, however, had not ratified the treaty on borders by late 1999 and seemed unlikely to do so soon; see 'Ukraine's Unmended Northern Fence', The Economist, 6 Feb. 1999, p.52. Also in 1997, Ukraine joined Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and, later, Uzbekistan to form a regional integration organization known as GUUAM that irked Russia which saw it as a challenge to the CIS; Kolsto (note 29) p.252.
109. On these issues, see: Ustina Markus, 'Black Sea Fleet Dispute Apparently Over', Transition, 23 July 1995, pp.30-1, and James Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords', Survival 39/3 (Autumn 1997) pp.33-50. See also 'Russia and Ukraine Are Not Irreconcilable Rivals', Nezavismaya Gazeta, 4 Sept. 1997. Russia's Duma, however, had not ratified the treaty on borders by late 1999 and seemed unlikely to do so soon; see 'Ukraine's Unmended Northern Fence', The Economist, 6 Feb. 1999, p.52. Also in 1997, Ukraine joined Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and, later, Uzbekistan to form a regional integration organization known as GUUAM that irked Russia which saw it as a challenge to the CIS; Kolsto (note 29) p.252.
110. On these issues, see: Ustina Markus, 'Black Sea Fleet Dispute Apparently Over', Transition, 23 July 1995, pp.30-1, and James Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords', Survival 39/3 (Autumn 1997) pp.33-50. See also 'Russia and Ukraine Are Not Irreconcilable Rivals', Nezavismaya Gazeta, 4 Sept. 1997. Russia's Duma, however, had not ratified the treaty on borders by late 1999 and seemed unlikely to do so soon; see 'Ukraine's Unmended Northern Fence', The Economist, 6 Feb. 1999, p.52. Also in 1997, Ukraine joined Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and, later, Uzbekistan to form a regional integration organization known as GUUAM that irked Russia which saw it as a challenge to the CIS; Kolsto (note 29) p.252.
111. The public division and ambivalence rests on ethnic, religious, regional, and linguistic differences and disparate views on the Soviet and post-Soviet experience; see summary of Andrew Wilson's remarks, 'Ukrainian National Identity: The "Other Ukraine"', Meeting Report 17/9 (Washington DC: Kennan Inst. 2000).
112. 'Leonid Kuchma: Ukraine's Dismal Choice', The Economist, 20 Nov. 1999.
113. On the Rada elections, see Katya Gorchinskaya, 'Ukraine Joins the Party', Transition (May 1998) pp.54-64.
114. Daniel Williams, 'Gore Declines to Back Ukrainian Loan Appeal', Washington Post, 23 July 1998. Kuchma pointed out that Ukraine is as deserving of an IMF loan as Russia. Kuchma argued in a July 21 interview that 'if a strategic partner is in need, it is normally aided, if of course, strategic partnership is not just a motto written on paper', quoted in 'Ukrainian Asks for More Aid', Washington Post, 22 July 1998. On Ukraine's economic ties to Russia, see Oles M. Smolansky, 'Ukraine's Economic Dependence on Russia', Problems of Post-Comimmism, March-April 1999.
115. Daniel Williams, 'Gore Declines to Back Ukrainian Loan Appeal', Washington Post, 23 July 1998. Kuchma pointed out that Ukraine is as deserving of an IMF loan as Russia. Kuchma argued in a July 21 interview that 'if a strategic partner is in need, it is normally aided, if of course, strategic partnership is not just a motto written on paper', quoted in 'Ukrainian Asks for More Aid', Washington Post, 22 July 1998. On Ukraine's economic ties to Russia, see Oles M. Smolansky, 'Ukraine's Economic Dependence on Russia', Problems of Post-Comimmism, March-April 1999.
116. Daniel Williams, 'Gore Declines to Back Ukrainian Loan Appeal', Washington Post, 23 July 1998. Kuchma pointed out that Ukraine is as deserving of an IMF loan as Russia. Kuchma argued in a July 21 interview that 'if a strategic partner is in need, it is normally aided, if of course, strategic partnership is not just a motto written on paper', quoted in 'Ukrainian Asks for More Aid', Washington Post, 22 July 1998. On Ukraine's economic ties to Russia, see Oles M. Smolansky, 'Ukraine's Economic Dependence on Russia', Problems of Post-Comimmism, March-April 1999.
117. Remarks, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 Oct. 1998; co-author's notes.
118. Global Intelligence Update, January 20, 1999 (STRATFOR, Inc.: alert@yorktown.stratfor. com). This source notes that Ukraine was confronted in this period by a report of the Council of Europe threatening to suspend its delegation unless it complied with pledges made on joining the Council in 1995: death penalty abolition, legal and judicial reform, enacting a new civil code and laws on political parties, freedom of the press, and respect for the rights of prisoners.
119. On land reform, see 'Ukraine's Farms: Unreformed', The Economist, 11 Sept 1999.
120. See note 60 citation.
121. On the election, see Markian Bilynskyj, Update on Ukraine, 29 Oct and 10 Nov. 1999 (available from the US-Ukraine Foundation, Washington DC) and these The Economist articles: 'Who'll Lead Ukraine?' and 'Ukraine's Grim Choice', 23 Oct. 1999 and 'The Ukrainian Question' and 'Leonid Kuchma: Ukraine's Grim Choice', 20 Nov. 1999.
122. On the election, see Markian Bilynskyj, Update on Ukraine, 29 Oct and 10 Nov. 1999 (available from the US-Ukraine Foundation, Washington DC) and these The Economist articles: 'Who'll Lead Ukraine?' and 'Ukraine's Grim Choice', 23 Oct. 1999 and 'The Ukrainian Question' and 'Leonid Kuchma: Ukraine's Grim Choice', 20 Nov. 1999.
