Understanding America's hesitant steps toward financial capitalism: Politics, the Depression, and the separation of commercial and investment banking

Public Choice

Volumn 106, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 93-116

  Ramírez, Carlos D ^a   De Long, J Bradford ^b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035586965     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005280406247     Document Type: Article

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