Non-conventional solutions for non-conventional dilemmas?

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 147-175

  Shapir, Yiftah S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035601071     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390108565556     Document Type: Article

References (118)

1. Ed Blanche, 'Mordechai warned that Israel will strike', Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 Nov. 1997.
2. For quantitative data on the various weapons systems in the Middle East see Shlomo Brom and Yiftah Shapir (eds.) 'The Middle East Military Balance 1999-2000', The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv Univ (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999) pp.139-412.
3. Maj. Gen. (ret) Yitzhak Mordechai, then Minister of Defense, in a lecture given at a conference in Ef'al. For a summary of his speech see: Amnon Barzilai, 'Mordechai: Should the rear be attacked by missiles Israel would inflict a heavy price', Ha'Aretz 28 Oct. 1997. See also Amnon Barzilai, 'From the three M's to C4', Ha'Aretz (special supplement on security), 20 Sept. 1998.
4. Maj. Gen. (ret) Yitzhak Mordechai, then Minister of Defense, in a lecture given at a conference in Ef'al. For a summary of his speech see: Amnon Barzilai, 'Mordechai: Should the rear be attacked by missiles Israel would inflict a heavy price', Ha'Aretz 28 Oct. 1997. See also Amnon Barzilai, 'From the three M's to C4', Ha'Aretz (special supplement on security), 20 Sept. 1998.
5. This essay was written before Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000.
6. Amnon Barzilai, 'The crater near building number 5', Ha'Aretz, 20 Sept. 1998 (in Hebrew).
7. David Eshel, 'Israel's future forces', Jane's Defence Weekly 23/8 (25 Aug. 1999) p.21.
8. Ze'ev Schiff, 'a change in the definition of the threats', Ha'Aretz, 5 May 1999 (in Hebrew).
9. Aluf Ben, 'Terrorism is merely a slight headache', Ha'Aretz, 7 Sept. 1999 (in Hebrew).
10. See note 3.
11. For a comprehensive discussion of the IDF civil defense forces since 1948, see Natan Roi, 'Haga' (the Civil defense), in Ilan Kfir and Ya'akov Erez (eds.) 'Tzahal Be 'Heylo (The IDF's might): an encyclopedia of military affairs and security' (Tel Aviv: Revivim 1982) Vol. 16, pp. 134-67 (in Hebrew).
12. 'Shelters for the civilian population' in the State Comptroller of Israel, Report no. 44 for 1993 (and for fiscal year 1992), (In Hebrew). (Jerusalem: the Official Publisher, 21 April 1994) pp.956-63.
13. The problem is the different, even contradicting nature of the correct measures one should take in the two different situations. During a chemical agent attack, underground shelters might prove a very dangerous place, if they are not properly sealed and have no filtering system. That is because most CW agents are heavier than air. On the other hand, during a conventional bomb attack, underground shelters may give good protection, but standard apartment houses might collapse. Another problem is the time needed to go to a shelter. When the threat is a ballistic missile attack, there might not be enough time to go to a shelter. In this case it would be reasonable to stay in one's apartment rather than risk being caught in the street, on the way to a shelter. It should be added that the average Israeli building is constructed with a reinforced concrete beams, and is relatively resistant to bombs.
14. See for example: Asher Wallfish, 'The Comptroller eases criticism of army on gas masks, but IDF blasts her report', Jerusalem Post, 15 April 1991.
15. 'Protective gear for the civilian population' in the State Comptroller of Israel, Report no. 44, ibid, pp.948-56.
16. Orit Reuveni, Ba-Mahane, 3 Nov. 1993 (in Hebrew).
17. Sharon Sade, Ha'Aretz, 26 April 1994 (in Hebrew).
18. Reuven Pedatzur, Ha'Aretz, 31 Oct. 1996 (in Hebrew).
19. Follow up report on sheltering in the State Comptroller of Israel, Report No. 48 for 1997 (9 April 1998) pp. 1099-108. The press reported that 500,000 apartments were built since the new law entered force. See Amnon Barzilai, On pigs, people and missiles', Ha'Aretz, 4 Feb. 1998 (in Hebrew).
20. Follow up report on sheltering in the State Comptroller of Israel, Report No. 48 for 1997 (9 April 1998) pp. 1099-108. The press reported that 500,000 apartments were built since the new law entered force. See Amnon Barzilai, On pigs, people and missiles', Ha'Aretz, 4 Feb. 1998 (in Hebrew).
21. Ed Blanche, 'Israel seeks protection from chemical attack', Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 Feb. 1998.