123. On the election, see Markian Bilynskyj, Update on Ukraine, 29 Oct and 10 Nov. 1999 (available from the US-Ukraine Foundation, Washington DC) and these The Economist articles: 'Who'll Lead Ukraine?' and 'Ukraine's Grim Choice', 23 Oct. 1999 and 'The Ukrainian Question' and 'Leonid Kuchma: Ukraine's Grim Choice', 20 Nov. 1999.
124. On the electoral aftermath, see Bilynskyj, Update on Ukraine, for 10 Jan and 24 Feb 2000. Bilynskyj directs the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy in Kyiv.
125. Bilynskyj, Update on Ukraine, 10 Jan. 2000. His analysis notes that, in Kuchma's Washington visit soon after the election, the US insisted that Yushchenko or acting deputy premier Serhiy Tyhipko be named prime minister. Other creditors were also insistent. In a post-election decree. Kuchma also ordered drastic cuts in and reform of the government bureaucracy.
126. Early referendum returns indicated that 83 percent of voters endorsed four proposals to limit the Rada and that the turnout was 79 per cent of voters; Reuters, Washington Post, 17 April 2000. The Constitutional Court later ruled that Kuchma's Rada reform proposals did not violate the constitution. The newly reformist Rada was expected to approve the voting results; Reuters, Washington Post, 30 June 2000. Yushchenko's May visit to the World Bank, IMF, and White House went very well; see the Associated Press dispatches for 9 May 2000: 'Yushchenko, World Bank Leader Discuss Economic Reform' and 'Clinton Meets with Ukrainian Prime Minister'.
127. Early referendum returns indicated that 83 percent of voters endorsed four proposals to limit the Rada and that the turnout was 79 per cent of voters; Reuters, Washington Post, 17 April 2000. The Constitutional Court later ruled that Kuchma's Rada reform proposals did not violate the constitution. The newly reformist Rada was expected to approve the voting results; Reuters, Washington Post, 30 June 2000. Yushchenko's May visit to the World Bank, IMF, and White House went very well; see the Associated Press dispatches for 9 May 2000: 'Yushchenko, World Bank Leader Discuss Economic Reform' and 'Clinton Meets with Ukrainian Prime Minister'.
128. Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (NY: Simon & Schuster 1994) Chapters 2-10.
129. David Hoffman, 'Clinton's Troubles Cause Jitters Overseas', Washington Post, 18 Sept. 1998; Sebastian Mallaby, 'The Clinton Affair', ibid., 31 Jan. 1999.
130. David Hoffman, 'Clinton's Troubles Cause Jitters Overseas', Washington Post, 18 Sept. 1998; Sebastian Mallaby, 'The Clinton Affair', ibid., 31 Jan. 1999.
131. On Bush, see Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989-1992 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press 1997), an excellent but overly praiseworthy portrait. If Clinton's foreign policy appointees were liberal ideologically, they included specialists with distinct convictions and sets of goal priorities sharply-honed during 12 years out of office. Emphasis among them differed on West and Central Europe versus East Europe, on weapons proliferation versus strategic nuclear arms control, human rights, Middle East peace, military intervention, and other issues.
132. The Clinton foreign policy team was thus slow to start and often said to be in disarray; see Woodward (note 67) p.320.
133. On the bureaucratic machinations, see James M. Goldgeier, 'NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision', The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1998). Longer studies include his Not Whether But When: The US Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington DC: Brookings 1999) and George W. Grayson, Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East (Lanham, MD: UP of America 1999). Domestically, Clinton also faced Republican support for enlargement and relatively less interest in aid to Russia or Ukraine.
134. On the bureaucratic machinations, see James M. Goldgeier, 'NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision', The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1998). Longer studies include his Not Whether But When: The US Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington DC: Brookings 1999) and George W. Grayson, Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East (Lanham, MD: UP of America 1999). Domestically, Clinton also faced Republican support for enlargement and relatively less interest in aid to Russia or Ukraine.
135. On the bureaucratic machinations, see James M. Goldgeier, 'NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision', The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1998). Longer studies include his Not Whether But When: The US Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington DC: Brookings 1999) and George W. Grayson, Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East (Lanham, MD: UP of America 1999). Domestically, Clinton also faced Republican support for enlargement and relatively less interest in aid to Russia or Ukraine.
136. In the late 1980s, NATO's demise was widely assumed; for example, see: Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No. 76 (Fall 1989); Richard K. Betts, 'NATO's Mid-Life Crisis', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1989); Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, 'Limited Collective Security', Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1990); Jenonne Walker, 'Keeping America in Europe', Foreign Policy, No. 83 (Summer 1991); Doug Bandow, 'Avoiding War', ibid. No. 89 (Winter 1992-93); and Jonathan Clarke, 'Replacing NATO', ibid. No. 93 (Winter 1993-94). Walker wrote: '…in the next decade, NATO will be at best a bit player. Often it will not even be relevant - Washington's desperate efforts to give the Atlantic Alliance 'new political roles' notwithstanding'.
137. In the late 1980s, NATO's demise was widely assumed; for example, see: Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No. 76 (Fall 1989); Richard K. Betts, 'NATO's Mid-Life Crisis', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1989); Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, 'Limited Collective Security', Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1990); Jenonne Walker, 'Keeping America in Europe', Foreign Policy, No. 83 (Summer 1991); Doug Bandow, 'Avoiding War', ibid. No. 89 (Winter 1992-93); and Jonathan Clarke, 'Replacing NATO', ibid. No. 93 (Winter 1993-94). Walker wrote: '…in the next decade, NATO will be at best a bit player. Often it will not even be relevant - Washington's desperate efforts to give the Atlantic Alliance 'new political roles' notwithstanding'.
