State of the art: Consciousness

Psychologist

Volumn 14, Issue 10, 2001, Pages 522-525

  Blackmore, Susan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST OF ENGLAND   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035599768     PISSN: 09528229     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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5. Chalmers, D. J. (1995, December).The puzzle of conscious experience. Scientific American, 62-68.
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21. Parfit, D. (1987). Divided minds and the nature of persons. In C. Blakemore & S. Greenfield (Eds.). Mindwaves (pp. 19-26). Oxford: Blackwell.
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23. Rensink, R. (2000).The dynamic representation of scenes. Visual Cognition, 7, 17-42.
24. Rensink, R.A., O'Regan, K. O., & Clark, J. J. (1997).To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes. Psychological Science, 8, 368-373.
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26. Simons, D.J., & Levin, D.T. (1998). Failure to detect changes to people during a real-world interaction. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 4, 644-649.
27. Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. P. (1999). Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will. American Psychologist, 54, 480-492.
28. Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A case study and implications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.