22. Israel Budget Law No.129 for FY 2000, published 20 March 2000, article 16 (in Hebrew). Expenditure in previous years was similar: 215,264,000 NIS for 1999; 248,167,000 NIS for 1998 (all in current prices).
23. For a list of the various protective kits see the official Homefront Command's website, at www.idf.il/english/organization/homefront/index.stm.
24. Amnon Barzilai, 'What would happen should the batteries run out', Ha'Aretz, 5 April 1998 (in Hebrew).
25. Ze'ev Schiff 'The protective gear sets do not assure enough protection for youth', Ha'Aretz, 9 Feb. 1998 (in Hebrew).
26. State Comptroller of Israel, report No. 44, p.952 (in Hebrew).
27. Amos Harel, 'Quarter of the population have no protective gear', Ha'Aretz, 12 Nov. 1998 (in Hebrew).
28. Blanche (note 19).
29. Amnon Barzilai, Operation Panic', Ha'Aretz, 24 Feb. 1998 (in Hebrew).
30. The two cases were: A. Ha-Rav Hayim Miller and others vs. the Minister of Defense (Bagatz 4919/90, Israeli Supreme court decisions, Vol.45, Part II, 1991, pp.293-4). The plaintiff argued that the protective gear was unsuitable for bearded men. This appeal was rejected because the Ministry of Defense argued that by the time the case came up before the court, a suitable technological solution was found. In essence, the plaintiffs' demands were satisfied. B. Miladi Markus vs. the Minister of Defense (Bagatz 168/91, Israeli Supreme Court decisions, Vol.45, Part I, 1991, pp.467-8). The plaintiff, an Arab living in the West Bank, demanded that protective gear should be handed to the inhabitants of the West Bank. The Supreme Court endorsed the appeal and ordered the Ministry of Defense to hand out 173,000 sets of protective gear that existed in storage to the adult inhabitants of the region close to Jerusalem. Furthermore, it ordered the ministry to acquire sets for the children of those who get the sets. Third, it ordered the ministry to hand out protective gear sets to the whole population of the region as soon as these are acquired. The court rejected the argument that the decisions to hand out protective gear was a matter of political, military and security decisions that cannot be subjected to a trial by a court of law, and stressed the fact that the legal issue was one of discrimination.
31. The two cases were: A. Ha-Rav Hayim Miller and others vs. the Minister of Defense (Bagatz 4919/90, Israeli Supreme court decisions, Vol.45, Part II, 1991, pp.293-4). The plaintiff argued that the protective gear was unsuitable for bearded men. This appeal was rejected because the Ministry of Defense argued that by the time the case came up before the court, a suitable technological solution was found. In essence, the plaintiffs' demands were satisfied. B. Miladi Markus vs. the Minister of Defense (Bagatz 168/91, Israeli Supreme Court decisions, Vol.45, Part I, 1991, pp.467-8). The plaintiff, an Arab living in the West Bank, demanded that protective gear should be handed to the inhabitants of the West Bank. The Supreme Court endorsed the appeal and ordered the Ministry of Defense to hand out 173,000 sets of protective gear that existed in storage to the adult inhabitants of the region close to Jerusalem. Furthermore, it ordered the ministry to acquire sets for the children of those who get the sets. Third, it ordered the ministry to hand out protective gear sets to the whole population of the region as soon as these are acquired. The court rejected the argument that the decisions to hand out protective gear was a matter of political, military and security decisions that cannot be subjected to a trial by a court of law, and stressed the fact that the legal issue was one of discrimination.
32. The Israeli national health law sets a ceiling for the cost of a medical action to save a human's life See the National Health Insurance law 1994 (Hok Bituah Bri'ut Mamlachti, Tashnad 1994, Sefer Ha-Hukim tashnad, 1469, on 26 June 1994, p. 156). Article 19(a) of the law requires the Minister of Health to prepare a list of severe diseases, and sets the maximum cost of annual medical services for an insured citizen who suffers from that particular disease. For example, a person who suffers from HIV is entitled for medical service that would cost no more than 48,000 NIS a year. (Kovetz ha-Takanot Tashnah 5649, 1 Jan. 1995, p.492).
33. Amnon Barzilai, 'A missile is Born', Ha'Aretz, 4 Oct. 1998 (in Hebrew).
34. I use here the official name. For some odd reasons the name in English is slightly different from the name in Hebrew: 'Etrog Zahav' actually means 'Golden Citron'.
35. 'Washington Outlook: The Israeli air force took over operational control of...' Aviation Week and Space Technology, 20 March 2000. All earlier official estimates ranged between $ 1.6 and 1.9 billion. See Amnon Barzilai, '$700 millions invested in the Arrow Program', Ha'Aretz, 16 Dec. 1996 (in Hebrew).