138. In the late 1980s, NATO's demise was widely assumed; for example, see: Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No. 76 (Fall 1989); Richard K. Betts, 'NATO's Mid-Life Crisis', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1989); Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, 'Limited Collective Security', Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1990); Jenonne Walker, 'Keeping America in Europe', Foreign Policy, No. 83 (Summer 1991); Doug Bandow, 'Avoiding War', ibid. No. 89 (Winter 1992-93); and Jonathan Clarke, 'Replacing NATO', ibid. No. 93 (Winter 1993-94). Walker wrote: '…in the next decade, NATO will be at best a bit player. Often it will not even be relevant - Washington's desperate efforts to give the Atlantic Alliance 'new political roles' notwithstanding'.
139. In the late 1980s, NATO's demise was widely assumed; for example, see: Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No. 76 (Fall 1989); Richard K. Betts, 'NATO's Mid-Life Crisis', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1989); Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, 'Limited Collective Security', Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1990); Jenonne Walker, 'Keeping America in Europe', Foreign Policy, No. 83 (Summer 1991); Doug Bandow, 'Avoiding War', ibid. No. 89 (Winter 1992-93); and Jonathan Clarke, 'Replacing NATO', ibid. No. 93 (Winter 1993-94). Walker wrote: '…in the next decade, NATO will be at best a bit player. Often it will not even be relevant - Washington's desperate efforts to give the Atlantic Alliance 'new political roles' notwithstanding'.
140. In the late 1980s, NATO's demise was widely assumed; for example, see: Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No. 76 (Fall 1989); Richard K. Betts, 'NATO's Mid-Life Crisis', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1989); Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, 'Limited Collective Security', Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1990); Jenonne Walker, 'Keeping America in Europe', Foreign Policy, No. 83 (Summer 1991); Doug Bandow, 'Avoiding War', ibid. No. 89 (Winter 1992-93); and Jonathan Clarke, 'Replacing NATO', ibid. No. 93 (Winter 1993-94). Walker wrote: '…in the next decade, NATO will be at best a bit player. Often it will not even be relevant - Washington's desperate efforts to give the Atlantic Alliance 'new political roles' notwithstanding'.
141. In the late 1980s, NATO's demise was widely assumed; for example, see: Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No. 76 (Fall 1989); Richard K. Betts, 'NATO's Mid-Life Crisis', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1989); Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, 'Limited Collective Security', Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1990); Jenonne Walker, 'Keeping America in Europe', Foreign Policy, No. 83 (Summer 1991); Doug Bandow, 'Avoiding War', ibid. No. 89 (Winter 1992-93); and Jonathan Clarke, 'Replacing NATO', ibid. No. 93 (Winter 1993-94). Walker wrote: '…in the next decade, NATO will be at best a bit player. Often it will not even be relevant - Washington's desperate efforts to give the Atlantic Alliance 'new political roles' notwithstanding'.
142. Reflective of the optimism of the times and the myopia about Russia was a disregard for the nearly 40 years of indoctrination of Soviet citizens at all levels in the idea that NATO was a US-led, German-manned weapon aimed at the security of (he USSR.
143. See Woodward (note 67) passim, on Clinton's deficit reduction and economic plans. On the barriers to easy and rapid transitions imposed by the heritage of the former Soviet Union, see Clifford B. Gaddy, The Price of the Past: Russia's Struggle with the Legacy of a Militarized Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings 1996); Celestine Bohlen, 'Facing Rust-Belt Giants Top Russian List of Vexing Crises', New York Times, 8 Nov. 1998; and Charles William Maynes, 'Squandering Triumph', Foreign Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 1999.
144. See Woodward (note 67) passim, on Clinton's deficit reduction and economic plans. On the barriers to easy and rapid transitions imposed by the heritage of the former Soviet Union, see Clifford B. Gaddy, The Price of the Past: Russia's Struggle with the Legacy of a Militarized Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings 1996); Celestine Bohlen, 'Facing Rust-Belt Giants Top Russian List of Vexing Crises', New York Times, 8 Nov. 1998; and Charles William Maynes, 'Squandering Triumph', Foreign Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 1999.
145. See Woodward (note 67) passim, on Clinton's deficit reduction and economic plans. On the barriers to easy and rapid transitions imposed by the heritage of the former Soviet Union, see Clifford B. Gaddy, The Price of the Past: Russia's Struggle with the Legacy of a Militarized Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings 1996); Celestine Bohlen, 'Facing Rust-Belt Giants Top Russian List of Vexing Crises', New York Times, 8 Nov. 1998; and Charles William Maynes, 'Squandering Triumph', Foreign Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 1999.
146. The Marshall Plan helped rob West European communist parties of growing power, a similar offer might have had the same effect on 'leftist' parties in Ukraine and Russia. As the strategic partnerships with Russia and Ukraine showed serious strains in late 1998, owing to the inequalities among the partners, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said: 'Americans have a great tendency to be very optimistic…the Berlin Wall fell, and the Soviet Union and empire, was gone, and we really wanted to take advantage of that to talk about democratic values and market economies…! think our only fault is that we are optimists.' Quoted in Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Narrows Its Vision of "Partnership" with Russia', Washington Post, 22 Nov. 1998.
147. See the defense of Clinton administration policy in Samuel R. Berger, 'Getting the New Russia on its Feet', ibid. 5 Sept. 1999.
148. For another interpretation, see William E. Odom, Our Russian Illusions, Crushed by Reality', ibid. 6 Sept. 1998.
149. The point here, of course, is not that the Clinton administration failed to conclude many useful agreements with Russia but that it concluded so many that were more window-dressing than substantive, that contained small or few incentives for fulfillment, or that had weak or no provisions for enforcement.
