Strategic culture and the military modernization of South Korea

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 99-127

  Cha, Victor D ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035565920     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0102800106     Document Type: Article

References (157)

1. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
2. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
3. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
4. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
5. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
6. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
7. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
8. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
9. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
10. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
11. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
12. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
13. Most of the literature on the topic includes both sets of security and economic factors, but there is a clear differentiation in terms of relative emphasis and in assessments of how dangerous the phenomenon is. Representative of the "affluence" argument is Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78-112; Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia Adelphi Paper 329 (London: HSS, 1999); Jonathan Sikes, "Asia Puts Its Wealth in Military," Washington Times 12 February 1990; Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defense Expenditure in the ASEAN Region," Journal of Peace Research 23, 1 (March 1986); Andrew Ross, "The International Arms Trade, Arms Imports, and Local Defence Production in ASEAN," in Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia," in Asian Securuty Handbook, eds. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 21-31. Representative of the "arms" argument is Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 136-152; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); "Asia's Arms Race," Economist 20 (February 1993): 19; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (New York: Morrow, 1996); and more generally, Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; and Rajan Menon and Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," National Interest (Spring 2000): 78-86.
14. The force improvement projects were known as Yulgok until 1986, after which the name was dropped. For historical background, see Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), Ch. 3; and MND, Defense White Paper 1998 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1998), 155-160.
15. The force improvement projects were known as Yulgok until 1986, after which the name was dropped. For historical background, see Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), Ch. 3; and MND, Defense White Paper 1998 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1998), 155-160.
16. The Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) of the defense ministry (established in 1971) is responsible for virtually all (95%) defense procurement activities.
17. KD-I was formerly known as KDX-I. Boats delivered as of summer 2000 are larger than earlier reported plans (3800-ton versus 3200-ton). A purchase decision on KDX-III is expected in 2002 with delivery in 2010 (U.S. defense official, personal interview).
18. The last boat for the KSS-I program was completed in summer 2000 followed by a decision to forego an additional three subs and move to KSS-II. Candidates for the new programs include Daewoo/HDW, a joint venture between Hyundai and DSN (France), and the Russian 2500-ton kilo class and 1900-ton Amur class subs.
19. Political rather than military motives drove the additional production as the government sought to keep the plant open until decisions were made about another aircraft (e.g., T-50) or on licensed production for the KFX aircraft.
20. Under consideration for this program are the French Rafale, Boeing F-15K, Russian SU-37, and Eurofighter EF-2000. The purchase decision was delayed because of changes in MND procurement procedures (effective 1 January 2000), which negated proposals submitted by foreign companies the previous fall. Proposals were again received in June 2000 with decisions expected by late 2001 (interview, U.S. Embassy official)
21. White Paper 1999, Part 3, Ch. 2, Sec. 4.
22. Chong-Hun Yi, "When Nodong 1 Attacks, Nation Plunged into Sea of Fire," Sisa Journal 17 (December 1998): 40 (in Korean): and "S. Korea to Explain to Bidders its Missile Project," Reuters, 20 September 1999. A decision on the program is expected in early to mid-2001.
23. Chong-Hun Yi, "When Nodong 1 Attacks, Nation Plunged into Sea of Fire," Sisa Journal 17 (December 1998): 40 (in Korean): and "S. Korea to Explain to Bidders its Missile Project," Reuters, 20 September 1999. A decision on the program is expected in early to mid-2001.
24. Anticipated big-ticket purchases include a $1.8 billion AH-X program for 40 heavy-attack helicopters by 2004 ("South Korea Seeks Helicopter Bids," China Daily, 15 March, 2000, 6). For figures on the percentage of the budget since 1974 devoted to maintaining readiness for ground contingencies, see Department of State, "South Korean Defense Procurement System," 1 September 1998 at www.tradeport.org/ts/countries
25. Anticipated big-ticket purchases include a $1.8 billion AH-X program for 40 heavy-attack helicopters by 2004 ("South Korea Seeks Helicopter Bids," China Daily, 15 March, 2000, 6). For figures on the percentage of the budget since 1974 devoted to maintaining readiness for ground contingencies, see Department of State, "South Korean Defense Procurement System," 1 September 1998 at www.tradeport.org/ts/countries
26. See MND, "Korean Security for the 21 St Century," and White Paper 1999 Part 2, Ch. 1,sec. 2.
27. Bruce Bennett, "Conventional Arms Control in Korea." Paper presented at the NPEC/INSS/Army War College conference on "Planning for a Peaceful Korea," Arlington, VA, June 12-14, 2000. The shift is also evident in the incongruence between ROK modernization plans and the DPRK threat. For example, a skeptic might argue that the increased focus on ROK naval modernization derives from altercations with the DPRK in coastal waters and increased DPRK infiltration activities in 1999. But this threat would dictate the purchase of more coastal patrol speed boats, not Aegis-class boats, which means that something else is driving the behavior.