36. 'Washington Outlook: The Israeli air force took over operational control of...' Aviation Week and Space Technology, 20 March 2000. All earlier official estimates ranged between $ 1.6 and 1.9 billion. See Amnon Barzilai, '$700 millions invested in the Arrow Program', Ha'Aretz, 16 Dec. 1996 (in Hebrew).
37. David A. Fulghum and John D. Morrocco, 'First Arrow battery deployed near Tel Aviv', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10 April 2000.
38. Reuven Pedatzur, 'Virtual intercept', Ha'Aretz, 24 Sept. 1998 (in Hebrew). Pedatzur cites Col. Butler, the chief of the program within the US Army, who estimates the program at more than $3 billion.
39. 'USA to finance a third Arrow battery for Israel', Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 April 1998.
40. 'The Arrow System' in Arieh Slav and Baruch Koroth (eds.) Ballistic Missiles: the threat and response (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonoth Chemed books 1999) (in Hebrew) pp.125-30.
41. Tony Cullen and Christopher F. Foss, Land Based Air Defence 1999-2000 (London: Jane's Information Group 1999) pp.261-3.
42. For a thorough analysis of the lessons of the Patriot deployment to Israel see: Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. IV: the Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1996) pp.867-72.
43. David Eshel, 'Israel's future Forces', Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 April 1999, p.21.
44. 6 Calories, which is the standard measure for nuclear explosions)-we get the equivalent of approximately 250 kg of TNT! This is of course a very rough calculation that assumes a perfect collision and ignores many aspects of the dynamics of an actual collision.
45. The exact figures are classified. Unconfirmed reports put it at 14 targets, but it is not clear whether this is the number of targets the system can track or the number of targets it can intercept simultaneously.
46. For a different approach see Reuven Pedatzur The Arrow System Memorandum No.42 (in Hebrew) (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv Univ. 1993) p.51.
47. Shlomo Gazit, 'Political and Military developments', in War in the Gulf, implications for Israel (JCSS report Tel Aviv Univ. (1992) pp.39-40.
48. See for example: William Saffire, 'The Great Scud-Patriot mystery', New York Times, 7 March 1991, p.25.
49. Bradley Burston, 'With the help of friends and foes', Jerusalem Post, 15 March 1991; Reuven Pedatzur, 'The Repression Syndrome', Ha'Aretz, 4 Aug. 1991 (in Hebrew).
50. Bradley Burston, 'With the help of friends and foes', Jerusalem Post, 15 March 1991; Reuven Pedatzur, 'The Repression Syndrome', Ha'Aretz, 4 Aug. 1991 (in Hebrew).
51. Reuven Pedatzur, 'The illusion of perfect defense', Ha'Aretz, 7 May 1998 (in Hebrew); see also 'The Fox is Saddam', Ha'Aretz, 10 Jan. 1999. Dr Pedatzur published scores of articles in Ha'Aretz opposing the deployment of the Arrow system.
52. Reuven Pedatzur, 'The illusion of perfect defense', Ha'Aretz, 7 May 1998 (in Hebrew); see also 'The Fox is Saddam', Ha'Aretz, 10 Jan. 1999. Dr Pedatzur published scores of articles in Ha'Aretz opposing the deployment of the Arrow system.
53. Reuven Pedatzur, 'The illusion of perfect defense', Ha'Aretz, 7 May 1998 (in Hebrew); see also 'The Fox is Saddam', Ha'Aretz, 10 Jan. 1999. Dr Pedatzur published scores of articles in Ha'Aretz opposing the deployment of the Arrow system.
54. The Lavi combat aircraft was cancelled in 1985. It was too ambitious, too expensive, and probably was an inferior solution for the Israeli Air Force needs, compared with the F-16 or F-15. But I argue that the project was important in terms of the push it gave the Israeli industry.
55. For Turkey's interest in BMD see for example: David Eshel, 'Turkey and Israel will cooperate on missile defence systems', Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 April 1998; Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 'USA and Turkey will talk on Arrow 2 missile', Jane's Defence Weekly 32/20, 17 Nov. 1999, p.3. For attempts to sell the Arrow see for example: Frank Wolfe, 'IAI plans to pick US company for arrow co-production', Defense Daily 205/44, 8 March 2000; Barbara Opall-Rome, 'Israel MOD opens door to export of Arrow missile', Defense News 15/4, 31 Jan. 2000, p.4; Steve Rodan, 'Israel seeks US partner for Arrow', Jane's Defense Weekly 33/9, 1 Jan. 2000, p.3.