150. The idea of 'shaping' the geostrategic environment was recommended in the 1998 US Quadrennial Defense Review. See Hans Binnendijk (ed.) 1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power for Peace (Washington DC: National Defense UP 1998) p.xiii.
151. On the JCTP, see Dana Priest, 'US Military Builds Alliances Across Europe', Washington Post, 14 Dec. 1998, which quotes Blank.
152. Kaiser, 'Pumping up the Problem' (note 8).
153. David Ignatius, 'Was the Looting of Russia Avoidable?' Washington Post, 8 Sept. 1999. Ignatius argues that an understanding of what 'went wrong' in Russia since the heady days of post-Communism ten years ago is necessary to frame new solutions. He concludes that the next administration should avoid four past misjudgments: accepting short-term financial schemes, indulging 'loans for shares' privatization schemes, allying with Yeltsin personally along with the corrupt oligarchs who supported him rather than the people, and avoiding the honest truth about Russia's 'robber barons'.
154. Alexei Arbatov, a leading Russian security expert and member of the Duma's defense committee, speaks very positively of the Trilateral Agreement but calls the NATO-Russian Founding Act 'a failure of Russian diplomacy' that allowed the US to 'trick Russia' so as to gain Senate ratification of NATO expansion. Remarks at the 7th Carnegie Endowment International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington, 12 Jan. 1999, co-author's notes. 82. For reflections of concern about American triumphalism, see Alexei Arbatov, 'Eurasia Letter: A Russian-U.S. Security Agenda, Foreign Policy 104 (Fall 1996), Andrei Kortunov, 'The US and Russia: A Virtual Partnership', Comparative Strategy, Oct.-Dec. 1996, and Andrei Kortunov and Andrei Shoumikhin, 'Current Russian Objections to US NMD and ABM Treaty Revision', ibid. (April-June 1997).
155. Alexei Arbatov, a leading Russian security expert and member of the Duma's defense committee, speaks very positively of the Trilateral Agreement but calls the NATO-Russian Founding Act 'a failure of Russian diplomacy' that allowed the US to 'trick Russia' so as to gain Senate ratification of NATO expansion. Remarks at the 7th Carnegie Endowment International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington, 12 Jan. 1999, co-author's notes. 82. For reflections of concern about American triumphalism, see Alexei Arbatov, 'Eurasia Letter: A Russian-U.S. Security Agenda, Foreign Policy 104 (Fall 1996), Andrei Kortunov, 'The US and Russia: A Virtual Partnership', Comparative Strategy, Oct.-Dec. 1996, and Andrei Kortunov and Andrei Shoumikhin, 'Current Russian Objections to US NMD and ABM Treaty Revision', ibid. (April-June 1997).
156. Alexei Arbatov, a leading Russian security expert and member of the Duma's defense committee, speaks very positively of the Trilateral Agreement but calls the NATO-Russian Founding Act 'a failure of Russian diplomacy' that allowed the US to 'trick Russia' so as to gain Senate ratification of NATO expansion. Remarks at the 7th Carnegie Endowment International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington, 12 Jan. 1999, co-author's notes. 82. For reflections of concern about American triumphalism, see Alexei Arbatov, 'Eurasia Letter: A Russian-U.S. Security Agenda, Foreign Policy 104 (Fall 1996), Andrei Kortunov, 'The US and Russia: A Virtual Partnership', Comparative Strategy, Oct.-Dec. 1996, and Andrei Kortunov and Andrei Shoumikhin, 'Current Russian Objections to US NMD and ABM Treaty Revision', ibid. (April-June 1997).
157. On the partnership with Russia, see the sources in note 82 and R. Craig Nation, 'Beyond the Cold War: Change and Continuity in US-Russian Relations', in The United States and Russia into the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College 1997) passim.
158. The carefully-wrought language of the 1972 Basic Principles Agreement signed by Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev is open to two divergent readings: (1) as a license for the Soviet Union to indulge in all of the practices of the US (e.g., covert operations, ousting of political leaders, political or military interventions, support for clients, etc.) or (2) as the Soviet Union subscribing to the nominal Western rules of international good behavior.
159. Steven Mufson, 'Albright Defends Russia Policy', Washington Post, 17 Sept. 1999.
160. John Burgess, 'US Plan on Russia Debt Stirs Hill Anger', Washington Post, 1 July 2000 and Bloomberg News, 'Republicans Protest as U.S. Lets Russia Skip Debt Payment', Washington Post, 4 July 2000. The US debt rescheduling was pan of a broad agreement by the Paris Club of creditor nations to postpone $8 billion in Russian payments due in 1999 and 2000.
161. John Burgess, 'US Plan on Russia Debt Stirs Hill Anger', Washington Post, 1 July 2000 and Bloomberg News, 'Republicans Protest as U.S. Lets Russia Skip Debt Payment', Washington Post, 4 July 2000. The US debt rescheduling was pan of a broad agreement by the Paris Club of creditor nations to postpone $8 billion in Russian payments due in 1999 and 2000.
162. Ina growing literature, see 'Implications of the Duma's Approval of START II' and 'START II Resolution of Ratification', Arms Control Today, May 2000, which treats missile, missile defense, and related issues. On sanctions, see Thomas W. Lippman, 'Sanctions Imposed on 3 Russian Institutions', Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1999, and David Hoffman, 'Russia Denounces US Sanctions', ibid. 14 Jan. 1999. On de-alerting, see Bruce Blair, 'De-Alerting Nuclear Forces;', in Harold A. Feiveson (ed.) The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: Brookings 1999).
