Did Glass-Steagall increase the cost of external finance for corporate investment?: Evidence from bank and insurance company affiliations

Journal of Economic History

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 372-396

  Ramîrez, Carlos D ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; ECONOMIC HISTORY; HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY; INVESTMENT;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 17944385767     PISSN: 00220507     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022050700022877     Document Type: Article

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