56. For Turkey's interest in BMD see for example: David Eshel, 'Turkey and Israel will cooperate on missile defence systems', Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 April 1998; Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 'USA and Turkey will talk on Arrow 2 missile', Jane's Defence Weekly 32/20, 17 Nov. 1999, p.3. For attempts to sell the Arrow see for example: Frank Wolfe, 'IAI plans to pick US company for arrow co-production', Defense Daily 205/44, 8 March 2000; Barbara Opall-Rome, 'Israel MOD opens door to export of Arrow missile', Defense News 15/4, 31 Jan. 2000, p.4; Steve Rodan, 'Israel seeks US partner for Arrow', Jane's Defense Weekly 33/9, 1 Jan. 2000, p.3.
57. For Turkey's interest in BMD see for example: David Eshel, 'Turkey and Israel will cooperate on missile defence systems', Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 April 1998; Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 'USA and Turkey will talk on Arrow 2 missile', Jane's Defence Weekly 32/20, 17 Nov. 1999, p.3. For attempts to sell the Arrow see for example: Frank Wolfe, 'IAI plans to pick US company for arrow co-production', Defense Daily 205/44, 8 March 2000; Barbara Opall-Rome, 'Israel MOD opens door to export of Arrow missile', Defense News 15/4, 31 Jan. 2000, p.4; Steve Rodan, 'Israel seeks US partner for Arrow', Jane's Defense Weekly 33/9, 1 Jan. 2000, p.3.
58. For Turkey's interest in BMD see for example: David Eshel, 'Turkey and Israel will cooperate on missile defence systems', Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 April 1998; Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 'USA and Turkey will talk on Arrow 2 missile', Jane's Defence Weekly 32/20, 17 Nov. 1999, p.3. For attempts to sell the Arrow see for example: Frank Wolfe, 'IAI plans to pick US company for arrow co-production', Defense Daily 205/44, 8 March 2000; Barbara Opall-Rome, 'Israel MOD opens door to export of Arrow missile', Defense News 15/4, 31 Jan. 2000, p.4; Steve Rodan, 'Israel seeks US partner for Arrow', Jane's Defense Weekly 33/9, 1 Jan. 2000, p.3.
59. For Turkey's interest in BMD see for example: David Eshel, 'Turkey and Israel will cooperate on missile defence systems', Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 April 1998; Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 'USA and Turkey will talk on Arrow 2 missile', Jane's Defence Weekly 32/20, 17 Nov. 1999, p.3. For attempts to sell the Arrow see for example: Frank Wolfe, 'IAI plans to pick US company for arrow co-production', Defense Daily 205/44, 8 March 2000; Barbara Opall-Rome, 'Israel MOD opens door to export of Arrow missile', Defense News 15/4, 31 Jan. 2000, p.4; Steve Rodan, 'Israel seeks US partner for Arrow', Jane's Defense Weekly 33/9, 1 Jan. 2000, p.3.
60. For a technical description of the principles of BPI see Dan Rosen, 'Boost Phase Intercept of Ballistic missiles' and Moshe Guelman, 'IBIS a general introduction', both in Stav and Koroth (note 36) pp.193-203 and pp.204-10.
61. For a technical description of the principles of BPI see Dan Rosen, 'Boost Phase Intercept of Ballistic missiles' and Moshe Guelman, 'IBIS a general introduction', both in Stav and Koroth (note 36) pp.193-203 and pp.204-10.
62. The Talon/Raptor system was to fly at 65,000 feet, for 50 hours. The Talon UAV was to carry 6 Raptor missiles. The missile was designed to be a kinetic kill vehicle, weighing 20 kg, and capable of intercepting targets between 50 and 200 km, at 3,300 m/sec. See Guy Norris, Flight International, 20 Oct.1993; James Hacket, Defense News, 30 Aug. 1993.
63. The Talon/Raptor system was to fly at 65,000 feet, for 50 hours. The Talon UAV was to carry 6 Raptor missiles. The missile was designed to be a kinetic kill vehicle, weighing 20 kg, and capable of intercepting targets between 50 and 200 km, at 3,300 m/sec. See Guy Norris, Flight International, 20 Oct.1993; James Hacket, Defense News, 30 Aug. 1993.
64. Barbara Opall-Rome, 'Israel pushes its BPI project', Defense News, 2 Nov. 1998. The HA-10 was offered to the USA, but was rejected as too small. See also David Fulghum, 'Reconnaissance, missile defense deemed most crucial Israeli needs', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 Feb. 1999, p.64.
65. Barbara Opall-Rome, 'Israel pushes its BPI project', Defense News, 2 Nov. 1998. The HA-10 was offered to the USA, but was rejected as too small. See also David Fulghum, 'Reconnaissance, missile defense deemed most crucial Israeli needs', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 Feb. 1999, p.64.
