The importance of uncertainty in a two-stage theory of constitutions

Public Choice

Volumn 108, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 223-258

  Mueller, Dennis C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035594937     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017500106015     Document Type: Article

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