Pivotal voting

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 111-116

  Margolis, Howard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Pivotal voting; Strategic voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035584602     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692801013001007     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Austen-Smith, David and Jeff Banks (1996) 'Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem', American Political Science Review 90: 34-45.
2. Feddersen, Timothy J. and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996) 'The Swing Voter's Curse', American Economic Review 86: 408-24.
3. Feddersen, Timothy J. and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1998) 'Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting', American Political Science Review 92: 23-35.
4. Feddersen, Timothy J. and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1999a) 'Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences', American Political Science Review 93: 381-98.
5. Feddersen, Timothy J. and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1999b) 'Elections, Information Aggregation and Strategic Voting', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 96: 10572-4.
6. Ladha, Krishna, Gary Miller and Joe Oppenheimer (1996) 'Information Aggregation by Majority Rule: Theory and Experiments', Mimeo, University of Maryland.
7. Margolis, Howard (2000a) 'Game Theory and Juries: a Miraculous Result', Mimeo, University of Chicago.
8. Margolis, Howard (2000b) 'Pivotal Voting and the Emperor's New Clothes', Social Choice and Welfare (in press).