28. Arguments on this subject include "ROK Navy Pursues Blue Water Navy," Korea Times 12 November 1995; Wall Street Journal, 17 January 1995; Calder, Pacific Defense; Aidan Foster-Carter, Korea's Coming Reunification: Another East Asian Superpower? Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. M212 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992); and Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 September 2000 (Wall, "Korea Detente No Bar to Military Buys"): 38.
29. Arguments on this subject include "ROK Navy Pursues Blue Water Navy," Korea Times 12 November 1995; Wall Street Journal, 17 January 1995; Calder, Pacific Defense; Aidan Foster-Carter, Korea's Coming Reunification: Another East Asian Superpower? Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. M212 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992); and Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 September 2000 (Wall, "Korea Detente No Bar to Military Buys"): 38.
30. Arguments on this subject include "ROK Navy Pursues Blue Water Navy," Korea Times 12 November 1995; Wall Street Journal, 17 January 1995; Calder, Pacific Defense; Aidan Foster-Carter, Korea's Coming Reunification: Another East Asian Superpower? Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. M212 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992); and Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 September 2000 (Wall, "Korea Detente No Bar to Military Buys"): 38.
31. Arguments on this subject include "ROK Navy Pursues Blue Water Navy," Korea Times 12 November 1995; Wall Street Journal, 17 January 1995; Calder, Pacific Defense; Aidan Foster-Carter, Korea's Coming Reunification: Another East Asian Superpower? Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. M212 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992); and Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 September 2000 (Wall, "Korea Detente No Bar to Military Buys"): 38.
32. Arguments on this subject include "ROK Navy Pursues Blue Water Navy," Korea Times 12 November 1995; Wall Street Journal, 17 January 1995; Calder, Pacific Defense; Aidan Foster-Carter, Korea's Coming Reunification: Another East Asian Superpower? Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. M212 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992); and Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 September 2000 (Wall, "Korea Detente No Bar to Military Buys"): 38.
33. See Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman, "Status, Norms and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons," in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 79-113.
34. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
35. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
36. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
37. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
38. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
39. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
40. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
41. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
42. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
43. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
44. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1997-98; "Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan," Korea Herald, 8 June 1998; Myung-ho Moon, "Debate on a Blue Water Navy," Munhwa Ilbo, 8 April 1997; "Military Concerned about Defense Budget," Korea Herald, 7 February 1998; C. Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security Out-look (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997); "Major Military Procurement Projects to be Delayed," Korea Times, 8 January 1998; South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft, Korea Herald, 20 November 1997; Korea's Seapower and National Development (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995); Yong-sup Han, "Korea's Security Strategy for 21st Century," Korea Focus 5, 4 (July-August 1997); Joon-ho Do, "Security Strategy for 21st Century," Wolgan Choson, 25 November 1993; Seohang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Korea Focus 5, 2 (March-April 1997).
45. Korea Herald, 5 September 1999 ("Military Satellite to be Launched in 2005"); and Jane's Defence Weekly 32, 11 (15 September 1999).
46. Korea Herald, 5 September 1999 ("Military Satellite to be Launched in 2005"); and Jane's Defence Weekly 32, 11 (15 September 1999).
47. This is admittedly an imperfect test; however given the absence of explicit and credible statements about the strategy behind the programs, it is a useful first cut. Moreover, it is a "hard" test of ROK intentions. Because ROK force procurement is heavily weighted toward external purchases, budget entries for planned purchases are denominated in U.S. dollars rather than local currency. Logic dictates that in a liquidity crunch with a rapidly depreciating currency, those dollar-denominated purchases would face the most extreme pressure in terms of cuts. If such cuts are not evident, this offers credible evidence that Seoul's interests in acquiring these capabilities are more than byproducts of affluence and integral to a larger strategic vision.
