Authoritarian and democratic responses to the financial meltdown in Russia

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 46, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 22-32

  McFaul, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033164171     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.1999.11655842     Document Type: Review

References (51)

1. On the emergence of this system, see Michael McFaul, "Lessons from Russia's Protracted Transition from Communist Rule," Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (spring 1999): 1-28.
2. For details, see Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov, "Russian Electoral Politics After Transition: Regional and National Assessments," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 38, no. 9 (November 1997): 507-49.
3. The new rules of the game have been less successful in shaping federal relations, as the disastrous war in Chechnya demonstrated most dramatically.
4. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 10.
5. Of course, we do not know whether Yeltsin would have given up power peacefully had he lost the election. Regarding the threats that he would not, see Michael McFaul, Russia's 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997).
6. Well before August 1998, many administration officials were advocating a weakening of the presidential office, both because they feared who might occupy it next and because they were increasingly troubled about Yeltsin's leadership ability (author interview with Presidential Adviser Emil Pain, May 1998).
7. James Meek, "Rich Rasputin Who Bewitched Yeltsin," Observer (August 30, 1998): 12-13.
8. The mayor of Moscow, Iurii Luzhkov, came in second, while Yeltsin was ranked a distant third. See "20 naibolee vliiatel'nykh politikov rossii v ianvare" [The Twenty Most Influential Russian Politicians in January], Nezavisimaia gazeta (January 30, 1999).
9. The most comprehensive and thoughtful reform plan can be found in Viktor Sheinis, "Konstitutsiia i zhizn'," Nezavisimaia gazeta (January 27, 1999). Even the head of the pro-presidential faction, Our Home Is Russia, supports constitutional amendments to limit the powers of the presidency. See Timothy Heritage, "Russia Faces Obstacles to Political Truce," Reuters (February 11, 1999).
10. The most comprehensive and thoughtful reform plan can be found in Viktor Sheinis, "Konstitutsiia i zhizn'," Nezavisimaia gazeta (January 27, 1999). Even the head of the pro-presidential faction, Our Home Is Russia, supports constitutional amendments to limit the powers of the presidency. See Timothy Heritage, "Russia Faces Obstacles to Political Truce," Reuters (February 11, 1999).
11. Although the conditions are ripe, the ideas for achieving this result are few. In a seminar on this subject at the Moscow Carnegie Center in November 1998, it was clear from the discussion that only one faction, Yabloko, had given serious attention to amending the constitution constitutionally. At the seminar, a Yabloko Duma deputy, Viktor Sheinis, presented his group's proposed amendments, including the convening of a constitutional assembly. Most of the analysts at the meeting, however, believed that the probability for success of these proposals was very low.
12. In July 1998, the author chaired a seminar on Russia's political future at the Moscow Carnegie Center. Communists, nationalists, and liberals all mentioned this historical analogue. On the comparison, see Stephen Hanson and Jeffrey Kopstein, "The Weimar/Russia Comparison," Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 3 (1997): 252-83; and Stephen Shenfeld, "The Weimar/Russia Comparison: Reflections on Hanson and Kopstein," Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 4 (1998): 355-68.
13. In July 1998, the author chaired a seminar on Russia's political future at the Moscow Carnegie Center. Communists, nationalists, and liberals all mentioned this historical analogue. On the comparison, see Stephen Hanson and Jeffrey Kopstein, "The Weimar/Russia Comparison," Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 3 (1997): 252-83; and Stephen Shenfeld, "The Weimar/Russia Comparison: Reflections on Hanson and Kopstein," Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 4 (1998): 355-68.
14. "Democratic Choice Warns of Threat of Dictatorship," ITAR-TASS (January 30, 1999).
15. Yeltsin, quoted in Bill Powell and Evgeniia Albats, "Summer of Discontent," Newsweek (International edition) (January 19, 1999).
16. "Primakov's 'Non-Aggression' Initiative Gets Mixed Reviews," Jamestown Monitor (January 27, 1999).
17. Ziuganov, quoted in "Kremlin: Communists Consistently Promote Anti-Semitism," Bozeman Daily Chronicle (December 27, 1998): 28.