163. Ina growing literature, see 'Implications of the Duma's Approval of START II' and 'START II Resolution of Ratification', Arms Control Today, May 2000, which treats missile, missile defense, and related issues. On sanctions, see Thomas W. Lippman, 'Sanctions Imposed on 3 Russian Institutions', Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1999, and David Hoffman, 'Russia Denounces US Sanctions', ibid. 14 Jan. 1999. On de-alerting, see Bruce Blair, 'De-Alerting Nuclear Forces;', in Harold A. Feiveson (ed.) The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: Brookings 1999).
164. Ina growing literature, see 'Implications of the Duma's Approval of START II' and 'START II Resolution of Ratification', Arms Control Today, May 2000, which treats missile, missile defense, and related issues. On sanctions, see Thomas W. Lippman, 'Sanctions Imposed on 3 Russian Institutions', Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1999, and David Hoffman, 'Russia Denounces US Sanctions', ibid. 14 Jan. 1999. On de-alerting, see Bruce Blair, 'De-Alerting Nuclear Forces;', in Harold A. Feiveson (ed.) The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: Brookings 1999).
165. Ina growing literature, see 'Implications of the Duma's Approval of START II' and 'START II Resolution of Ratification', Arms Control Today, May 2000, which treats missile, missile defense, and related issues. On sanctions, see Thomas W. Lippman, 'Sanctions Imposed on 3 Russian Institutions', Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1999, and David Hoffman, 'Russia Denounces US Sanctions', ibid. 14 Jan. 1999. On de-alerting, see Bruce Blair, 'De-Alerting Nuclear Forces;', in Harold A. Feiveson (ed.) The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: Brookings 1999).
166. The Economist, 'Russia and the United States: Best of Foes', 10 June 2000, Sharon Lafraniere, 'Russian Threatens Action Over US Missile Plan', Washington Post, 23 June 2000, (the commander of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces threatened to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty) and 'Russian Official Says Arms Talks Failed', Washington Post, 21 Aug. 1999, and Luke Hill, 'Putin Readies Details of Russian Missile Defense, Defense News, 19 June 2000. On Sino-Russian opposition to theater missile defense in Northeast Asia, see John Pomfret, 'China, Russia Forging Partnership', Washington Post, 29 Nov. 1998. The chances of averting a major Russian-American clash over the issue dimmed when the Clinton administration neared an early NMD deployment decision on the basis of resuming talks on the ABM Treaty in 2001; see Thomas E. Ricks and Steven Mufson, 'US Eyes Starting Missile Defense', Washington Post, 28 June 2000.
167. The Economist, 'Russia and the United States: Best of Foes', 10 June 2000, Sharon Lafraniere, 'Russian Threatens Action Over US Missile Plan', Washington Post, 23 June 2000, (the commander of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces threatened to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty) and 'Russian Official Says Arms Talks Failed', Washington Post, 21 Aug. 1999, and Luke Hill, 'Putin Readies Details of Russian Missile Defense, Defense News, 19 June 2000. On Sino-Russian opposition to theater missile defense in Northeast Asia, see John Pomfret, 'China, Russia Forging Partnership', Washington Post, 29 Nov. 1998. The chances of averting a major Russian-American clash over the issue dimmed when the Clinton administration neared an early NMD deployment decision on the basis of resuming talks on the ABM Treaty in 2001; see Thomas E. Ricks and Steven Mufson, 'US Eyes Starting Missile Defense', Washington Post, 28 June 2000.
168. The Economist, 'Russia and the United States: Best of Foes', 10 June 2000, Sharon Lafraniere, 'Russian Threatens Action Over US Missile Plan', Washington Post, 23 June 2000, (the commander of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces threatened to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty) and 'Russian Official Says Arms Talks Failed', Washington Post, 21 Aug. 1999, and Luke Hill, 'Putin Readies Details of Russian Missile Defense, Defense News, 19 June 2000. On Sino-Russian opposition to theater missile defense in Northeast Asia, see John Pomfret, 'China, Russia Forging Partnership', Washington Post, 29 Nov. 1998. The chances of averting a major Russian-American clash over the issue dimmed when the Clinton administration neared an early NMD deployment decision on the basis of resuming talks on the ABM Treaty in 2001; see Thomas E. Ricks and Steven Mufson, 'US Eyes Starting Missile Defense', Washington Post, 28 June 2000.
169. The Economist, 'Russia and the United States: Best of Foes', 10 June 2000, Sharon Lafraniere, 'Russian Threatens Action Over US Missile Plan', Washington Post, 23 June 2000, (the commander of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces threatened to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty) and 'Russian Official Says Arms Talks Failed', Washington Post, 21 Aug. 1999, and Luke Hill, 'Putin Readies Details of Russian Missile Defense, Defense News, 19 June 2000. On Sino-Russian opposition to theater missile defense in Northeast Asia, see John Pomfret, 'China, Russia Forging Partnership', Washington Post, 29 Nov. 1998. The chances of averting a major Russian-American clash over the issue dimmed when the Clinton administration neared an early NMD deployment decision on the basis of resuming talks on the ABM Treaty in 2001; see Thomas E. Ricks and Steven Mufson, 'US Eyes Starting Missile Defense', Washington Post, 28 June 2000.