66. David Eshel, 'in search of an effective defence', in Jane's Defence Weekly 31/10, 10 March 1999, p.71.
67. Barzilai, 'a Missile is Born' (note 30).
68. Steve Rodan, 'BPI future in debate', Jane's Defence Weekly 32/19, 10 Nov. 1999, p.27.
69. Opall-Rome (note 51).
70. David Fulghum and John D. Morrocco, 'Israel Air Force to grow'. Aviation Week and Space technology, 10 April 2000. Hints about it were published earlier. See Barbara Opall-Rome 'Israel proposes mission to target missile launchers', Defense News 14/12, 29 March 1999, p.1. See also Amnon Barzilai, 'Israel develops a UAV that would attack launchers', Ha'Aretz, 25 Dec. 1998 (in Hebrew).
71. David Fulghum and John D. Morrocco, 'Israel Air Force to grow'. Aviation Week and Space technology, 10 April 2000. Hints about it were published earlier. See Barbara Opall-Rome 'Israel proposes mission to target missile launchers', Defense News 14/12, 29 March 1999, p.1. See also Amnon Barzilai, 'Israel develops a UAV that would attack launchers', Ha'Aretz, 25 Dec. 1998 (in Hebrew).
72. David Fulghum and John D. Morrocco, 'Israel Air Force to grow'. Aviation Week and Space technology, 10 April 2000. Hints about it were published earlier. See Barbara Opall-Rome 'Israel proposes mission to target missile launchers', Defense News 14/12, 29 March 1999, p.1. See also Amnon Barzilai, 'Israel develops a UAV that would attack launchers', Ha'Aretz, 25 Dec. 1998 (in Hebrew).
73. For technical analysis of the problems of intercepting ballistic missiles in their boost phase see David Vaughan et al. 'Developing BPI/API capability' in Slav and Koroth (note 36) pp.47-267. For a technical analysis of the use of lasers for boost phase intercept see Geoffrey E. Forden 'the Airborne Laser', in ibid, pp.227-46.
74. For technical analysis of the problems of intercepting ballistic missiles in their boost phase see David Vaughan et al. 'Developing BPI/API capability' in Slav and Koroth (note 36) pp.47-267. For a technical analysis of the use of lasers for boost phase intercept see Geoffrey E. Forden 'the Airborne Laser', in ibid, pp.227-46.
75. For the sake of comparison - the TUAAD is designed to intercept at 2,000 m/sec. The American program for DPI - the Talon (now cancelled) was projected to intercept at 3,000-4,000 m/sec
76. Reuven Pedatzur, 'the advantages of Moab', Ha'Aretz, 8 Nov. 1998 (in Hebrew).
77. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War - Final report to Congress, US Department of Defense (April 1992) pp.165-8. See also Cordesman and Wagner (note 38) pp.860-7.
78. Amnon Barzilai, 'In Middle East, more missiles, same old threats', Ha'Aretz, 22 Dec. 1999 (in Hebrew). For tunnels in Libya see Joshua Sinai, 'Ghadaffi's Libya: the patient proliferator', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/12 (Dec. 1998) pp.27-30. For tunnels in Syria see Harold Hough 'Viewing Syria's strategic missile infrastructure from space', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/4 (April 1998) pp. 24-25. For tunnels in Iran see Barbara Starr; 'USA moves to block weapon danger', Jane's Defence Weekly 12 April 1997.
79. Amnon Barzilai, 'In Middle East, more missiles, same old threats', Ha'Aretz, 22 Dec. 1999 (in Hebrew). For tunnels in Libya see Joshua Sinai, 'Ghadaffi's Libya: the patient proliferator', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/12 (Dec. 1998) pp.27-30. For tunnels in Syria see Harold Hough 'Viewing Syria's strategic missile infrastructure from space', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/4 (April 1998) pp. 24-25. For tunnels in Iran see Barbara Starr; 'USA moves to block weapon danger', Jane's Defence Weekly 12 April 1997.
80. Amnon Barzilai, 'In Middle East, more missiles, same old threats', Ha'Aretz, 22 Dec. 1999 (in Hebrew). For tunnels in Libya see Joshua Sinai, 'Ghadaffi's Libya: the patient proliferator', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/12 (Dec. 1998) pp.27-30. For tunnels in Syria see Harold Hough 'Viewing Syria's strategic missile infrastructure from space', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/4 (April 1998) pp. 24-25. For tunnels in Iran see Barbara Starr; 'USA moves to block weapon danger', Jane's Defence Weekly 12 April 1997.