18. Bill Powell, "President-in-Waiting," Newsweek (February 15, 1999).
19. See the interview with Primakov in Itogi, January 31, 1999, reprinted by Federal News Service.
20. For instance, the disappearance of liberals from the national government has emboldened the governor of Primorskii krai, Evgenii Nazdratenko, to violate the law in his effort to remove the mayor of Vladivostok, Vladimir Cherepkov, from power. More commonly, regional governors have responded to the latest economic crisis by increasing the state's role in the economy with little respect for individual rights. These interventions include the introduction of new trade barriers between regions, price controls, and new decrees restricting trade even within the region.
21. Nezavisimaia gazeta (February 4, 1999); and William Cohen, "Racist Alliance Takes Over Southern Russia Province" (unpublished manuscript, November 17, 1997). On the history of Russian National Unity, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Aleksandr Barkashov and Russian National Unity: Blackshirt Friends of the Nation," Nationalities Papers 24, no. 4 (1996): 625-39; and William Jackson, "Fascism, Vigilantism, and the State: The Russian National Unity Movement," Problems of Post-Communism 46, no. 1 (January/February 1999): 34-42.
22. Nezavisimaia gazeta (February 4, 1999); and William Cohen, "Racist Alliance Takes Over Southern Russia Province" (unpublished manuscript, November 17, 1997). On the history of Russian National Unity, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Aleksandr Barkashov and Russian National Unity: Blackshirt Friends of the Nation," Nationalities Papers 24, no. 4 (1996): 625-39; and William Jackson, "Fascism, Vigilantism, and the State: The Russian National Unity Movement," Problems of Post-Communism 46, no. 1 (January/February 1999): 34-42.
23. Nezavisimaia gazeta (February 4, 1999); and William Cohen, "Racist Alliance Takes Over Southern Russia Province" (unpublished manuscript, November 17, 1997). On the history of Russian National Unity, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Aleksandr Barkashov and Russian National Unity: Blackshirt Friends of the Nation," Nationalities Papers 24, no. 4 (1996): 625-39; and William Jackson, "Fascism, Vigilantism, and the State: The Russian National Unity Movement," Problems of Post-Communism 46, no. 1 (January/February 1999): 34-42.
24. Nezavisimaia gazeta (February 4, 1999); and William Cohen, "Racist Alliance Takes Over Southern Russia Province" (unpublished manuscript, November 17, 1997). On the history of Russian National Unity, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Aleksandr Barkashov and Russian National Unity: Blackshirt Friends of the Nation," Nationalities Papers 24, no. 4 (1996): 625-39; and William Jackson, "Fascism, Vigilantism, and the State: The Russian National Unity Movement," Problems of Post-Communism 46, no. 1 (January/February 1999): 34-42.
25. This level of support for the RNE was recorded in a January 1999 poll conducted by the Russian Social Economic Agency; "Russian Opinion Poll Puts Communists Ahead," Bloomberg News Service (February 3, 1999). No other polling agency has recorded such a high number for this openly fascist organization, but the result - if eventually confirmed by other surveys - is very troubling.
26. John Thornhill, "Premier Tightens Grip on Power," Financial Times (January 20, 1999).
27. "Primakov Calls for Reorganizing Federation," RFE/RL Newsline (January 27, 1999).
28. Even before the economic crisis, nearly half the incumbents lost their jobs in the latest gubernatorial elections. See McFaul and Petrov, "Russian Electoral Politics After Transition."
29. He first raised the idea during the 1996 presidential election.
30. Ziuganov's press conference, February 8, 1999; transcript distributed in English by the Federal News Service (February 9, 1999).
31. On the absence of state capacity, see Michael McFaul, "Russia's 'Privatized' State as an Impediment to Democratic Consolidation, Part II," Security Dialogue 29, no. 3 (summer 1998): 219-36; and "Russia's 'Privatized' State as an Impediment to Democratic Consolidation, Part I," Security Dialogue 29, no. 2 (spring 1998): 25-33.