170. The Economist, 'Russia and the United States: Best of Foes', 10 June 2000, Sharon Lafraniere, 'Russian Threatens Action Over US Missile Plan', Washington Post, 23 June 2000, (the commander of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces threatened to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty) and 'Russian Official Says Arms Talks Failed', Washington Post, 21 Aug. 1999, and Luke Hill, 'Putin Readies Details of Russian Missile Defense, Defense News, 19 June 2000. On Sino-Russian opposition to theater missile defense in Northeast Asia, see John Pomfret, 'China, Russia Forging Partnership', Washington Post, 29 Nov. 1998. The chances of averting a major Russian-American clash over the issue dimmed when the Clinton administration neared an early NMD deployment decision on the basis of resuming talks on the ABM Treaty in 2001; see Thomas E. Ricks and Steven Mufson, 'US Eyes Starting Missile Defense', Washington Post, 28 June 2000.
171. The Economist, 'Russia and the United States: Best of Foes', 10 June 2000, Sharon Lafraniere, 'Russian Threatens Action Over US Missile Plan', Washington Post, 23 June 2000, (the commander of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces threatened to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty) and 'Russian Official Says Arms Talks Failed', Washington Post, 21 Aug. 1999, and Luke Hill, 'Putin Readies Details of Russian Missile Defense, Defense News, 19 June 2000. On Sino-Russian opposition to theater missile defense in Northeast Asia, see John Pomfret, 'China, Russia Forging Partnership', Washington Post, 29 Nov. 1998. The chances of averting a major Russian-American clash over the issue dimmed when the Clinton administration neared an early NMD deployment decision on the basis of resuming talks on the ABM Treaty in 2001; see Thomas E. Ricks and Steven Mufson, 'US Eyes Starting Missile Defense', Washington Post, 28 June 2000.
172. 'Jump-START: Retaking the Initiative to Reduce Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers', Arms Control Today, Jan./Feb. 1999.
173. On the warhead requirement, see William Drozdiak, 'Albright, Russian Set New Nuclear Talks', Washington Post, 10 Dec. 1998.
174. See for example, Ariel Cohen, 'U.S.-Russian Relations at Moscow Summit: Time to Face Reality', Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 26 Aug. 1998.
175. John C. Baker, Non-Proliferation Incentives for Russia and Ukraine, Adelphi Paper 309 (London: IISS 1997) p.37. A compromise was made.
176. Peter Finn, 'Ukraine Trying to Take Off Into Global Space Industry', Washington Post, 11 Nov. 1998.
177. See also John Mintz, 'US Suspends Boeing-Ukraine Rocket Launch', ibid. 8 Aug. 1998. The State Department suspended work on a joint venture of Yuzhmash, Boeing Aerospace, and a Norwegian ship-building firm to launch Yuzhmash's Zenith rocket, a modified Soviet SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile, from an ocean-going platform; it charged that sensitive US information was revealed to Ukrainian and Russian engineers.
178. 'The program went forward in a March 1999 test when a dummy satellite was launched…' said a United Press Imemational-Kyodo News Service dispatch, Japan Times, 29 March 1999.
179. Dana Priest, 'Cohen Says US Will Build Missile Defense', Washington Post, 21 Jan 1999. The decision to deploy is conditioned by the effectiveness of the technology; see 'Moving to Missile Defense,' editorial, Washington Post, 22 Jan. 1999.
180. Dana Priest, 'Cohen Says US Will Build Missile Defense', Washington Post, 21 Jan 1999. The decision to deploy is conditioned by the effectiveness of the technology; see 'Moving to Missile Defense,' editorial, Washington Post, 22 Jan. 1999.
181. David Hoffman, 'Downsizing A Mighty Arsenal, Moscow Rethinks Role As Its Weapons Rust', Washington Post, 16 March 1998. 'All we have is the nuclear stick', said Lev Volkov, a prominent Russian strategist. Of course, we should all together decrease this nuclear danger. But right now, we have nothing else…'.
182. While Russian and Chinese opposition to NMD and TMD has been well voiced for some time and American allies in Europe are becoming more vocal, in 2000 the Chinese factor began to attract more attention in the U.S.; see Charles Ferguson, 'Sparking a Buildup: U.S. Missile Defense and China's Nuclear Arsenal', Arms Control Today (March 2000) and Brad Roberts, Robert Manning, and Robert Montaperto, 'China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power', Foreign Affairs (July/Aug. 2000) which concludes '…American policy-makers risk ending up with the worst of both worlds: missile defenses that are less effective than they might have been, and Chinese and Russian strategic responses that leave the United States less secure than before.' In April, Russia authorized full deployment of its new Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile with several counter-defense measures; see Philipp C. Bleek, 'Russia Approves Topol-M, Warns Missile Could Defeat US Defense', Arms Control Today (June 2000).
183. While Russian and Chinese opposition to NMD and TMD has been well voiced for some time and American allies in Europe are becoming more vocal, in 2000 the Chinese factor began to attract more attention in the U.S.; see Charles Ferguson, 'Sparking a Buildup: U.S. Missile Defense and China's Nuclear Arsenal', Arms Control Today (March 2000) and Brad Roberts, Robert Manning, and Robert Montaperto, 'China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power', Foreign Affairs (July/Aug. 2000) which concludes '…American policy-makers risk ending up with the worst of both worlds: missile defenses that are less effective than they might have been, and Chinese and Russian strategic responses that leave the United States less secure than before.' In April, Russia authorized full deployment of its new Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile with several counter-defense measures; see Philipp C. Bleek, 'Russia Approves Topol-M, Warns Missile Could Defeat US Defense', Arms Control Today (June 2000).