81. Amnon Barzilai, 'In Middle East, more missiles, same old threats', Ha'Aretz, 22 Dec. 1999 (in Hebrew). For tunnels in Libya see Joshua Sinai, 'Ghadaffi's Libya: the patient proliferator', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/12 (Dec. 1998) pp.27-30. For tunnels in Syria see Harold Hough 'Viewing Syria's strategic missile infrastructure from space', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/4 (April 1998) pp. 24-25. For tunnels in Iran see Barbara Starr; 'USA moves to block weapon danger', Jane's Defence Weekly 12 April 1997.
82. It was estimated at the time of the Gulf War that Iraq had 36 mobile launchers, but the largest number of missiles fired within one day was 10 missiles. (Conduct of the Gulf War, note 60 p.165) thus it is possible that a smaller number was active during the war itself.
83. Conduct of lhe Gulf War (note 60) p. 167.
84. For a comprehensive analysis of Israel's nuclear deterrence see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence (NY: Columbia UP 1982). Feldman argued in his book for a shift to open deterrence.
85. Nitzan Hurvitz, 'Peres dismisses the value of the NPT', Ha'Aretz, 19 Feb. 1995 (in Hebrew). Peres is quoted as telling Mr Musa that Israel has no intention of joining the NPT as long as it is threatened by Iran and Iraq. See also Ze'ev Schiff, 'An Egyptian wall', Ha'Aretz, 27 Jan. 1995 (in Hebrew).
86. Nitzan Hurvitz, 'Peres dismisses the value of the NPT', Ha'Aretz, 19 Feb. 1995 (in Hebrew). Peres is quoted as telling Mr Musa that Israel has no intention of joining the NPT as long as it is threatened by Iran and Iraq. See also Ze'ev Schiff, 'An Egyptian wall', Ha'Aretz, 27 Jan. 1995 (in Hebrew).
87. Barbara Opall-Rome, One on one: Interview with Maj. General Yitzhak Ben-Yisrael', Defense News, 17 Aug. 1998. General Ben-Yisrael discussed the paradox between the need to deter and the secrecy, and claimed that all the options will be reviewed. Brig. Gen. (ret) Ephraim Sneh, who became in 1999 Deputy Minister of Defense argued then for the continuation of the nuclear ambiguity: see Ephraim Sneh, 'Dimona sacrificed for Yitzhar', Ha'Aretz, 13 Aug. 1998 (in Hebrew).
88. Barbara Opall-Rome, One on one: Interview with Maj. General Yitzhak Ben-Yisrael', Defense News, 17 Aug. 1998. General Ben-Yisrael discussed the paradox between the need to deter and the secrecy, and claimed that all the options will be reviewed. Brig. Gen. (ret) Ephraim Sneh, who became in 1999 Deputy Minister of Defense argued then for the continuation of the nuclear ambiguity: see Ephraim Sneh, 'Dimona sacrificed for Yitzhar', Ha'Aretz, 13 Aug. 1998 (in Hebrew).
89. Amos Harel, 'Minister of defense in the ceremony for the arrival of the new planes: a leap in the deterring capability of the air force', Ha 'Aret, 20 Jan. 1998 (in Hebrew).
90. Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1994). For thorough analysis of the aspects of Israel's conventional deterrence see Uri Bar-Joseph, 'Variations on a theme: the conceptualization of deterrence in Israeli strategic thinking', Security Studies 7/3 (Spring 1998) pp.145-81. See also Ellie Lieberman, 'What makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry', Security Studies 4/4 (Summer 1995) pp. 851-910. Bar-Joseph distinguishes between four types of deterrence according to the goals of the deterrence. An analysis of the relevance of each type of deterrence in countering nonconventional threats to Israel is beyond the scope of this essay.
91. Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1994). For thorough analysis of the aspects of Israel's conventional deterrence see Uri Bar-Joseph, 'Variations on a theme: the conceptualization of deterrence in Israeli strategic thinking', Security Studies 7/3 (Spring 1998) pp.145-81. See also Ellie Lieberman, 'What makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry', Security Studies 4/4 (Summer 1995) pp. 851-910. Bar-Joseph distinguishes between four types of deterrence according to the goals of the deterrence. An analysis of the relevance of each type of deterrence in countering nonconventional threats to Israel is beyond the scope of this essay.
92. Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1994). For thorough analysis of the aspects of Israel's conventional deterrence see Uri Bar-Joseph, 'Variations on a theme: the conceptualization of deterrence in Israeli strategic thinking', Security Studies 7/3 (Spring 1998) pp.145-81. See also Ellie Lieberman, 'What makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry', Security Studies 4/4 (Summer 1995) pp. 851-910. Bar-Joseph distinguishes between four types of deterrence according to the goals of the deterrence. An analysis of the relevance of each type of deterrence in countering nonconventional threats to Israel is beyond the scope of this essay.