48. Korea Herald, 8 June 1998, and 15 September 1998; and Department of State, "South Korea Defense Procurement System," 1 September 1998 Industry Sector Analysis, 1999 (website version) www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/skorea/isa/isar003.8.html, p.3
49. Korea Herald, 8 June 1998, and 15 September 1998; and Department of State, "South Korea Defense Procurement System," 1 September 1998 Industry Sector Analysis, 1999 (website version) www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/skorea/isa/isar003.8.html, p.3
50. The projects most affected were the KDX-II destroyer and KSS-I submarine programs and the $1.7 billion purchase of four AWACs by 2010.
51. Korea Herald, 22 September 1998; and MND official, interview, Seoul, 8 July 1998.
52. Aviation Week & Space Technology 18 September 2000 (Wall, "Korea Detente No Bar to Military Buys), 38; and correspondence with U.S. defense official, 20 August 2000.
53. U.S. defense official, personal interview. On the supplementary budget in fall 1998, see Korea Herald, 8 June 1998 ("Defense Ministry Pushes Destroyer Plan"), and wire reports from Xinhua News Agency, 7 June 1998.
54. U.S. defense official, personal interview. On the supplementary budget in fall 1998, see Korea Herald, 8 June 1998 ("Defense Ministry Pushes Destroyer Plan"), and wire reports from Xinhua News Agency, 7 June 1998.
55. As of summer 2000, two KD-I boats have been delivered and the third has been commissioned. Purchase decisions on KDX-III are expected in 2002.
56. Korea Herald, 8 June 1998 ("Defense Ministry Pushes Destroyer Plan"); and wire reports from Xinhua News Agency, 1 June 1998. The KSS-I program was completed in summer 2000 (U.S. defense official, personal interview).
57. Korea Herald, 8 June 1998 ("Defense Ministry Pushes Destroyer Plan"); and wire reports from Xinhua News Agency, 1 June 1998. The KSS-I program was completed in summer 2000 (U.S. defense official, personal interview).
58. Defense White Paper 1999, Part 2, Ch. 1, Sec. 1.
59. Procurement through Foreign Military Sales is increasingly unattractive because of bureaucratic delays and the restrictions on transfer of technology (compared with Direct Commercial Sales discussed below).
60. Bryan Bender, "ROK Chooses New Defence System," Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 August 1999.
61. Defense White Paper 1999, Part 3, Ch. 2, Sec. 3.
62. In this vein, the MND established a research and development office in 1998 and an RMA (revolution in military affairs) Planning Group in April 1999 that will receive allocations of the defense budget on the order of ten percent by 2015. To enhance the domestic defense technology base, the government is bringing private industry and universities more into the fold, not just as testers of basic and more advanced technologies but as commercial innovators for potential dual-use technologies. The government is also encouraging small and medium-size businesses to enter the domestic defense industry, traditionally dominated by the chaebol (conglomerates), to infuse more creativity into the system (for additional details, see Defense White Paper 1999, Part 3, Ch. 2, Sections 1 -4: and Jane's Defence Weekly 31.23 [9 June 1999]).
63. In this vein, the MND established a research and development office in 1998 and an RMA (revolution in military affairs) Planning Group in April 1999 that will receive allocations of the defense budget on the order of ten percent by 2015. To enhance the domestic defense technology base, the government is bringing private industry and universities more into the fold, not just as testers of basic and more advanced technologies but as commercial innovators for potential dual-use technologies. The government is also encouraging small and medium-size businesses to enter the domestic defense industry, traditionally dominated by the chaebol (conglomerates), to infuse more creativity into the system (for additional details, see Defense White Paper 1999, Part 3, Ch. 2, Sections 1 -4: and Jane's Defence Weekly 31.23 [9 June 1999]).
64. Defense White Paper 1999, Part 3. Ch. 2. Sec. 4.
65. Table 4 does not wholly capture this dynamic, as the data cover only the 1990s, and as defense officials note, the trend is only now emerging in this decade. However, if one considers that the two upticks in FMS sales in 1991 and 1996 from the U.S. were the result of unusual big-ticket purchases (F-16 aircraft and P-3C vessels in 1991, Signal Intelligence System Project in 1996), one gets a better sense of the increasing activity in U.S.-based DCS as well as non-U.S. based purchases. Defense officials admit that the trend lines indicate more DCS in the coming years along with more flexibility in technology transfer (U.S. defense official, personal interview).
