Loyal political cartels and committee assignments in Congress: Evidence from the Congressional Black Caucus

Public Choice

Volumn 108, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 313-330

  Mixon Jr , Franklin G ^a   Ressler, Rand W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA AT LAFAYETTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035597047     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017560923687     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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