93. For an analysis of Israeli leader's messages, see Shai Feldman, 'Israel's deterrence and the Gulf War' in War in the Gulf (note 43) pp. 184-208. Prof. Feldman argues that Israeli leaders failed in implementing a coherent policy of deterring messages, but he thinks that this had little effect on the Arab perceptions of Israel's strength.
94. Amnon Barzilai, 'Mordechai: Israel shall inflict a high cost if the rear would be attacked with ballistic missiles', Ha'Aretz, 28 Oct. 1997 (in Hebrew).
95. Yerah Tal, 'USA promises a tough response to an Iraqi attack on Israel', Ha'Aretz, 6 Feb. 1998 (in Hebrew).
96. 'The correct response for a threat', Ha'Aretz, editorial (unsigned) 12 Feb. 1998 (in Hebrew).
97. Thomas C. Schelling Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966) pp.1-18. See also Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1959) p.273. See also Patrick Morgan, Deterrence (Beverly Hills and London: Sage 1977); Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be Better Adelphi Papers No. 171 (London: IISS 1981) pp.28-30.
98. Thomas C. Schelling Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966) pp.1-18. See also Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1959) p.273. See also Patrick Morgan, Deterrence (Beverly Hills and London: Sage 1977); Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be Better Adelphi Papers No. 171 (London: IISS 1981) pp.28-30.
99. Thomas C. Schelling Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966) pp.1-18. See also Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1959) p.273. See also Patrick Morgan, Deterrence (Beverly Hills and London: Sage 1977); Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be Better Adelphi Papers No. 171 (London: IISS 1981) pp.28-30.
100. Thomas C. Schelling Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966) pp.1-18. See also Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1959) p.273. See also Patrick Morgan, Deterrence (Beverly Hills and London: Sage 1977); Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be Better Adelphi Papers No. 171 (London: IISS 1981) pp.28-30.
101. Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence (note 64) pp.42-3.
102. For an analysis of the Arabs perceptions of Israel's nuclear deterrence see Emili B. Landau and Ariel E. Levite, Israel's Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and Papirus Books 1994) pp. 165-7 (in Hebrew).
103. Reuven Pedatzur, 'A Severe Blow to deterrence', Ha'Aretz, 24 Feb. 1998 (in Hebrew).
104. Feldman, 'Israel's deterrence and the Gulf War' (note 69) pp. 184-208.
105. To name just a few examples of the debate see: Michael O'Hanlon 'Star wars strike back', Foreign Affairs 78/6 (Nov.-Dec. 1998); John Steinbrunner, 'National missile defense: collision in progress', Arms Control today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.3-6; Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis, 'How a limited national missile defense would impact the ABM treaty', Arms Control Today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.7-13; Paul Mann, 'Missile defense gains political favor amid rifts', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 March 1999, p.51; David Smith, 'Has time come to throw ABM to the dustbin', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/12 (Dec. 1998); Michael A. Dornheim, 'Missile defense soon, but will it work?', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 Feb. 1997.
106. To name just a few examples of the debate see: Michael O'Hanlon 'Star wars strike back', Foreign Affairs 78/6 (Nov.-Dec. 1998); John Steinbrunner, 'National missile defense: collision in progress', Arms Control today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.3-6; Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis, 'How a limited national missile defense would impact the ABM treaty', Arms Control Today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.7-13; Paul Mann, 'Missile defense gains political favor amid rifts', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 March 1999, p.51; David Smith, 'Has time come to throw ABM to the dustbin', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/12 (Dec. 1998); Michael A. Dornheim, 'Missile defense soon, but will it work?', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 Feb. 1997.
107. To name just a few examples of the debate see: Michael O'Hanlon 'Star wars strike back', Foreign Affairs 78/6 (Nov.-Dec. 1998); John Steinbrunner, 'National missile defense: collision in progress', Arms Control today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.3-6; Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis, 'How a limited national missile defense would impact the ABM treaty', Arms Control Today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.7-13; Paul Mann, 'Missile defense gains political favor amid rifts', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 March 1999, p.51; David Smith, 'Has time come to throw ABM to the dustbin', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/12 (Dec. 1998); Michael A. Dornheim, 'Missile defense soon, but will it work?', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 Feb. 1997.