184. While Russian and Chinese opposition to NMD and TMD has been well voiced for some time and American allies in Europe are becoming more vocal, in 2000 the Chinese factor began to attract more attention in the U.S.; see Charles Ferguson, 'Sparking a Buildup: U.S. Missile Defense and China's Nuclear Arsenal', Arms Control Today (March 2000) and Brad Roberts, Robert Manning, and Robert Montaperto, 'China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power', Foreign Affairs (July/Aug. 2000) which concludes '…American policy-makers risk ending up with the worst of both worlds: missile defenses that are less effective than they might have been, and Chinese and Russian strategic responses that leave the United States less secure than before.' In April, Russia authorized full deployment of its new Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile with several counter-defense measures; see Philipp C. Bleek, 'Russia Approves Topol-M, Warns Missile Could Defeat US Defense', Arms Control Today (June 2000).
185. Remarks of Alexander Pikayev to the National Press Institute in Moscow, 2 Feb. 1999, excerpted in Proliferation Brief, II:1, 3 Feb. 1999 (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for Int. Peace).
186. Ibid.
187. Michael R. Gordon, 'Moscow Opposes Air Raids, but Is Miffed at Serbs', New York Times, 23 March 1999; Reuters, 'US Oil Firms Downplay Anger in Russia', Japan Times, 27 March 1999. A Russian poll showed 87 per cent of those surveyed favored sending anti-aircraft missiles to Serbia, 67 per cent willing to do something personally to help Serbia, and 42 per cent willing to go as volunteers; data in 'Russia and Kosovo: A Toothless Growl', The Economist, 1 May 1999, p.48.
188. Michael R. Gordon, 'Moscow Opposes Air Raids, but Is Miffed at Serbs', New York Times, 23 March 1999; Reuters, 'US Oil Firms Downplay Anger in Russia', Japan Times, 27 March 1999. A Russian poll showed 87 per cent of those surveyed favored sending anti-aircraft missiles to Serbia, 67 per cent willing to do something personally to help Serbia, and 42 per cent willing to go as volunteers; data in 'Russia and Kosovo: A Toothless Growl', The Economist, 1 May 1999, p.48.
189. Michael R. Gordon, 'Moscow Opposes Air Raids, but Is Miffed at Serbs', New York Times, 23 March 1999; Reuters, 'US Oil Firms Downplay Anger in Russia', Japan Times, 27 March 1999. A Russian poll showed 87 per cent of those surveyed favored sending anti-aircraft missiles to Serbia, 67 per cent willing to do something personally to help Serbia, and 42 per cent willing to go as volunteers; data in 'Russia and Kosovo: A Toothless Growl', The Economist, 1 May 1999, p.48.
190. 'Facing Huge Debt Payments, Russia Reaches Loan Accord with IMF', compiled from dispatches, International Herald Tribune, 30 March 1999; Associated Press, 'IMF-Russia Discussions on Loans to go Forward', Japan Times, 29 March 1999; Associated Press, 'Yeltsin to Hit Airstrikes, Back Test Ban in Speech', ibid. 30 March 1999; 'Russian Debt: The Waiting Game', The Economist, 7 Aug. 1999, p.64.
191. 'Facing Huge Debt Payments, Russia Reaches Loan Accord with IMF', compiled from dispatches, International Herald Tribune, 30 March 1999; Associated Press, 'IMF-Russia Discussions on Loans to go Forward', Japan Times, 29 March 1999; Associated Press, 'Yeltsin to Hit Airstrikes, Back Test Ban in Speech', ibid. 30 March 1999; 'Russian Debt: The Waiting Game', The Economist, 7 Aug. 1999, p.64.
192. 'Facing Huge Debt Payments, Russia Reaches Loan Accord with IMF', compiled from dispatches, International Herald Tribune, 30 March 1999; Associated Press, 'IMF-Russia Discussions on Loans to go Forward', Japan Times, 29 March 1999; Associated Press, 'Yeltsin to Hit Airstrikes, Back Test Ban in Speech', ibid. 30 March 1999; 'Russian Debt: The Waiting Game', The Economist, 7 Aug. 1999, p.64.
193. 'Facing Huge Debt Payments, Russia Reaches Loan Accord with IMF', compiled from dispatches, International Herald Tribune, 30 March 1999; Associated Press, 'IMF-Russia Discussions on Loans to go Forward', Japan Times, 29 March 1999; Associated Press, 'Yeltsin to Hit Airstrikes, Back Test Ban in Speech', ibid. 30 March 1999; 'Russian Debt: The Waiting Game', The Economist, 7 Aug. 1999, p.64.
194. Poll data from 'Ukraine's Two Faces', The Economist, 5 June 1999, p.48.
195. For the positions of the Rada, Foreign Ministry, and Kuchma, see 'Kosovo Crisis Deepens Political Divisions in Ukraine', Global Intelligence Update, 26 March 1999 (STRATFOR Inc.: alert@yorktown.stratfor.com).
196. Constantine Pleshakov describes Russian interest in terms of nostalgia in 'The View from Moscow: Russia's New Paranoia', Japan Times, 1 April 1999.
197. 'Russia and the United States: Best of Foes', The Economist, 10 June 2000.
198. David Hoffman, 'Russian Generals Diverge from Putin-Clinton Stance on Missile Threat', Washington Post, 30 June 2000.
199. Quoted in Thomas W. Lippman, 'US Narrows its Vision of 'Partnership' with Russia', Washington Post, 22 Nov. 1998
200. Simes later criticized the policy shift; see his 'Now is No Time to Bait the Bear', Newsday
201. reprinted in Japan Times, 4 April 1999.
202. Inattention to Ukraine by American media is reflected in the brief two-year duration in Kyiv of a Washington Post reporter in the mid-1990s. Most English-language coverage of Ukraine -as in the New York Times, Financial Times, and Washington Post - relies on correspondents based in Moscow or local 'stringers' (on-call reporters). Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (note 1) especially Chapter 6, 'Shaping a "Post-Nuclear" Western Policy', indicates that the US and the West in general have paid too little attention to Ukraine, with policy repercussions.