66. Jane's Defence Weekly 32, 7(18 August 1999).
67. After the establishment of military attaché offices in 1991, Moscow inquired informally about offset arrangements involving Soviet armaments for ROK light industry products. After the Soviet collapse, a combination of South Korean relief at Russia's commitment to assume the unpaid debt (May 1992), and an expansion of bilateral defense exchanges prompted greater openness in Seoul to such an arrangement. An important step was a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two defense ministers in November 1992 that paved the way to exchange visits of joint chiefs, academy exchanges, warship visits, and Russian observers at Team Spirit exercises in 1993 (Yonhap newswire 20 November 1992 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service - East Asia (FBIS-EAS) 92-225, 20 November 1992, 11). The proposal for the 1994 agreement was made during an August 1993 visit to Seoul by Alejsandr Shokin (then Vice Premier for External Economic Relations). A second MOU on military-technical cooperation in 1995 enabled the implementation of the 1994 agreement. For additional details, see Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-ho Joo, "Military Cooperation between Russia and South Korea," International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 8 (1999): 151-156.
68. After the establishment of military attaché offices in 1991, Moscow inquired informally about offset arrangements involving Soviet armaments for ROK light industry products. After the Soviet collapse, a combination of South Korean relief at Russia's commitment to assume the unpaid debt (May 1992), and an expansion of bilateral defense exchanges prompted greater openness in Seoul to such an arrangement. An important step was a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two defense ministers in November 1992 that paved the way to exchange visits of joint chiefs, academy exchanges, warship visits, and Russian observers at Team Spirit exercises in 1993 (Yonhap newswire 20 November 1992 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service - East Asia (FBIS-EAS) 92-225, 20 November 1992, 11). The proposal for the 1994 agreement was made during an August 1993 visit to Seoul by Alejsandr Shokin (then Vice Premier for External Economic Relations). A second MOU on military-technical cooperation in 1995 enabled the implementation of the 1994 agreement. For additional details, see Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-ho Joo, "Military Cooperation between Russia and South Korea," International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 8 (1999): 151-156.
69. This included BMP-3 armored fighting vehicles, T-80U battlefield tanks, portable antiaircraft missiles and antitank missiles (see Kwak and Joo, "Military Cooperation," 158).
70. U.S. defense official, personal interview; and Korea Herald, 2 October 1996 ("ROK Army Activates Russian Arms-Equipped Infantry Battalion").
71. See New York Times, 16 July 2000 (Michael Gordon, "Russia is Pushing to Increase Share in Weapons Trade").
72. The S-300 missile series includes: S-300 PMU-1 (SA-10 Grumble) which is an antiaircraft missile and S-300V (SA-12 A/B Gladiator/Giant) which is an antitactical ballistic missile.
73. Correspondence with U.S. defense official, 20 August 2000, and Kwak and Joo, "Military Cooperation," 162, 164-165, and 170.
74. For example, one-third of the equipment kept at the Armor School remains in storage so that spare parts from these can be used to service the remainder of the "operational" stock. Although the ROK expresses interest in Russian Kilo submarines, defense officials reportedly were not impressed by the manufacturing facility and demonstrations during survey visits in early 2000. In addition, the Russians have been asking for a 30/70 split on the debt write-off/cash equation in future deals (correspondence with U.S. defense official, 20 August 2000).
75. Russians rebut these claims by citing the example of Greece, which employs both Russian and U.S.-made SAMs, but most military experts see severe compatibility problems for an ROK military so heavily dependent on U.S. systems to this point (Department of State, "South Korea Defense Procurement System," 1 September 1998 Industry Sector Analysis, 1999 (website version), www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/skorea/isa/isar003.8. html, 3.
76. Defense White Paper 1999, Sec. 3, Ch. 2, part 1.
77. Korea Herald, 15 September 1998.
78. In 1996 MND sued Lockheed for alleged overcharging on a $595 million 1990 purchase of P-3C antisubmarine craft (Korea Herald, 31 December 1999).
79. For example, Seoul claims that the United States quietly embargoed exports of core missile parts from October 1999 as a way of gaining leverage in ongoing U.S.-ROK talks on revision of the 1979 agreement on missiles (discussed below) (Korea Times 12 January 2000).
80. Korea Times 4 September 1998; and Kwak and Joo, "Military Cooperation," 156.
81. Korea Times 4 September 1998; and Kwak and Joo, "Military Cooperation," 156.
82. New York Times 16 July 2000 (Gordon, "Russia is Pushing to Increase Share").
83. New York Times 16 July 2000 (Gordon, "Russia is Pushing to Increase Share").
84. The quid pro quo for the voluntary limit on ROK missile ranges was U.S. technology for the ROK's NHK-2 missile (Korea Times 13 November 1998; and Hanguk Ilbo 10 November 1998).