108. To name just a few examples of the debate see: Michael O'Hanlon 'Star wars strike back', Foreign Affairs 78/6 (Nov.-Dec. 1998); John Steinbrunner, 'National missile defense: collision in progress', Arms Control today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.3-6; Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis, 'How a limited national missile defense would impact the ABM treaty', Arms Control Today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.7-13; Paul Mann, 'Missile defense gains political favor amid rifts', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 March 1999, p.51; David Smith, 'Has time come to throw ABM to the dustbin', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/12 (Dec. 1998); Michael A. Dornheim, 'Missile defense soon, but will it work?', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 Feb. 1997.
109. To name just a few examples of the debate see: Michael O'Hanlon 'Star wars strike back', Foreign Affairs 78/6 (Nov.-Dec. 1998); John Steinbrunner, 'National missile defense: collision in progress', Arms Control today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.3-6; Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis, 'How a limited national missile defense would impact the ABM treaty', Arms Control Today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.7-13; Paul Mann, 'Missile defense gains political favor amid rifts', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 March 1999, p.51; David Smith, 'Has time come to throw ABM to the dustbin', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/12 (Dec. 1998); Michael A. Dornheim, 'Missile defense soon, but will it work?', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 Feb. 1997.
110. To name just a few examples of the debate see: Michael O'Hanlon 'Star wars strike back', Foreign Affairs 78/6 (Nov.-Dec. 1998); John Steinbrunner, 'National missile defense: collision in progress', Arms Control today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.3-6; Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis, 'How a limited national missile defense would impact the ABM treaty', Arms Control Today 29/7 (Nov. 1999) pp.7-13; Paul Mann, 'Missile defense gains political favor amid rifts', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 March 1999, p.51; David Smith, 'Has time come to throw ABM to the dustbin', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/12 (Dec. 1998); Michael A. Dornheim, 'Missile defense soon, but will it work?', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 Feb. 1997.
111. Alcibiadis Thalassocrates, 'NATO opens up a TMD effort'. Military Technology 22/8 (Aug. 1998); Nick Cook, 'Europe's missing Shield', Jane's Defence Weekly 31/17, 28 April 1999; Philip Finnegan, 'Politics hinders joint Gulf missile defense'. Defense News 14/11,22 March 1999; John Morrocco, 'Allies pursue few indigenous projects'. Aviation Week and Space Technology 151/7, 16 Aug. 1999, pp.76-7.
112. Alcibiadis Thalassocrates, 'NATO opens up a TMD effort'. Military Technology 22/8 (Aug. 1998); Nick Cook, 'Europe's missing Shield', Jane's Defence Weekly 31/17, 28 April 1999; Philip Finnegan, 'Politics hinders joint Gulf missile defense'. Defense News 14/11,22 March 1999; John Morrocco, 'Allies pursue few indigenous projects'. Aviation Week and Space Technology 151/7, 16 Aug. 1999, pp.76-7.
113. Alcibiadis Thalassocrates, 'NATO opens up a TMD effort'. Military Technology 22/8 (Aug. 1998); Nick Cook, 'Europe's missing Shield', Jane's Defence Weekly 31/17, 28 April 1999; Philip Finnegan, 'Politics hinders joint Gulf missile defense'. Defense News 14/11,22 March 1999; John Morrocco, 'Allies pursue few indigenous projects'. Aviation Week and Space Technology 151/7, 16 Aug. 1999, pp.76-7.
114. Alcibiadis Thalassocrates, 'NATO opens up a TMD effort'. Military Technology 22/8 (Aug. 1998); Nick Cook, 'Europe's missing Shield', Jane's Defence Weekly 31/17, 28 April 1999; Philip Finnegan, 'Politics hinders joint Gulf missile defense'. Defense News 14/11,22 March 1999; John Morrocco, 'Allies pursue few indigenous projects'. Aviation Week and Space Technology 151/7, 16 Aug. 1999, pp.76-7.
115. One important report issued in the United States was the 'Rumsfeld report', which reassessed the threat of ballistic missiles. The report influenced both the debate in the United States, giving much support to the proponents of BMD, and in other countries: in Europe and of course in Israel. On the American debate see: Richard Garwin 'What have we done', and Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, 'What they haven't done', both in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Nov. 1998).
116. One important report issued in the United States was the 'Rumsfeld report', which reassessed the threat of ballistic missiles. The report influenced both the debate in the United States, giving much support to the proponents of BMD, and in other countries: in Europe and of course in Israel. On the American debate see: Richard Garwin 'What have we done', and Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, 'What they haven't done', both in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Nov. 1998).
117. For a statement of Israel's policy regarding arms control regimes see: Eytan Bentsur (the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'Israel's Approach to Regional Security, Arms Control and Disarmament', Statement before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 4 Sept. 1997.
118. Bentsur, ibid.