203. Inattention to Ukraine by American media is reflected in the brief two-year duration in Kyiv of a Washington Post reporter in the mid-1990s. Most English-language coverage of Ukraine -as in the New York Times, Financial Times, and Washington Post - relies on correspondents based in Moscow or local 'stringers' (on-call reporters). Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (note 1) especially Chapter 6, 'Shaping a "Post-Nuclear" Western Policy', indicates that the US and the West in general have paid too little attention to Ukraine, with policy repercussions.
204. Inattention to Ukraine by American media is reflected in the brief two-year duration in Kyiv of a Washington Post reporter in the mid-1990s. Most English-language coverage of Ukraine -as in the New York Times, Financial Times, and Washington Post - relies on correspondents based in Moscow or local 'stringers' (on-call reporters). Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (note 1) especially Chapter 6, 'Shaping a "Post-Nuclear" Western Policy', indicates that the US and the West in general have paid too little attention to Ukraine, with policy repercussions.
205. Inattention to Ukraine by American media is reflected in the brief two-year duration in Kyiv of a Washington Post reporter in the mid-1990s. Most English-language coverage of Ukraine -as in the New York Times, Financial Times, and Washington Post - relies on correspondents based in Moscow or local 'stringers' (on-call reporters). Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (note 1) especially Chapter 6, 'Shaping a "Post-Nuclear" Western Policy', indicates that the US and the West in general have paid too little attention to Ukraine, with policy repercussions.
206. On Russian views of US actions, see the articles by Dmitri Simes and Constantine Pleshakov cited above, especially the US Information Agency polls in Simes' essay. America's allies have become increasingly concerned about US unilateralism, particularly in terms of NMD. Gopal Ratnam writes: 'European countries have been vocal in their opposition to US plans to build a National Missile Defense system, insisting that the nuclear deterrence is sufficient to stop potential enemies from launching missile attacks on a country', 'NATO Will Review Theater Missile Defense Needs', Defense News, 26 June 2000.
207. Quoted by Jim Hoagland, 'Russia's Restive Military', Washington Post, 29 June 2000.
208. Remarks at the Kennan Institute, Washington, 23 Nov. 1998, co-author's notes.
209. Quoted by Mortimer B. Zuckerman, 'Proud Russia on its Knees', US News and World Report, & Feb. 1999, p.36.
210. On the rule of law, see David Hoffman, 'A State of Lawlessness', Washington Post, 9 Sept. 1999. He writes: 'Even at the top, the rule of law is weak. Dimitriyev, the law professor, said many lawyers thought it an enormous victory that the Constitutional Court was established, even if only on paper. "They did not foresee a small detail", he added. "The mechanism of enforcement of the decisions of the Constitutional Court - it does not exist. There are court bailiffs who will beat you for not paying alimony, but there is no mechanism that will make the state obey a decision of the Constitutional Court."'
211. Odom, Our Russian Illusions' (note 75).
212. Mary McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty, p. 15. See also the works by Gaddy, Bohlen, and Maynes cited in note 74 on the deep-seated obstacles to easy transitions. Too little appreciated by Americans is that in many circumstances, especially those of the former Soviet republics, democratization and marketization are conflicted, rather than compatible, objectives.
213. 'Russia Needs True Reform, Not Higher Taxes', New York Times, 4 Aug. 1998; see also his 'Authoritarian and Democratic Responses to the Financial Meltdown in Russia', Problems of Post-Communism (July-Aug. 1999), which stresses the resiliency of democracy.
214. 'Russia Needs True Reform, Not Higher Taxes', New York Times, 4 Aug. 1998; see also his 'Authoritarian and Democratic Responses to the Financial Meltdown in Russia', Problems of Post-Communism (July-Aug. 1999), which stresses the resiliency of democracy.
215. Quoted by Serge Schmemann, 'Russia's Precapitalist Economy: How Can You Have a Bust if You Never Had a Boom?' New York Times, 27 Dec. 1998. Schmemann interviewed workers who 'vented frustrations pent up over months and years of low and unpaid salaries. Yet they knew there was little the city could do. There is no money.'
216. The Nuclear Cities Initiative is useful for its people-to-people approach; see materials of the sponsoring Department of Energy and these overviews: The Nuclear Cities Initiative: Status and Issues (Washington DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council 1999); Kenneth Luongo and William E. Hoehn III, 'Getting It Right', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/June 1999); and Oleg Bukharin, Thomas Cochran, and Robert Norris, New Perspectives on Russia's Ten Secret Cities (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense Council 1999).
217. The Nuclear Cities Initiative is useful for its people-to-people approach; see materials of the sponsoring Department of Energy and these overviews: The Nuclear Cities Initiative: Status and Issues (Washington DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council 1999); Kenneth Luongo and William E. Hoehn III, 'Getting It Right', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/June 1999); and Oleg Bukharin, Thomas Cochran, and Robert Norris, New Perspectives on Russia's Ten Secret Cities (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense Council 1999).
218. The Nuclear Cities Initiative is useful for its people-to-people approach; see materials of the sponsoring Department of Energy and these overviews: The Nuclear Cities Initiative: Status and Issues (Washington DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council 1999); Kenneth Luongo and William E. Hoehn III, 'Getting It Right', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/June 1999); and Oleg Bukharin, Thomas Cochran, and Robert Norris, New Perspectives on Russia's Ten Secret Cities (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense Council 1999).
219. Post-Soviet Ukraine benefited, as Russia did not, from the assistance of Diaspora Ukrainians who settled in Europe, North America, and Australia. They sponsor numerous 'grassroots' programs of the kind envisaged in this analysis, oflen with government and private funds.