85. The quid pro quo for the voluntary limit on ROK missile ranges was U.S. technology for the ROK's NHK-2 missile (Korea Times 13 November 1998; and Hanguk Ilbo 10 November 1998).
86. One prominently reported revelation in this area was the discovery of rocket motor testing sites that had not been made public to the U.S. (New York Times, 14 November 1999).
87. The ROK currently has six satellites for communications and scientific research, all launched by foreign countries.
88. As ROK space agency officials have explained, "We don't want to depend on other countries anymore...we pay a lot of money to outside countries and we have to wait for launching time which is dependent on their schedule and wastes our time and budget" (New York Times, 15 January 2000 [Calvin Sims, "South Korea Plans to Begin Rocket Program"]).
89. As ROK space agency officials have explained, "We don't want to depend on other countries anymore...we pay a lot of money to outside countries and we have to wait for launching time which is dependent on their schedule and wastes our time and budget" (New York Times, 15 January 2000 [Calvin Sims, "South Korea Plans to Begin Rocket Program"]).
90. Contrary to what one might expect, South Korean interest in these capabilities date back to the 1970s. In 1975, the government sought a $2 million purchase from Lockheed Corporation for manufacturing facilities for solid-fueled rocket motors (useable for either ballistic missiles or civilian space launch vehicles). In 1979 the ROK also inquired into obtaining U.S. intermediate range ballistic missile technology from the Atlas Centaur missile. These efforts tapered off in the 1980s but have resurfaced as part of the space program (see Peter Hayes, "Early Indicators: ROK Long Range Missile Capabilities," Nautilus Institute Special Report, 17 November 1999).
91. Kwak and Joo. "Military Cooperation," 171.
92. The example here is Japan, which spent billions of dollars on the flawed H-II rocket program.
93. U.S. nonproliferation official's comments quoted in the New York Times, 15 January 2000 (Sims, "South Korea Plans to Begin Rocket Program"); also see Hayes, "Early Indicators."
94. U.S. nonproliferation official's comments quoted in the New York Times, 15 January 2000 (Sims, "South Korea Plans to Begin Rocket Program"); also see Hayes, "Early Indicators."
95. U.S. nonproliferation official's comments quoted in the New York Times, 15 January 2000 (Sims, "South Korea Plans to Begin Rocket Program"); also see Hayes, "Early Indicators."
96. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
97. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic
98. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
99. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
100. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
101. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
102. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
103. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
104. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
105. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
106. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
107. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
108. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
109. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), 61. For some of the pioneering works in the 1970s, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yizhak Klein, "The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, 4 (December 1989): 453-490; and Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Good conceptual overviews of this field of study include, Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (New York: D.C. Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64; Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), ch. 1; Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters 14, 4 (Winter 1984): 26-33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); William Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martins, 1999), 323-338; and John Duffield, "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies, " International Security 24, 1 (Summer 1999).
110. Rothschild, "Culture and War,"in The Lessons, 69; also Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 11-12; and Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961), 48.
111. Rothschild, "Culture and War,"in The Lessons, 69; also Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 11-12; and Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961), 48.
112. Rothschild, "Culture and War,"in The Lessons, 69; also Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 11-12; and Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961), 48.
113. Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," Security Studies 3, 1 (Autumn, 1993): 44-45; and Alagappa, Asian Security Practice, 625-626.
114. Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," Security Studies 3, 1 (Autumn, 1993): 44-45; and Alagappa, Asian Security Practice, 625-626.
115. Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 12; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 36-43; Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," Review of International Studies 25 (1999); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 52-55. This analysis does not deny the analytical shortcomings of the strategic culture appraoch. Among these are questions with regard to which agents and narratives dominate within any given society (Macmillan, Booth, and Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 9-12) and problems of measurement, operationalizanon, and falsifiability (Kupchan, Vulnerability, 25-28; Michael Desch, "Culture Clash," International Security 23, 1 [Summer 1998]: 149-150; and Duffield, "Isms and Schism," 156-158). Done poorly, strategic cultural analyses can reinforce cognitive rigidities regarding a state's behavior; however, done correctly, such analyses can provide more empathetic and accurate understandings of behavior (Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 63-64).
116. Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 12; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 36-43; Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," Review of International Studies 25 (1999); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 52-55. This analysis does not deny the analytical shortcomings of the strategic culture appraoch. Among these are questions with regard to which agents and narratives dominate within any given society (Macmillan, Booth, and Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 9-12) and problems of measurement, operationalizanon, and falsifiability (Kupchan, Vulnerability, 25-28; Michael Desch, "Culture Clash," International Security 23, 1 [Summer 1998]: 149-150; and Duffield, "Isms and Schism," 156-158). Done poorly, strategic cultural analyses can reinforce cognitive rigidities regarding a state's behavior; however, done correctly, such analyses can provide more empathetic and accurate understandings of behavior (Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 63-64).
117. Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 12; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 36-43; Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," Review of International Studies 25 (1999); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 52-55. This analysis does not deny the analytical shortcomings of the strategic culture appraoch. Among these are questions with regard to which agents and narratives dominate within any given society (Macmillan, Booth, and Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 9-12) and problems of measurement, operationalizanon, and falsifiability (Kupchan, Vulnerability, 25-28; Michael Desch, "Culture Clash," International Security 23, 1 [Summer 1998]: 149-150; and Duffield, "Isms and Schism," 156-158). Done poorly, strategic cultural analyses can reinforce cognitive rigidities regarding a state's behavior; however, done correctly, such analyses can provide more empathetic and accurate understandings of behavior (Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 63-64).
118. Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 12; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 36-43; Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," Review of International Studies 25 (1999); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 52-55. This analysis does not deny the analytical shortcomings of the strategic culture appraoch. Among these are questions with regard to which agents and narratives dominate within any given society (Macmillan, Booth, and Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 9-12) and problems of measurement, operationalizanon, and falsifiability (Kupchan, Vulnerability, 25-28; Michael Desch, "Culture Clash," International Security 23, 1 [Summer 1998]: 149-150; and Duffield, "Isms and Schism," 156-158). Done poorly, strategic cultural analyses can reinforce cognitive rigidities regarding a state's behavior; however, done correctly, such analyses can provide more empathetic and accurate understandings of behavior (Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 63-64).
119. Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 12; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 36-43; Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," Review of International Studies 25 (1999); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 52-55. This analysis does not deny the analytical shortcomings of the strategic culture appraoch. Among these are questions with regard to which agents and narratives dominate within any given society (Macmillan, Booth, and Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 9-12) and problems of measurement, operationalizanon, and falsifiability (Kupchan, Vulnerability, 25-28; Michael Desch, "Culture Clash," International Security 23, 1 [Summer 1998]: 149-150; and Duffield, "Isms and Schism," 156-158). Done poorly, strategic cultural analyses can reinforce cognitive rigidities regarding a state's behavior; however, done correctly, such analyses can provide more empathetic and accurate understandings of behavior (Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 63-64).
120. Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 12; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 36-43; Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," Review of International Studies 25 (1999); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 52-55. This analysis does not deny the analytical shortcomings of the strategic culture appraoch. Among these are questions with regard to which agents and narratives dominate within any given society (Macmillan, Booth, and Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 9-12) and problems of measurement, operationalizanon, and falsifiability (Kupchan, Vulnerability, 25-28; Michael Desch, "Culture Clash," International Security 23, 1 [Summer 1998]: 149-150; and Duffield, "Isms and Schism," 156-158). Done poorly, strategic cultural analyses can reinforce cognitive rigidities regarding a state's behavior; however, done correctly, such analyses can provide more empathetic and accurate understandings of behavior (Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 63-64).
121. Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 12; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 36-43; Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," Review of International Studies 25 (1999); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 52-55. This analysis does not deny the analytical shortcomings of the strategic culture appraoch. Among these are questions with regard to which agents and narratives dominate within any given society (Macmillan, Booth, and Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 9-12) and problems of measurement, operationalizanon, and falsifiability (Kupchan, Vulnerability, 25-28; Michael Desch, "Culture Clash," International Security 23, 1 [Summer 1998]: 149-150; and Duffield, "Isms and Schism," 156-158). Done poorly, strategic cultural analyses can reinforce cognitive rigidities regarding a state's behavior; however, done correctly, such analyses can provide more empathetic and accurate understandings of behavior (Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 63-64).
122. Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 12; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 36-43; Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," Review of International Studies 25 (1999); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 52-55. This analysis does not deny the analytical shortcomings of the strategic culture appraoch. Among these are questions with regard to which agents and narratives dominate within any given society (Macmillan, Booth, and Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 9-12) and problems of measurement, operationalizanon, and falsifiability (Kupchan, Vulnerability, 25-28; Michael Desch, "Culture Clash," International Security 23, 1 [Summer 1998]: 149-150; and Duffield, "Isms and Schism," 156-158). Done poorly, strategic cultural analyses can reinforce cognitive rigidities regarding a state's behavior; however, done correctly, such analyses can provide more empathetic and accurate understandings of behavior (Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 63-64).
123. Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 12; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 36-43; Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," Review of International Studies 25 (1999); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 52-55. This analysis does not deny the analytical shortcomings of the strategic culture appraoch. Among these are questions with regard to which agents and narratives dominate within any given society (Macmillan, Booth, and Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Strategic Cultures, 9-12) and problems of measurement, operationalizanon, and falsifiability (Kupchan, Vulnerability, 25-28; Michael Desch, "Culture Clash," International Security 23, 1 [Summer 1998]: 149-150; and Duffield, "Isms and Schism," 156-158). Done poorly, strategic cultural analyses can reinforce cognitive rigidities regarding a state's behavior; however, done correctly, such analyses can provide more empathetic and accurate understandings of behavior (Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 63-64).
124. I choose here to employ a synthesis of Johnston's and Ball's templates as they are most useful as a first cut at understanding Korean strategic culture. This is by no means a comprehensive treatment of what other authors have offered. For other frameworks, see Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons, 53-72; Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region"; and Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective."
125. I choose here to employ a synthesis of Johnston's and Ball's templates as they are most useful as a first cut at understanding Korean strategic culture. This is by no means a comprehensive treatment of what other authors have offered. For other frameworks, see Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons, 53-72; Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region"; and Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective."
126. I choose here to employ a synthesis of Johnston's and Ball's templates as they are most useful as a first cut at understanding Korean strategic culture. This is by no means a comprehensive treatment of what other authors have offered. For other frameworks, see Rothschild, "Culture and War," in The Lessons, 53-72; Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region"; and Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective."
127. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 61. Johnston's reference is to the Chinese case and is supported by a rich and detailed reading of classic Chinese military texts. While there has been growing interest in strategic culture applications to Asia, there has been virtually nothing written about Korea. The argument here is not that Korean strategic culture is wholly distinct from a general Asian strategic culture; instead, the particular traits I describe are pronounced in the Korean case and the most relevant analytically in terms of drawing out propositions about behavior.
128. See James William Morley, "The Dynamics of the Korean Connection," in The U.S.-South Korean Alliance, eds. Gerald Curtis and Sung-joo Man (Lexington, MA: DC Heath, 1983), 7-30.
129. See Chung-in Moon, "South Korea: Recasting Security Paradigms," in Asian Security Practice, ed. Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 264. Moon defines this metastructure as a cognitive map guiding the decision-makers' assessment of threats, policy formulation, and policy implementation (p. 265).
130. Ministry of National Defense, Mukyong Ch'ilsu (Seven Books of Military Strategy) (Seoul: MND Office of Military History, 1987); and Kang Choi, "Korea: A Tradition of Peace," in Strategic Cultures, 100.
131. Ministry of National Defense, Mukyong Ch'ilsu (Seven Books of Military Strategy) (Seoul: MND Office of Military History, 1987); and Kang Choi, "Korea: A Tradition of Peace," in Strategic Cultures, 100.
132. For example, philosophers have argued that Korea's externally unforgiving situation has given rise to a fatalism-pessimism-paranoia complex in domestic political culture. See Un-Tae Kim, Han'guk Chongch'iron (Korean Political Theory) (Seoul: Pakyongsa, 1994).
133. On the links between strategic culture and civil-military relations, see Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific," 63-66; Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures, 333-335; and Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Soldier and the State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).
134. On the links between strategic culture and civil-military relations, see Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific," 63-66; Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures, 333-335; and Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Soldier and the State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).
135. On the links between strategic culture and civil-military relations, see Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific," 63-66; Tow, "Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective," in Strategic Cultures, 333-335; and Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Soldier and the State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).
136. Military bases sit at the center of major cities; military conscription is part of every Korean male's life (often during impressionable years); and social relationships from the classroom to the boardroom operate in a military culture of hierarchy, respect, and obedience.
137. On this point, see Victor Cha, "Politics and Democracy under the Kim Young Sam Government," Asian Surrey 33, 9 (Sept. 1993): 849-863; and Jon Huer, Marching Orders: The Role of the Military in South Korea's "Economic Miracle" 1961-71 (New York: Greenwood, 1989).
138. On this point, see Victor Cha, "Politics and Democracy under the Kim Young Sam Government," Asian Surrey 33, 9 (Sept. 1993): 849-863; and Jon Huer, Marching Orders: The Role of the Military in South Korea's "Economic Miracle" 1961-71 (New York: Greenwood, 1989).