32. On the absence of state capacity, see Michael McFaul, "Russia's 'Privatized' State as an Impediment to Democratic Consolidation, Part II," Security Dialogue 29, no. 3 (summer 1998): 219-36; and "Russia's 'Privatized' State as an Impediment to Democratic Consolidation, Part I," Security Dialogue 29, no. 2 (spring 1998): 25-33.
33. Steven Solnick, "Hanging Separately? Cooperation, Cooptation, and Cheating in Developing Federations" (unpublished manuscript, 1998).
34. The centrality of uncertainty about the outcome is critical to keeping the electoral process in place. If, for instance, a major deterioration in the economy makes it certain that a protest candidate will win the next election, then those now associated with the status quo may become less committed to elections.
35. For elaboration, see McFaul, Russia's 1996 Presidential Election, chap. 2.
36. Even these theories only partially capture the dynamic involved when voters are making choices about the kind of political and economic system they want to see in their country. Such electoral contexts are rare in that elections usually do not occur during revolutionary transitions.
37. Michael MacKuen, Robert Erikson, and James Stimson, "Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy," American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (September 1992): 597-611.
38. Morris Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 15.
39. The assumption of prospective voting does not mean that the past is unimportant, because voters do not make prospective calculations in a historical void. On the contrary, a voter's best information about the future is based on past experiences. In the Russian case, most voters (except the youngest) had lived in both systems - the one represented by the communist candidate, Gennadii Ziuganov, and the one represented by Boris Yeltsin. In making calculations about the expected utility of these systems, therefore, they were able to compare systems and did not necessarily have to believe promises about future policies.
40. The fear of a communist comeback helped to drive up turnout rates to nearly 70 percent in both rounds of the presidential elections. In the absence of a communist threat, such turnouts are unlikely, and lower turnouts generally help opposition candidates in Russia.
41. See Vladimir Bokser, Michael McFaul, and Vasilii Ostavshev, "Elektoraty priserov," Prezidentskie vybory v Rossii 9 (June 1996): 5-8; and idem, "Golosa - oboim, strana - odnomu," Itogi (June 25, 1996): 10-12.
42. See Vladimir Bokser, Michael McFaul, and Vasilii Ostavshev, "Elektoraty priserov," Prezidentskie vybory v Rossii 9 (June 1996): 5-8; and idem, "Golosa - oboim, strana - odnomu," Itogi (June 25, 1996): 10-12.
43. This strategy is evident in Luzhkov's interview in Obshchaia gazeta (January 14-20, 1999): 1, 7; reprinted in World News Connection, Daily Report: Central Eurasia (January 25, 1999).
44. This strategy is evident in Luzhkov's interview in Obshchaia gazeta (January 14-20, 1999): 1, 7; reprinted in World News Connection, Daily Report: Central Eurasia (January 25, 1999).
45. Luzhkov called the anti-Semitic statements by Makashov and Iliukhin "anti-statist." As he remarked, "How can politicians who sow interethnic discord call themselves proponents of a strong state? In a multi-national country such as Russia, anyone who plays the ethnic card is objectively working for the collapse of the state and provoking separatist tendencies" (ibid.).
46. Nemtsov is currently playing the generational card, Lebed is fixated on bolstering his identity as the anti-corruption candidate, while Nikita Mikhalkov is best situated to run under the banner "I am not a professional politician."
47. For this reason, KPRF campaign officials plan to try to win the presidential election in the first round (author interview with Viktor Peshkov, a KPRF Duma deputy, March 19, 1999).
48. On why the 1999 "primary" will be more important than the 1995 "primary," see Dmitrii Kamishev, "Bez tsaria vo glave," Kommersant' vlast (January 19, 1999).
49. On this danger for Luzhkov, see Nezavisimaia gazeta (February 6, 1999). This is exactly what happened to Chemomyrdin in 1995. Luzhkov runs the additional risk in the parliamentary vote of not having a "legislative" identity. Since voters know him as an executive, they may not vote for his party in a parliamentary election.
50. See Nikolai Petrov, Aleksandr Lebed' v Krasnoiarskom krae [Aleksandr Lebed in Krasnoiarsk Krai] (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 1999).
51. Thomas Remington, "Democratization and the New Political Order in Russia," Democratic Challenges and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 118.