139. See Soon Hyun Kim, Kunsa Munhwa (Military Culture) (Seoul: Yujisojok, 1990), 298-333. Those with a wider historical lense might disagree with this characterization, arguing that the dominance of the military in Korea in the post-1945 era was an aberration amid centuries of nonmilitary dynastic rule (see Choi, "Korea: A Tradition of Peace," in Strategic Cultures, 93-110). This criticism is not factually inaccurate, but it does not consider: (1) Both the Koryo and Yi dynasties were created by military officers who then emasculated the military institutions and purged their challengers to consolidate power (hence the military was far from irrelevant to dynastic Korea); and (2) the impact that Korea's experience in the late-1800s - as a militarily weak country subjugated to balance of power politics-had on subsequent Korean thinking.
140. See Soon Hyun Kim, Kunsa Munhwa (Military Culture) (Seoul: Yujisojok, 1990), 298-333. Those with a wider historical lense might disagree with this characterization, arguing that the dominance of the military in Korea in the post-1945 era was an aberration amid centuries of nonmilitary dynastic rule (see Choi, "Korea: A Tradition of Peace," in Strategic Cultures, 93-110). This criticism is not factually inaccurate, but it does not consider: (1) Both the Koryo and Yi dynasties were created by military officers who then emasculated the military institutions and purged their challengers to consolidate power (hence the military was far from irrelevant to dynastic Korea); and (2) the impact that Korea's experience in the late-1800s - as a militarily weak country subjugated to balance of power politics-had on subsequent Korean thinking.
141. Methodologically, this is an important point. Once cannot merely identify the sources of strategic culture and presume these guide security choices. Mechanisms must exist by which the sources are "transmitted" or mapped onto the current cognitive templates of decision-makers.
142. Seong Min Yoo, "Korea's Economy in the 20th Century," Millennium-Emerge Monthly, November 1999 (in Korean): 60.
143. Choon-Kun Lee, "War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula" Korea Military Review (in Korean), 10 January 2000, reprinted in Korea Focus 8, 2 (March-April 2000), 17.
144. Choon-Kun Lee, "War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula" Korea Military Review (in Korean), 10 January 2000, reprinted in Korea Focus 8, 2 (March-April 2000), 17.
145. Lee, "War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula," 17, 21. On "time's arrow," see Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," International Security 16, 3 (1991/2).
146. Lee, "War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula," 17, 21. On "time's arrow," see Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," International Security 16, 3 (1991/2).
147. Young-Oh Kang, Han'guk Kunsachonryak Saron (On the Military Strategy of Korea) (Seoul Yunkyung, 1991), 71-84; and Choi, "Korea-A Tradition of Peace," in Strategic Cultures, 94.
148. Young-Oh Kang, Han'guk Kunsachonryak Saron (On the Military Strategy of Korea) (Seoul Yunkyung, 1991), 71-84; and Choi, "Korea-A Tradition of Peace," in Strategic Cultures, 94.
149. Choi, "Korea-A Tradition of Peace," in Strategic Cultures, 96; and Kim, Han'guk Chongch'iron, 229-31.
150. Choi, "Korea-A Tradition of Peace," in Strategic Cultures, 96; and Kim, Han'guk Chongch'iron, 229-31.
151. Moon, "South Korea: Recasting Security Paradigms," 264 and 270.
152. Proceedings of the Sejong National Strategy Forum, "Korea's Opportunities and Challenges in the 21st Century: What is the Proper Strategy?" in Sejong News 15 (Summer 2000); and Lee "Korea's Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War," Korea Focus 7, 6 (November-December 1999), 13-15.
153. Proceedings of the Sejong National Strategy Forum, "Korea's Opportunities and Challenges in the 21st Century: What is the Proper Strategy?" in Sejong News 15 (Summer 2000); and Lee "Korea's Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War," Korea Focus 7, 6 (November-December 1999), 13-15.
154. In-Taek Hyun, "Seoul-Washington Relations in the 21st Century," Joongang Ilbo 29 (November 1999) (in Korean); and Lee, "Korea's Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era."
155. In-Taek Hyun, "Seoul-Washington Relations in the 21st Century," Joongang Ilbo 29 (November 1999) (in Korean); and Lee, "Korea's Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era."
156. Choi, "Korea - A Tradition of Peace," in Strategic Cultures, 103.
157. Washington Post, 30 August 2000 ("South Korea Says North Wants U.S. Troops to Stay").